Seminar: Using fees to reduce bed-blocking: A game between hospitals and care providers
By: Snorre Kverndokk, Frisch
Sted: HiOA, Pilestredet 35, rom: Pi531 Dato og tid: torsdag 21. september 2017 kl. 13.00 - 14.00
Abstract: In several countries, a fee is introduced to reduce bed-blocking in hospitals. This paper studies the implications of this fee for the decisions of the hospitals and care providers. We first introduce a Stackelberg game where the hospital is the leader and the care provider is the follower. The policy reduces the discharge date at the hospital, but does not necessarily lead to less bed-blocking as this depends on the total hospital services and discharge date before the reform. We test the results with data from the Norwegian Coordination reform introduced in 2012, and find that the reform led to a large reduction in bed-blocking. The direct effect was even larger than a naïve comparison would suggest since the hospitals also on average started to report the patients to be ready to be discharged earlier than before the reform. Confronted with the theoretical predictions, this points in the direction of a high level of total hospital services before the reform.