Norwegian Party Assistance in Tanzania
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Erik Henningsen and Einar Braathen

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NIBR Report 2009:16
Preface

This report presents the results of an evaluation carried out for the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support (NDS) of three political party assistance projects implemented in Tanzania by Høyre and Senterpartiet. The project leader has been Einar Braathen, and the principal researcher and author of the report has been Erik Henningsen.

The team is grateful to Eva Langslet and Sylvia Eide, coordinators at the NDS, for their facilitation of the evaluation and assistance to the team. Thanks are also rendered to informants from Høyre, Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen for their frankness in responding to questions from the team and help in the preparations of the field study. The team has appreciated the detailed comments on the first draft of the report from Senterpartiet and Høyre and the partners in Tanzania. The team has tried to accommodate all relevant comments into the final version of the report. Nonetheless, the authors alone bear the responsibility for the report, its recommendations and conclusions.

We are grateful to Mr. Mudasia Kadasia, who was the Kiswahili interpreter and assistant during the field work, and to all informants in Dar-es-Dalaam, Mwanza and Magu for their hospitality, openness and spirit of cooperation. Finally, we are grateful to Peris Jones and Gro Sandkjær Hansen for comments on a draft version of the report.

Oslo, June 2009

Marit Haug
Research Director
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</td>
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<td>CODRA</td>
<td>Community Development and Relief Agency of Tanzania</td>
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<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
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<td>IDU</td>
<td>International Democratic Union</td>
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<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support</td>
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<td>NIBR</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMD</td>
<td>Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACCO</td>
<td>Savings and credit co-operative society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCD</td>
<td>Tanzania Centre for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>United Democratic Party</td>
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Summary

Erik Henningsen and Einar Braathen  
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The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support was established by the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in 2002, as a politically neutral non-profit organisation with the aim of strengthening the Norwegian foreign policy goal of securing good governance through the promotion of multiparty democracy and free elections in other parts of the world. More specifically, the objective of NDS has been to facilitate the use of the experience and competence of Norwegian political parties in the development of strong and stable democracies in countries in the South.

This report is an evaluation of three projects of international party assistance that are implemented in Tanzania with funding from NDS. Two of the projects which are considered in the report are carried out in Magu district in the Mwanza region in the North-Western part of Tanzania. Haki na Demokrasia (Rights and Democracy) is a cooperation project between the Norwegian Senterpartiet (Centre Party) and the local branches of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) in Magu district. Vijana na Ushawishi (Youth and Influence) is a cooperation project between Senterungdommen (Centre Party Youth) and the youth wings of the CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu. The third project considered in the report, Democracy in Tanzania, is a cooperation-project between the Norwegian Conservative Party (Høyre) and CHADEMA.
The projects that are implemented in Magu district by the Senterpartiet and senterungdommen are described and analysed in chapter 2 of the report. *Haki na Demokrasia* has been running since 2005. The project targets the members of the district branches of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu and employs the study circle methodology to impart knowledge about issues of rights and democracy to project participants. The long term objective of the project is to strengthen civil society through capacity building of grassroots leaders from the party organisations, youth and women organisations in order to enhance unity, democracy and sustainable development in Magu district. *Vijana na Ushawishi*, which started in 2006, target the young membership of the political parties. The long term objective of the project is to strengthen the position of youth within political parties and in Tanzanian democracy.

The core activity in both projects is the study circle groups with local members from CCM, CUF and CHADEMA. The study circle groups are established by facilitators who have received training at seminars with the Norwegian project partners. The groups meet on a continuous basis at the facilitator’s home location. At the end of 2008 120 facilitators have received training as a part of the *Haki* project and 40 persons have received similar training in the *Vijana* project. Apart from the activities of the study circle groups, project activities consist of seminars with the Norwegian project partners, production of study material for the study circle groups and study trips to Norway. The report notes that the frequency of visits to Tanzania by the Norwegian project partners is high and points out that, given the overlaps in objectives and target groups, the creation of two projects in Magu district was unnecessary.

The projects seem to be well known to representatives of the political-administrative system in Magu. In group interviews with project participants it was reported that the projects have affected local communities in Magu positively in three ways. *Firstly*, the projects are reported to have improved the working relations between the political parties and made it possible for members of different parties to discuss matters of community development in a constructive atmosphere. *Secondly*, the projects are reported to have increased the political participation of women and youth. *Thirdly*, the projects are reported to have improved project participants understanding of matters of good leadership and good governance.
In Magu it is common to expect payment for participation in development projects. According to the study circle group facilitators interviewed for this study, it is difficult to recruit members to a project for educational purposes only. As an incentive for recruitment, most of the study circle groups interviewed for the evaluation engages in economic activities, such as micro-credit funds. These activities contribute to the sustainability of the project, but may also give study circle groups an exclusive character.

An important incentive for participation in the project is the allowance payment participants receive for attending seminars with the Norwegian project partners. Reflecting on the issue of allowances, the report notes that this may create unrealistic expectations about the material rewards of project participation, that it creates problems of free riding on project resources, which in turn enhances the need for monitoring activities, and that it elevates actual or perceived gate keepers of project resources into positions of power. The report notes project participants’ interest for the study trips to Norway, which seems to be an important incentive for recruitment to the project, and that the projects seem to have promoted a glorification of Norway as a socio-economic ideal. The report further notices that there is rivalry and suspicion between project participants with regards to the distribution of these rewards in the projects.

The *Haki* and *Vijana* projects are administered locally by an NGO which is owned by an MP from Magu district. The MP has a central role in the projects, formally as the project coordinator and symbolically as a provider of the project. In Tanzania, development projects are common vehicles for the dispensing of political patronage to the poor. Reflecting on this circumstance, the report points out that the use of the NGO in the projects is unfortunate. The report further notes that the second largest opposition party in Magu district and a rival to the MP, United Democratic Party (UDP), has to a large extent been excluded from the project.

The study circle approach is potentially a low-cost method of education that can be appropriated by people with little formal education, but the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects have taken on a character as parallel structures and are not sustainable in their
present mode of operation. If the Norwegian financial support is withdrawn, it is likely that the project activities in Magu will come to an end.

Given the problematic features of the projects, continued funding of Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects is not recommended. If similar projects are to be implemented in other districts in Tanzania it is important that they give more emphasis to the study circle methodology’s potential as a decentralised and low-cost educational approach, that clear criteria of eligibility for participation by political parties are developed, and that the project avoids contributing to the fragmentation of local governance structures.

Chapter 3 in the report describes and analyses the Democracy in Tanzania project, which started in 2006. Democracy in Tanzania is smaller than the projects implemented in Magu district in terms of its budget, and unlike those it is a bilateral project of “sisterparty” cooperation. The objective of the project is to help CHADEMA become a good, decent and effective opposition party. More specifically, the goals of the project are to encourage more women to contest for positions in the party and in Parliament, and to produce a larger group of young aspiring leaders within CHADEMA. Project activities mainly consist of seminars. In 2008 Høyre visited Tanzania two times together with the Swedish Moderatarna. On both occasions the Scandinavian team gave two seminars for youth and two seminars for women. Since 2007 Høyre has been running a standard seminar concept featuring general tools for party work. The main teaching components of the seminars are: recruitment of members, communication skills, campaigning skills and SWOT-analysis. In addition to the seminar activities, the project includes study trips to Norway for CHADEMA officials.

In interviews with party members who had participated in seminars and party officials at the CHADEMA headquarter it was reported that the skills and knowledge conveyed at the seminars are relevant and useful. It was reported that the seminars are important occasions for networking among party members and that they strengthen the cohesion of the party’s membership. Party officials also reported that relations with foreign political parties
lend prestige to CHADEMA and may be helpful in terms of voter support.

In interviews with CHADEMA officials it was pointed out that the Høyre’s standard seminar concept has been appropriated by resource persons in CHADEMA, and that new seminar concepts should be developed for future visits. In particular, the party has a need for training of electoral candidates in the run up to the next elections. This would imply a shift of focus away from women and youth. Also, the party has needs for research and policy advice, assistance for the development of the informational infrastructure of the party and for organisational development.

In interviews with CHADEMA officials it was reported that there is a lack of continuous communication with Høyre and that project activities tend to be of an ad hoc nature. As a result of this, the project tends to take on the character of a series of events rather than a cumulative process. The short time frame for planning of activities makes it difficult to ensure that the right people are invited to seminars and to coordinate the activities with CHADEMAs engagements with other providers of party assistance. It was also pointed out in interviews that study trips to Norway may be of dubious value to the party organisation unless there are follow up activities in CHADEMA afterwards.

The report recommends that Høyre and CHADEMA develop yearly activity plans for the project, and that Høyre establishes a project team with representatives from the women and youth movements of the party. It is further recommended that project activities are given the form of training of trainers and that written manuals are developed for the seminars. Finally, it is recommended that study trips to Norway should not be a part of the project activities.
1 Introduction

In November 2008 the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) was commissioned by the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support (NDS) to carry out an evaluation of three party assistance projects that are implemented in Tanzania with funding from NDS. This report documents the study which was carried out by NIBR, presents our analysis of the three projects and makes recommendations with regards to future project activities. Two of the projects which are considered in the report are carried out in Magu district in the Mwanza region in the North-Western part of Tanzania. *Haki na Demokrasia* (Rights and Democracy) is a cooperation project between the Norwegian Senterpartiet (Centre Party) and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) in Magu district. The project target the members of the district branches of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu and employ the study circle methodology to impart knowledge about issues of rights and democracy to project participants. *Vijana na Ushavishi* (Youth and Influence) is a cooperation project between Senterungdommen (Centre Party Youth) and the youth wings of the CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu. The third project considered in the report, *Democracy in Tanzania*, is a cooperation-project between the Norwegian Conservative Party (Høyre) and CHADEMA. In the terms of reference for the project (Appendix 2) it is specified that the evaluation should illuminate the following questions with regards to the three NDS-projects in Tanzania:

1. Does the projects contribute to making CHADEMA a more effective political party and to strengthening grassroots influence in CCM, CHADEMA and CUF? With regards to the last question, the evaluation should consider the
usefulness of the study circle approach employed by Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen.

2. Do NDS and its partners have routines to ensure quality and effectiveness in the projects, including budgetary and financial accuracy?

In accordance with the terms of reference the principal goal of the evaluation is to promote learning from project experience among partners involved in NDS-projects. It is further stated in the terms of reference that the evaluation should take local socio-political contextual circumstances into account. In line with this, the project proposal on which the evaluation is based (Appendix 3) states that the study aims to identify and describe mechanisms that contribute to the realisation of the projects objectives or that works to subvert them. Thus the aim of the evaluation is not only to account for the positive and negative effects of the projects, but to promote understanding of how and why these effects have been brought about. The project proposal further states that the two projects that are implemented in Magu district is the main focus of the study. One reason for this choice of focus is that the Magu-projects are larger than the third project in terms of budget size and in terms of the number of activities and people involved. Another reason is that the projects in Magu employ an innovative approach to party-assistance, the effects of which are interesting to document.

1.1 The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support

The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support was established by the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in 2002, as a politically neutral non-profit organisation with the aim of strengthening the Norwegian foreign policy goal of securing good governance through the promotion of multiparty democracy and free elections in other parts of the world. More specifically, the objective of NDS has been to facilitate the use of the experience and competence of Norwegian political parties in the development of strong and stable democracies in countries in the South.
In 2006 the centre was reorganised and became an independent organisation consisting of a Council, a Board and a Secretariat. The Council has consisted of the party secretaries and two other representatives from all the political parties represented in Parliament. The Board has been made up of representatives of the political parties and three independent experts and convened two to four times a year to consider and approve applications for project funding. The secretariat, which is staffed with two persons, has been responsible for the day to day activities of the centre, facilitation of the activities of the Board, and processing of project applications. In 2008 NDS provided funding for 16 party assistance projects, which were carried out in seven countries in Africa, Asia and Latin-America. NDS has been fully financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In May 2009 the NDS Council decided to shut down the centre. At the same time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signalled that the Norwegian government will continue to fund a programme of international party assistance.

### 1.2 International party assistance

Projects funded by NDS belong to the subfield of international democracy assistance which is commonly referred to as party assistance.\(^1\) Programmes of international party assistance have been in existence since the 1960s, but as Kumar (2004) notes, the expansion of this field of activities has mainly taken place in the post-cold war era in conjunction with the wave of transitions to multiparty democracy in developing countries. The growth in programmes of party assistance ties in with the emphasis on policies of good governance among donors in the same period.

In liberal democracies political parties have historically taken on important roles of interest articulation, interest aggregation and control over government. Political parties in developing countries often fail to fulfil some or all of these roles. They are often weak in

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\(^1\) Party assistance can be defined as “any type of international assistance geared towards individual parties or the party system as a whole, with the purpose of strengthening democracy in a given country” (Caton 2007: 6).
terms of internal organisation and internal democracy. They may lack a social foundation and be undermined as institutions by corruption and informal politics of clientilism. The principal aim of programmes of party assistance is to strengthen political parties and to improve the legal and regulatory environment in which they operate (Kumar 2004). Party assistance focus on areas such as organisational development of parties, internal democracy within parties, election campaigning, political participation of disadvantaged groups and multiparty collaborations.

Donor support to political parties is controversial, mainly because it can be seen as interference in sovereign national politics. Party assistance therefore seldom takes the form of direct financial or commodity aid to political parties. It is provided in the form of capacity building and training activities, but may also take the forms of technical assistance, policy advice, polling and research assistance, and study trips. As this indicates, party assistance tends to be premised on a belief in the power of dialogue and the imparting of knowledge as means of bringing about political change.

According to Amundsen (2007), donor support for political parties is channelled through at least 32 European and two American party-affiliated organisations. Among these are single party-based foundations, like the German Stiftungen, whose programmes of party assistance mainly take the form of bilateral sister-party arrangements. Another type of actors is the American single party-affiliated NGOs National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), which operates mainly on a multiparty basis abroad. A third category of actors are multiparty based NGOs like the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), which implements projects of both a bilateral and a multiparty nature in its cooperating countries.

The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support belongs to the last category, but unlike NIMD its role has largely been restricted to the funding of projects of party assistance. With two exceptions, the projects funded by NDS have all been implemented by Norwegian political parties and local partners in the South. In 2007 about two thirds of NDS’ budget was spent on bilateral project and the rest on multiparty projects. The part of the budget which was spent on multiparty projects was increased in 2008 (Kjøstvedt
et al 2008). In terms of the scale of its programme, NDS hardly compares to any of the abovementioned organisations. In 2008 NDS’ total budget was about EUR 1.0 million. In 2004-5 NDI, IRI and the two largest German foundations all spent more than twenty million Euros on party assistance, while NIMDs expenditure was EUR 6.1 millions (Caton 2007).

1.3 Challenges to democratisation in Tanzania

After nearly thirty years of one-party rule, multiparty politics was reintroduced in Tanzania in 1992. The ‘second wave’ of political liberalisation in Africa in the 1990s was in most places strongly induced by international donor pressure, but in Tanzania the transition to multiparty politics came about mainly as a result of domestic political processes. The call for political pluralism emerged from within the ruling CCM party, what some commentators view as a tactical attempt to secure the party’s future dominance in the country (Pietla, Ojalammi-Wamai and Laakso 2002). In the wake of the constitutional reform, efforts have been made by the Tanzanian government to separate the civil services from the structures of the CCM-party and to achieve devolution of political power through a local government reform programme. Unlike some of its neighbouring countries, ethnicity plays a modest role in Tanzanian politics. The policy of national unity which was pursued by CCM under the one-party era has been carried forward in the multiparty era through a ban on regional and religious parties. In other respects Tanzania conforms to contemporary patterns of politics in African countries.

The political system in Tanzania is generally characterised by centralised structures of decision making, which gives people at the grassroots level little scope for exerting influence. Elected local political bodies, in particular at the sub-district level, have traditionally been assigned a role as implementers of decisions taken at higher levels of government. In the governing tradition of

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2 Personal communication with the secretariat
3 One important exception to this is Zanzibar, where communal identities is a major source of political mobilisation In the last two elections Zanzibar has been rocked by extensive political violence.
CCM, the emphasis has been on military-style mobilisation of the people to effectuate directives from the central government, rather than on democratic participation. As with other revolutionary parties that view themselves as the champions of the interests of the downtrodden masses, the immediate strategy is not “to involve the people in prolonged discussion about whether or not to terminate their misery but to move them to act in a well-directed and disciplined manner to attack the enemy or the problem as they see it” (Mihyo 2003: 77. Italics in original). To achieve a shift in orientation from mobilisation to participation in matters of government is accordingly a major challenge of democratisation. The abovementioned Local Government Reform Programme can be seen as a step in this direction (Braathen et al 2005). But as Shivjy and Peters (2000) notes in this regard, it is ironic that the reform programme should target the district level of government, which was put in place in the 1980s with the intention of strengthening the central government’s grip over local governments.

Another challenge of democratisation in Tanzania is the proliferation of politics of clientilism. Since the opening of the country to the market economy in the 1980s, politics in Tanzania have increasingly come to rely on informal networks which facilitate personal “deals” rather than on impersonal rules and institutions. As Hyden (2005) notes, more than a cause of corruption, clientilism has become the very backbone on which Tanzania’s power structure depends. As such it affects politics at all levels of government, from the national down to the local. In the one-party era individual Members of Parliament were highly dependant on the resources of the CCM party to retain power in their local constituencies, and thus tended to act as agents of the centre at the periphery. With the shift to multipartyism, CCM is no longer able to provide its MPs with the necessary resources to stay in power and as a result of this, a change in the power structure of CCM has occurred:

“First, it has increasingly become dependant on leaders who can deliver constituencies to Parliament irrespective of their ideology or record in terms of transparency. Second, its MPs have built patron-client networks that help them to raise funds and retain support in their constituencies. Most of these
networks are aimed at controlling not only power but also resources and business opportunities. As the CCM becomes increasingly dependant on these networks, its government cannot avoid giving preferential treatment to its patrons in the areas of import permits, land allocation, public contract and licenses” (Mihyo 2003: 87).

In a recent study from the Mwanza region, Lange (2008) notes that growing class polarisation since the 1980s have served to amplify tendencies of clientilism in local politics. As a consequence of this, women and youth, who are generally less economically resourceful than men, are effectively excluded from competition for political positions.

This situation can be interpreted as an invitation for party assistance. Under such circumstances, international efforts to strengthen political parties as democratic institutions can be a way of enlarging the space of political participation for ordinary citizens. But this can also be seen as a futile endeavour. A main criticism of party assistance, Kumar (2004) notes, is that if what really matters in politics is individual politicians, it is pointless to strengthen political parties. Support to political parties may in effect turn out to be support to powerful individuals. As we shall see in the pages that follow, these questions are highly relevant with regards to the NDS projects in Tanzania as well.

1.4 Fieldwork and method

Given the evaluation’s aim of stimulating learning from project experience, we have employed an explorative research approach. Research questions and themes have been allowed to emerge in and through our dialogue with informants.

The evaluation is based on two types of information sources. Firstly, a desk study of project documents provided to us by NDS and project partners in Norway and Tanzania. The second source of information is semi-structured interviews with persons who are directly or indirectly involved in the projects in Tanzania and Norway (see Appendix 1. for a list of interviewees). In this regard, the study relies on a combination of personal interviews and group
interviews. Most of the personal interviews we carried out were framed as conversations on the basis of a list of questions about the projects we brought to the interviews. Apart from soliciting factual information about the projects, we encouraged informants to reflect on how the projects have affected themselves as individuals, their political party organisations and the local communities to which they belong, and to reflect on possible problems and shortcomings of the projects. In the group interviews we tried to engage interviewees in discussions about similar questions.

Fieldwork in Tanzania was carried out over a period of two weeks in January 2009. In Dar es Salaam we interviewed party officials at CHADEMA’s headquarter, the director of Tanzania Centre for Multiparty Democracy (TCD), party officials from United Democratic Party (UDP) and a representative of the Royal Norwegian Embassy. In many of these interviews we collected viewpoints and information about the projects in Magu. The main focus of most of the interviews we carried out at the CHADEMA headquarter was the Democracy in Tanzania project. In addition to discussions with party officials involved in the project, we interviewed four CHADEMA members who had participated in project activities. These informants were selected by CHADEMA on our request. During the interviews a CHADEMA employee acted as interpreter. In the other interviews we carried out in Dar es Salaam, communication with informants was in English or Norwegian.

In Magu district we carried out interviews with the local steering committees of the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects and members of nine study circle groups from the two projects. We interviewed the District Commissioner, the District Planning Officer and the District Executive Director in Magu about the projects, as well as the chairpersons of the district party branches of CHADEMA and UDP. In six of the villages where we interviewed study circle groups, we carried out interviews with local leaders (District executive officers, chairpersons of school committees, chairperson of Village Council). In Mwanza town we interviewed the regional secretaries of CCM and CHADEMA and a representative of CUF. Here we also interviewed representatives of the NGO Community Development and Relief Agency of Tanzania (CODRA). CODRA made practical arrangements for
most of the interviews we carried out in Magu and Mwanza and escorted us to the villages where the study circle groups are located. In all of these interviews communication was translated from Kiswahili to English by an interpreter employed by NIBR.

The selection of study circle groups for interviewing was made by the members of the steering committees of the two projects, who were instructed by us to select only study circle groups that are well functioning. Our reason for choosing this “best case approach” was to avoid criticism that the conclusions we arrive at in the report might stem from having met with the “wrong” informants. The meetings with the study circle groups took place in school buildings or outdoors where the groups normally meet. The number of persons who were present during these meetings ranged from more than twenty to four (not counting the interviewers). In the two first villages we carried out a group interview with all the members of the study circle group, group interviews with three women and three male members of the group, and a personal interview with the study circle group facilitator. For practical reasons, the rest of the meetings featured only a group interview with the members of the study circle group and a personal interview with the facilitator.

In most cases, the project participants appeared to be familiar with the group interview as a type of social situation. This may be due to the fact that meetings of a similar nature have been held on several occasions in connection with monitoring missions of the Norwegian project partners. In our talks with the Norwegian project partners, it was repeatedly underscored that, in their experience, project participants in Magu tend to “only tell you what they think you will hear”, and that this poses a challenge with regards to obtaining credible information. We were left with a similar impression in the group interviews we carried out in Magu. Here it was difficult to engage project participants in discussions and we hardly ever encountered any open disagreements about assessments of the projects among interviewees. For the most part, project participants made approving statements about the projects. Most of these comments were centred on a few themes only, which made the responses we solicited from the different groups quite predictable. On several occasions, project participants voiced these “standard” assessments even when we inquired about different matters. This is not to suggest that the statements were
untrue, but rather that there was a lack of spontaneous reflection and nuanced viewpoints in the responses we got from project participants in group interviews. The “front stage” (Goffman 1971) character of the communication was underlined by the fact that, in three cases, the study circle groups had prepared written statements, which was presented by a group member at the start of the meeting. When pushed to reflect on problems and challenges that affect the projects, project participants sometimes pointed to the need for more resources from the Norwegian donors. Apart from this, project participants were reluctant to talk about problems that might affect the projects during the group interviews. One reason for this might be that project participants find it inappropriate to air criticism or to talk about sensitive issues in public settings like these and in the presence of foreign visitors. Another reason might be that informants see it in their interest to avoid saying things that could place the project in an unfavourable light, out of a fear that this may harm the project or shut them off from the project.

Based on our observations of the immediate context of communication, we consider the personal interviews we carried out with study circle facilitators a more credible source of information than the group interviews. In the personal interviews, the communication between interviewers and interviewees was more relaxed and informants spoke with greater nuance about the projects. In addition to approving comments, they pointed to perceived problems in the projects and voiced criticisms of actors involved in them. Some themes that emerged in the initial interviews with facilitators proved to be catalysts for reflection in most of the other interviews as well. For instance, we found that the facilitators could easily relate to questions about the challenges of recruiting members to the study circle groups. Having explained that it was difficult to recruit members to the study circle groups, it fell natural in the flow of the conversation that the facilitators should proceed to explain why this was the case, and in doing so they touched on various features of the projects which never surfaced during the group interviews.
2  Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi

In this chapter we describe the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects that are implemented in Magu district by Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen and local partner organisations. The projects target the members of the district branches of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu and employ the study circle methodology to impart knowledge about issues of rights and democracy to project participants. In the sections that follow we highlight both positive and problematic features of the projects we were alerted to during our fieldwork. In many cases we make direct comments upon observations as we move through the sections. The observations are summarised and discussed further in the two closing sections of the chapter.

2.1  Background and organisation of projects

Magu district is located in the Mwanza region of Tanzania and borders on Lake Victoria in the West and Kenya to the North. In 2004 the total population of the district was 433 773, the majority of which belongs to the Sukuma ethnic group. Most settlements in the district are classified as rural and agriculture is the by far most common source of employment (Magu District Council 2005). The administrative and commercial centre of the district is Magu town, which is located along the Mwanza-Musoma road, the main transport line in the district. As in most other rural districts of Tanzania, CCM is the political party in dominance. It holds a large majority in the District Council, and chairs most of the 124 Village Councils of the district. The two Members of Parliament from Magu are currently both representing CCM.
Senterpartiet has since 1999 supported a community development project in Magu district which is run by CARE Norway. The idea for the *Haki na Demokrasia* project was born on a visit to the project by representatives of Senterpartiets Studieforbund (Centre Party Adult Education Organisation). In Magu the Norwegians met with local political leaders, among them the Hon. Dr. Rafael Chegeni, the Member of Parliament for Busega constituency in Magu representing CCM. The local leaders took an interest in the Norwegian organisation’s use of study circles, and the possibility of employing this methodology locally for purposes of capacity building. It was agreed from the outset that the project should target the grassroots population of the district and in particular women and youth. In 2002 Senterpartiet was granted financial support from NDS to carry out a pre-project in Tanzania. On the basis of consultations with Tanzanian political actors in 2002 and 2003 it was decided that the project should not be restricted to the CCM membership, as originally planned, but be of a cross-party nature. A letter of understanding concerning participation in the project was signed by national and local representatives of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in 2004. In 2005 NDS granted support to *Haki na Demokrasia* for pilot activities, and the project commenced the following year.

*Vijana na Ushawishi* is an offshoot of the *Haki* project which specifically targets the young membership of the political parties. The idea for the project was brought up in talks between a representative of Senterungdommen and representatives of the youth wings of the political parties in Magu during a project visit for *Haki na Demokrasia*. In 2006 Senterungdommen was granted support from NDS to carry out a pre-project in Magu during which an agreement about project participation was signed by the leaders of the youth wings of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA and the Norwegian partner. *Vijana na Ushawishi* commenced the next year.

### 2.1.1 Project objectives

Project documents of the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects emphasise that the level of socio-economic development in Magu district is low, because of a lack of grassroots democracy and good governance. Project documents from *Vijana na Ushawishi* highlight the weakly
developed role of youth in Tanzanian politics, both in terms of the formal organisation of the youth wings of the political parties and more generally with regards to political participation. In the baseline studies for both projects it is stated that there is a “critical need to support human rights, and to promote democratic and participatory governance” in the district. In interviews we conducted with representatives of the Norwegian partners, they affirmed the relevance of Senterpartiets ideology of decentralisation to the projects and their conviction that “change must come from below”, i.e. through processes of political participation among the grassroots population. These convictions extend as well to the application of the study circle methodology in the projects. In our talks with representatives of the Norwegian partners they highlighted the low cost nature of these activities and their low demands in terms of formal qualifications of participants as factors which make the methodology suitable as a means of empowering the African grassroots population. The Norwegians also underscored the inherent value of participation in study circles, as form of activity which is egalitarian and democratic by nature.

The stated long term objective of Haki na Demokrasia is “to strengthen civil society through capacity building of grassroots leaders from the party organisations, youth and women organisations in order to enhance unity, democracy and sustainable development in Magu District”. The project goal is specified as “to empower women and youth so that they will be able to have greater influence in the democratic decision process”. The long term objective of the Vijana project is “to strengthen the position of youth within political parties and in Tanzanian democracy”. More specifically the project aims to “empower the youth branches of the political parties in Magu and to strengthen young people’s role in the local party organisations”. Here, as in the Haki project, the goal of contributing to the empowerment of girls/women is generally emphasised.

2.1.2 Project activities and expenditure

The core activity of the Haki and Vijana projects is the study circle groups which have been established in Magu with local members from CCM, CUF and CHADEMA. The study circle groups are
established by facilitators, who have received training at seminars with the Norwegian partners, and number up to twenty participants, usually from the facilitator’s home location. The groups meet on a continuous basis, but with varying frequency. In the nine groups we visited during our fieldwork in Magu, this varied from once every month to weekly meetings. At the meetings various issues of democracy and citizen’s rights are brought up for discussion among the participants. The emphasis of the activities is on participation and the inclusiveness of learning processes. At the end of 2008 120 facilitators have received training as a part of the Haki project and 40 persons have received similar training in the Vijana project.

Usually three members of the project team of Haki na Demokrasia’s Norwegian partner have visited Tanzania for a duration of two weeks, or more, three times a year since the start of the project. During these stays the team conducts training of study circle facilitators and other seminar activities with project participants. They also go on monitoring missions to study circle groups and have meetings with project partners and other actors in Magu and with party representatives from the regional and national offices. Local project participants who have been trained as trainers by the Norwegian partners contribute to the seminars in Magu. An evaluation workshop is conducted with project participants during one of the team’s yearly visits. The training and the study material produced for the Haki project are divided into five topical steps or modules. At the initial training seminar, facilitators are trained in the study circle methodology and the management of study circle groups. As the study circle groups progress through the study material, their facilitators are to receive training on the topics “Leadership and democracy”, “Parliament and gender”, “Local government decision level (sub-village-ward)”, “Local government decision level (district/region)” and “Corruption”. The Norwegian partner has produced three study material booklets in Kiswahili for the project. Nine project participants in Magu have been trained as study material writers and have produced the final two study material booklets.

Exchange trips to Norway are also included in the project activities of Haki na Demokrasia. On two occasions, project participants from Magu and party officials from the national offices of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA have visited Norway in connection with the
National Congress of Senterpartiet. As a representative of the Norwegian project partner pointed out, this is the ultimate manifestation of membership democracy in Norwegian party politics, and as such an important occasion for learning for the Tanzanian project partners. In addition, project participants have visited the Norwegian Parliament and study circles with members from Senterpartiet. A change of programme is planned for 2009, where the Tanzanian visitors will follow Senterpartiet during the election campaign. The project has been granted support from NDS amounting to NOK 574 000 in 2006, NOK 599 000 in 2007 and NOK 726 000 in 2008. Most of the money is allocated to the implementation of activities in Tanzania (travel costs, cost of workshops) in connection with the visits from the Norwegian partner. In 2008 these costs amounted to about NOK 520 000. The spending on production of study material in 2008 was NOK 89 000 and about NOK 51 000 was spent on administration and monitoring activities carried out by Tanzanian associates. The administrative costs of the Norwegian partner amounted to about NOK 66 000. Another large but irregular source of expenditure in the project is the exchange trips to Norway. The budget for the exchange trip to Norway in 2007 was about NOK 189 000.

The project activities of Vijana na Ushawishi replicates those of the Haki project, but on a smaller scale. Since 2007 the project team from the Norwegian partner has visited Tanzania three times to conduct training seminars, monitor study circle groups and have meetings with project partners and other actors in Magu. Two modules of study material booklets were produced by the Norwegian partner in 2008, and a “training of trainers”-seminar was carried out the same year. Included in the project activities in 2008 was an exchange trip to Norway for project participants from Magu in connection with the National Congress of Senterpartiet. Another trip is taking place in 2009. NDS granted Vijana na Ushawishi support of NOK 433 000 in 2007 and 521 000 in 2008. The budgetary allocations are of the same pattern as in the Haki project.

2.1.3 Project management

Senterpartiet has established a committee within the party which is responsible for the Haki project, and the implementation of the
project is delegated to the adult education organisation of the party. Here, a project team of three persons has been established to ensure the continuity of the activities. Included in the team is a former citizen of Tanzania and resident of Magu. This team member has taken on a critical function as an advisor in the project, we were informed. For the Vijana project a project group of five persons from Senterungdommen have been established. The team answers to the Board of Senterungdommen. In Magu a Steering Committee with two members from each of the three political parties, have been set up for both projects. Included in the committees are the party secretaries from the district branches of the three parties/youth wings. The committees are responsible for the contents of the projects (including the selection of participants to seminars) and other project activities and meet regularly to plan project activities.

Both projects are administered locally in Tanzania by the Mwanza based NGO Community Development and Relief Agency of Tanzania (CODRA). The founder and owner of the organisation is the abovementioned Busega MP, the Hon. Dr. Rafael Chegeni. Chegeni is the project coordinator on the Tanzanian side for both projects, and CODRA is the practical facilitator of all project activities in Magu. Apart from making arrangements for seminar activities and meetings of the Steering Committees and study material writers, the organisation monitors the activities of the study circle groups and communicates with the project partners in Norway. In addition to CODRA, a group of project participants have been appointed as monitors of the study circle groups in the Haki project. Monitoring reports are submitted to the Steering Committee and CODRA distributes English summaries of the reports to the Norwegian partners (most of the documentation made by the Tanzanian partner is in Kiswahili). On the Norwegian side the project is well documented in writing. Apart from the annual project reports to NDS and yearly activity plans, the project team prepares thorough reports from all project visits.

Financially the Norwegian partners are responsible for the projects. In Tanzania CODRA prepares bills for all expenses connected to seminar and meeting activities of the projects. Members of the Norwegian project team reviews the documentation, e.g. by checking allowance payment against the
agreed rates and attendance lists and settles the bills in cash during their stays.

2.1.4 Norwegian partners as implementers of project activities

Before we venture into details about local perceptions of *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushwishi* in Magu, it is worth commenting upon some of the features of the projects we have already accounted for. We have seen that the Norwegian project teams travel to Tanzania frequently for visits that last for several weeks, and that they take on a prominent role in terms of the implementation of training activities in the projects. Local project participants have been trained as trainers and contribute at the seminars, but it seems that in the main these events are facilitated by the members of the Norwegian project teams. We have also seen that most of the budgetary spending in the two projects goes to this type of activities.

One of the ironies of development projects that employ “participatory” or “bottom up” approaches is that they often, to a considerable extent, are imposed upon local communities from outside actors. While the stated aim of such projects usually is to allow people to take responsibility for their own development, the frequent use of external facilitators betrays a lack of trust in the capabilities of the people targeted by the projects (Green 2000). A related form of criticism which is raised against participatory development projects is that participation tends to take the form of events rather than process (McNeish 2001). In several of our meetings with participants from the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects it was commented that the duration of the seminars is too short and that, as a consequence of this, facilitators are forced to rush through the various topics leaving insufficient time for discussions among the seminar participants. This is a familiar theme in discussions on activities of party assistance or democracy support, which we will return to in Chapter 3.

Another important objection which can be raised against the Norwegians role as implementers of project activities is that it is an expensive way of running the projects. In 2008 NOK 520 000 out of the total project budget of 724 000 of the *Haki* project was spent on workshop and seminar activities. Out of this about
249,000 was spent on the Norwegian participation in these activities. One may wonder how many qualified Tanzanians that could have been employed on a full time basis as mobile trainers for the project for the same amount of money?

2.1.5 Vijana na Ushawishi as appendix to Haki na Demokrasia

It should be evident from the descriptions of Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi we have provided above that the objectives and goals of the two projects are to a large extent overlapping. In both projects the ambition of contributing to the empowerment of youth and women is given high priority, rhetorically as well as in practice. Special seminars for women/girls only, have been conducted in both projects. What separates the two projects most clearly in this regard is the goal of Vijana na Ushawishi of strengthening the youth branches of the political parties in Magu. As noted, CCM, CUF and CHADEMA all have registered youth wings as parts of the party organisations, but these are not autonomous organisational entities as in Norway. In a conversation with a representative of the Norwegian partners from the Vijana project, it appeared that they had abandoned the goal of establishing autonomous youth party organisations in Magu, and have chosen instead to focus on capacity building of young individuals. It became evident as well in the conversation that in this context “youth” is an elusive category – in Magu the age-limit for membership in the youth wing of CCM is 45 years – and that this have posed quite a challenge to the project with respect to the recruitment of participants. This circumstance was confirmed in our fieldwork in Magu where we visited four study circle groups that belong to the Vijana project. In three of the groups most of the members were clearly of a young age. In the forth group, the facilitator was in his forties and several other members looked to be of the same or older age. To prevent persons who are clearly not youths from taking on central roles in the project, an age-limit of 35 years has been put into practice with regards to the members of the Steering Committee of Vijana na Ushawishi.

In our talks with members of the Steering Committee of Vijana na Ushawishi they repeatedly underscored the project’s lack of
resources in comparison to the *Haki* project. Among other things they complained about a shortage of study materials, which prevent study circle groups from progressing and about irregular visits by the Norwegian partner. According to the members of the Steering Committee many participants of the *Vijana* project feel that the *Haki* project is favoured by the Norwegian donors, and that they as project participants are discriminated. When seen in connection with the overlaps in objectives and target groups between *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi* this raises the question of the feasibility of running two NDS projects in Magu. There are good reasons to believe that the objective of strengthening the role of youth in political parties in Magu could have been better served by channelling more resources into just one project. This would have made for a smaller engagement on the Norwegian side and reduced the organisational complexity and administrative needs associated with the project activities. We will return to this question in the closing sections of the chapter.

### 2.2 Impacts of *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi*

In this section we account for responses we were given to questions of how *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi* have affected local communities in Magu district. As will be evident in the pages that follow, opinions about the degree of success of the projects differ among the actors who are directly or indirectly involved in the projects. It should be emphasised, however, that there is a wide ranging consensus among the persons we came in contact with during our fieldwork in Magu, in Mwanza and in Dar es Salaam that in principle *Haki Na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi* are good projects, which may potentially be of considerable importance as a means of promoting democratisation in Tanzania. In this regard, interviewees point to the great need for educating the grassroots population on issues of democracy. Interviewees also point to the multiparty nature of the projects and that they may contribute to the development of a constructive climate among the competing political parties. Many of the actors we contacted outside of Magu district voiced the opinion that the projects ought to be exported to other districts in Tanzania.
It can be noted as well that the projects seem to be well known to representatives of the political-administrative system in Magu. On our tour of visits to the study circle groups, we had talks with local leaders not directly attached to the projects. These included chairs of Village Councils, chairs of the school committees, members of Ward Development Committees and Village Executive Officers, mainly to establish if they were familiar with the projects. The local leaders we talked to all seemed to be well aware of the projects existence, and voiced positive assessments about them. Awareness of the *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi* projects was also confirmed in meetings we had with district counsellors from CCM and CUF, the District Planning Officer and the District Commissioner in Magu. In a meeting with the District Executive Director of Magu it emerged that he had not heard of the projects. This may be due to the fact that he had recently taken up the position and was coming from a different region of the country.

2.2.1 Project participants’ appraisals of *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi*

When asked to reflect on the impact of *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi*, members of the Steering Committees and members of the study circle groups pointed in particular to three ways in which the projects have affected their local communities.

*Firstly*, the most frequently reported impact of the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects concerns the working relations between the competing political parties in Magu district. It seems that the projects have been very successful in terms of removing animosities between members of the different political parties. In meetings with project participants we were repeatedly offered accounts of how, prior to the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects, members of the three political parties could not sit down together to discuss matters of interest to the local community, or hardly even speak to each other at all. This situation had now changed, we were told, as a result of the cross-party study circle groups and other project activities, which have allowed members of the different parties to cooperate and exchange views on matters of community development. As noted above, these opinions were echoed in assessments of the projects made by party officials at the regional and national offices.
Given the unison emphasis on this point among interviewees, we
nevertheless find reasons to question the significance of the
reported change. The reported harmonisation of relations between
parties does not resonate well with what is commonly known
about the pragmatism of the Tanzanian population with regards to
party affiliation. On several occasions where project participants
talked about how the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects had improved
relations between the political parties, we asked them if it was not
the case that animosities between political parties are only made
relevant in election times. In most such cases project participants
clearly confirmed that this was indeed the case. What this suggests
in turn is that the reported change in relations between the political
parties may be overstated. It is worth pointing out that, while the
aim of promoting a climate for civilised communicative exchanges
between the political parties is laudable, this should not be
misconstrued as a matter of erasing the boundaries between the
parties. There is a worrying side to the reported harmonisation of
relations between the parties as well, which we will return to this in
our discussion of politics of co-optation below (c.f. section 2.2.7).

*Secondly*, most project participants seem to agree that the projects
have increased the political participation of women and youth at
the various locations where study circle groups have been set up.
In most of the groups we visited it was reported that the project
had enabled women and/or youth to take on a more active and
visible role in various kinds of public meetings in the local
community. In most of the groups we visited several women and
youth attested that they would compete for political positions in
the upcoming grassroots elections. It was also reported in several
study circles that the projects had contributed to open up a wider
discussion within the local community of the rights and duties of
men and women within the household. When asked to explain
more precisely how these changes have been brought about, the
typical answer was that women and youth have gained “courage”
to take on roles as public actors as a result of the projects. This
was attributed to knowledge gained through participation in the
study circle groups about the rights of women and youth to
participate in public affairs. The change was also attributed to the
role of study circles as a training ground for public speaking.
Another reason, which was highlighted by a project participant, is
that the projects provides women and youths with an arena in
which to make contacts with influential politicians at the regional and national level.

The significance of this type of change should not be underestimated. As Lange (2008) notes with regard to Tanzanian local politics, grassroots women often find it hard to take the floor in public meetings where they risk being ignored or even ridiculed. The frequency with which these accounts were voiced among project participants adds to their credibility, but again there are reasons to believe that the reported change may be overstated. As it turned out, several of the women who voiced these opinions were already holding political positions for which they had been appointed prior to their participation in the project. Thus one woman who claimed to have been “empowered to speak in public” by the project was a counsellor in the District Council. Another woman, who made similar claims about the project, also told us that she was renowned for her abilities as a public speaker and that this had been a great asset to her when campaigning for the position of MP in 2005. A more significant test of the project’s success with regards to the empowerment of women and youth will come with the grassroots election in 2009.

Thirdly, most of the study circle groups we visited reported that they had made use of knowledge about good leadership and good governance which they had gained through participation in the projects. When asked to specify what they had learned in this regard, many project participants pointed to the irrelevance of party affiliation as a basis for selecting leaders as one of the principal teachings of the project. As we were explained, participation in the study circles had opened project participant’s eyes to the argument that, as voters, they should not blindly support candidates fielded by their own party but rather make decisions on the basis of the candidate’s merits as political leaders. Two Village Council chairpersons who were members of study circle groups told us that the project had made them better leaders. Another Village Council chairman we talked to explained that even though he was not a member of the kikundi, he had received a study material booklet from Haki Na Democracia and that this had helped him become a better leader. A study circle group facilitator, who had previously campaigned for a position in the District Council, attested that her principal motivation for joining the project was to educate her potential voters on issues of anti-
corruption in the hope of easing the pressure for making payouts in the next election.

Members of the study circle groups also highlighted the knowledge they had gained about transparency and accountability in the local governance system. One study circle group reported that its members had put an end to the taxation of sales and purchases of cattle in the area by the Village Council, by informing members of the local community about the illegality of this practice. In several instances it was reported that the study circle groups have written letters to local authorities at the district, ward and village level demanding insight into budgetary and financial matters. These accounts were confirmed by the District Planning Officer, who told us that citizens and the Village Councils in the district were much more inquisitive about budgetary matters than what used to be the case a few years ago. It seems in particular that the study circle groups have impacted the Village Councils. As mentioned, two of the study circle groups we visited had Village Council chairpersons as members. Many of the group members we met held other positions in Village Councils.

2.2.2 Understanding of study circle methodology and relevance of study material

We asked the study circle groups about their practicing of the study circle methodology and about the relevance of the study material they were using. Apart from stating their satisfaction with the way the groups were run and that the study material was “good”, the members of the study circle groups had little to say in this regard. In two groups, members pointed out that the treatment of the Tanzanian parliamentary system in the booklets is too superficial. It was reported in several study circle groups that the training on democracy and rights differs from ordinary school education in the sense that “everyone is allowed to speak” and that they take their time in discussing topics until they are understood by all members of the group. Study circle group members also pointed out that they are careful about allowing women opportunities to speak at the meetings. Generally study circle group members displayed an attitude of reverence with regards to the democratic rules and procedures of the groups. One of the study circle groups we visited had even adopted a constitution. In
addition to the trained facilitator, most of the study circle groups had appointed members to the positions of chairperson and secretary through internal elections, either on a rotational basis, from meeting to meeting, or for longer periods of time. In most cases the study circle group-organisation included the position of treasurer as well. As we shall see below, in the handling of their internal economic affairs, the study circle groups make up an important arena for practicing what the Haki and Vijana projects preaches about transparency and accountability.

2.2.3 Vikundi as economic enterprises

In the Norwegian tradition study circles are usually temporary groupings formed on the basis of a shared topical interest of their members. To the puzzlement of the Norwegian partners, project participants in Magu insisted from the very beginning of the Haki na Demokrasia project that the study circles should rather operate as permanent groups at various locations in the district. This is highlighted by the Kiswahili name which is used locally to designate the study circles, kikundi, the literal translation of which is “group”. In many cases we were struck by the degree to which members of the study circle groups we visited displayed a sense of collective identity and solidarity as kikundi members in spite of their crossing party affiliations. This is reflected in the fact that groups have taken names, such as Suduka (“To awaken”) or Imani (“Faith”). Group integration may even extend to the point of formal recognition of vikundi as organisations: in one of the groups we visited, we were shown a document issued from the local authorities certifying that the study circle group was a recognised community based organisation.

An important source of group cohesion in the vikundi is the role they have taken on as economic co-operatives. As we came to learn, this seems to be an essential precondition for the successful operation of study circle groups. At the village of Nassa Ginnery, we visited a kikundi which was founded in 2005. According to its facilitator, it is considered a “model group” within the project. When presenting the group’s activities to us, the facilitator underscored that, in his opinion, it is pointless to try to promote ideas of democracy and rights to members of the local community unless it is coupled with “economic liberation”. Most people in the
area are poor smallholder farmers, whose concerns for a large part lie with the immediate challenges of survival of the household, the facilitator pointed out. Projects that aim to educate people on matters of democracy can only work if they are seen to be directly linked to people’s experienced needs, he asserted, implicitly affirming the slogan “You cannot eat democracy!”. Over the last two-three decades the Tanzanian tradition for self-help activities have eroded, partly because of abuses from the state apparatus, which have engendered disillusionment with regards to such activities and partly because of the influx of the internationally funded development industry. As a result of the proliferation of donor projects with no input from local communities, people in the Mwanza region have come to expect payment for taking part in communal work (Mwanjala 2003, quoted in Lange (2008)).

For such reasons it initially proved very difficult for the facilitator at Nassa Ginnery to recruit members to the study circle group. When he approached members of the local community in this regard, they would always ask him about what kinds of material rewards they would receive from joining the group. The moment people learned that the project was about education only, they would usually tell him to forget about it. To promote recruitment to the kikundi and to ensure the continual commitment of its members to the activities of the group, the members had established a savings and credit co-operative society (SACCO), locally known as an Ifogongo. Each member of the kikundi has made an original contribution of Tzs 5000 to the fund, from which they can lend money at a certain interest rate. At the end of a year the surplus generated by the fund is split among the shareholders. In the facilitator’s assessment, vikundi which exist for educational purposes alone are “weak”, that is, in danger of dissolving because of a lack of commitment among their members. These viewpoints were echoed in the other study circle groups we visited. All the facilitators we spoke to, presented us with accounts of how they had struggled to recruit members to their study circle groups, for similar reasons as the ones cited above. Thus the facilitator of a recently founded kikundi in Itumbili in Magu town, told us that when it had dawned on the initial members of the group that there was little in the way of material rewards to be accrued from their participation, most of them had disappeared from the group and refused to return the study material booklets they had been
provided with. When the facilitator called upon members to attend meetings they would ask “Kuna posho? Wazungu wamekuja?” (“Is there allowance payment? Have the Europeans come?”). If her answer was negative, they would tell her that they were not interested. In an effort to rebuild the group, the facilitator had decided to establish an ifogongo fund as an incentive for recruitment and to further the cohesion of group members.

As we were informed, mafogongo has for long been a widespread economic practice among people in the Mwanza region. More recently, under the banner of “micro-credit”, the Tanzanian government has encouraged people to engage in such activities. Out of the nine study circle groups we visited, seven groups reported that they were engaged in joint economic activities. In most cases these were mafogongo funds. Two of the groups we visited were engaged in the business of chicken rearing, selling eggs and poultry, and in one case the kikundi members had joined efforts to dig a well. In another group, the members had jointly invested in a sewing machine, which was used for commercial purposes. The group aimed to expand the business by hiring a sewer. It can be noted that while most of the vikundi meet on a weekly basis or every two weeks, one of the groups we visited that did not report about economic activities only convene once a month.

The combination of deliberations on citizen rights and chicken farming may seem peculiar – as one party official at a national office remarked in this regard: “We are a political party, not a bank or a chicken farm!”. The emergence of these economic enterprises within the confines of study circles on democracy and rights can be seen as a reflection of a pragmatic outlook among project participants. To our minds, it is only natural that a project which aim to “empower the grassroots” through participatory methods should come to take on features that reflect the mentality of its target group. According to the facilitator of the kikundi at Nassa Ginnery and other project participants we talked to, there are no conflicts between the economic and educational objectives of the vikundi: when the groups convene, the members spend some of their time on matters pertaining to their joint economic enterprise; then, in the remaining time, they discuss issues of democracy and rights. In our estimation, the inclusion of these economic activities into the life of the study circle groups are among the best signs we
encountered during our entire fieldwork that the groups might have a basis for existence even in the absence of funding from the Norwegian donor, and hence of the sustainability of the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects. In the continuation of this point, it should also be noted that, by taking on the role of economic cooperatives, the study circle groups have become important arenas for practicing what the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects teaches about good governance. In all of the groups we visited it seemed that the members were satisfied with the ways in which the businesses were managed. In several cases, *kikundi* members emphasised that the management of the funds or other businesses was conducted in accordance with the principles of transparency and accountability promulgated in the projects.

Having said this, it is worth pointing out that this development is not without potential problems. For one thing, the funds and other businesses may give the study circle groups a more exclusive character. One may reasonably assume that there are many potential members of the study circle groups in Magu who cannot afford an entry-contribution of for instance Tzs 5000. We asked the members of one of the study circle groups about this. Their reply was that the group was open to anyone, including people who do not contribute to the fund. In spite of this, it seems unlikely that study circle members who do not partake in the economic activities will participate on an equal footing with the other members and with the same motivation. Another potential problem is that such funds and businesses may function as veritable invitations for political patronage. For this reason a CHADEMA official at the national office, was deeply sceptical about the use of such funds for purposes of party recruitment. In his experience, the funds are prime targets of “political corruption”, i.e. bribery. We did not inquire about this possibility in Magu, but given what is known about Tanzanian politics, there is an obvious plausibility to the argument. This is substantiated by the fact that in all of the *vikundi* we visited, members requested donations to their businesses from the Norwegian donor.

2.2.4 The posho-syndrome

As Green (2003) notes, the stakeholder workshop has become an institutionalised element in Tanzania’s development culture to the
extent of being treated as a proxy for project output. Especially in projects of capacity building, workshops have taken on a role as one of the most important manifestations of the projects as a tangible reality. In tandem with this development, “workshopping” has emerged as a mode of income-extraction among Tanzanians. The attractiveness of workshop attendance, Green shows, stems partly from the prestigious nature of these events. Often workshops are conducted in high-status places and the events are usually ripe with signifiers of global modernity, like electronic equipment and four wheel drive cars. Also, these are occasions for making potentially career-enhancing contacts with high ranking government officials and with representatives of international organisations. In the experience of representatives of the Norwegian partner of Haki na Demokrasia, people in Magu attach great prestige to attendance in the workshops and conference that have been held in connection with the project.

Apart from these symbolic rewards, workshops represent a welcomed opportunity, especially for under-salaried government employees, to extract incomes far higher than what they normally receive. It is customary in Tanzania that participants are provided with allowance payment for attending workshops. Indeed, as Green points out, this has become an essential precondition for attracting participants to the events in the first place. The workshop and seminar activities that have been conducted as a part of the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects are no exception to this rule. Since the inception of Haki na Demokrasia in 2005 a large number of people from Magu, members of the Steering Committee, study circle facilitators and other project participants, have been given the opportunity to participate in the workshop and seminar activities of the two projects. Participants to these events are given an allowance and are refunded travel expenses within reasonable limits. Allowances are paid in cash, which gives workshops participants the option of choosing a less expensive form of accommodation than what is catered for in the allowance rate, and save some of the money. Apart from the payments for seminar attendance, members of the Steering Committees and project participants who have been appointed as trainers of trainers, study material writers and monitors receive allowances in connection with various meeting assignments they take on in the projects.
Representatives of the Norwegian partner told us that in the first years of the *Haki na Demokrasia* project the allowances rates were much too generous, but that through a series of adjustments they had now landed on a reasonable level of payments. This is reportedly one area in which the *Vijana na Ushawishi* project has taken advantages of experiences gained in *Haki na Demokrasia*, which have allowed the partners to cut short much of the experimentation with allowance rates.

While the income opportunities offered by the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects must appear incremental by Western standards, they are no doubt deemed very important by the project participants we came in contact with. A recurring request at our meetings with the study circle groups was that there should be more seminars and that more people should be given a chance to participate. In many cases, project participants complained that the cost of living had risen and that allowance rates and the refunding of travel costs should be adjusted to the new circumstances. Three female members of a *kikundi* we talked to, insisted throughout the conversation that they were being “exploited” as project participants and that they should be given a more generous compensation from the Norwegian donor. Project participants’ expectancies for remuneration are not restricted to seminar and workshop events. As many of our informants asserted, in Magu face to face encounters with *wazungu* (Europeans) are generally classified as opportunities for attaining money or other material goods. One project participant explained that most people naturally assume that visiting foreigners are *kubwa* (“big” i.e. wealthy) and prone to hand out money to locals they come in contact with. In our meetings with the study circle groups and other project participants we were often reminded about this circumstance, and in some cases people who attended the meetings asked us directly for money. On one occasion, we were informed by a study circle facilitator that two persons who were not members of the group had turned up for the meeting, and that the probable reason was that they had heard that *wazungu* were coming and saw this as an opportunity to get some money.

As representatives of the Norwegian partners attested to in interviews, since the beginning project participants fixation on money issues has been a major distracting factor in the projects. Apart from the threats it poses in terms of the sustainability of
Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi, this “posho-syndrome” – as one of our informants termed the matter – can be seen to affect the projects in several ways. Firstly, it may work to create unrealistic expectations among vikundi members about the material rewards which might be accrued from participation in the projects. As noted, on our tour of meetings with the vikundi we encountered many requests for donations from the Norwegian partners. In many cases, the requests were directly linked to project objectives. Thus several study circle facilitators told us that they would be more effective in establishing new groups in locations that lie beyond walking distance if they were given means of transport such as a bicycle or a motorbike. But there were also signs that project participants had misunderstood the nature of the projects. In one of the study circle groups we visited, this became particularly evident. Talking about the difficulties involved in recruiting members to the kikundi, the chairman of the group explained that potential members often ask what kind of rewards that lie at the end of the study circles training on democracy. When confronted with such questions the chairman would tell people that at the end of the training lie donations from Norway which will enable the group members to start small businesses, like for instance a cafe or a hairdressing saloon. When asked to clarify if he himself held this belief, the chairman confirmed that: “Yes, this is my hope and my expectation”. The other study circle group members confirmed that they too were looking forward to donations from Norway that would allow them to start small businesses.

Secondly, the posho syndrome has created problems of “free-riding” on project resources by persons associated with the projects. The incident we described above where two “extra” members of a study circle group turned up for a meeting with us is symptomatic in this regard. Judging from what we were told by the Norwegian partners, members of the Steering Committees and CODRA representatives, it has been a recurring problem in the projects that persons who are not committed to the projects, or who belong to non-operative study circle groups, have been selected for participation in seminars and other project activities. In such cases it would appear that people are “only after the money”. It seems that not all of the 120 study circle groups that exist on paper in the Haki na Demokrasia project actually meet on a regular basis.
Members of the Steering Committees we talked to pointed out that they had discovered that in some cases study circle groups have as many as eighty members, which indicates that the groups have been set up for the sole purpose of providing people with opportunities to go to seminars.4

Thirdly, the problem of free riding seems to be a direct cause for the emergence of a more complex project organisation in the Haki and Vijana projects. As noted, a group of project participants (facilitators and members of the Steering Committees) have been trained as monitors of study circle groups. The main purpose of the monitors is to establish whether registered study circle groups are operative and well functioning, and hence, which project participants that are entitled to attend seminars and other project activities. The operative concept in this context is that of “spirit of volunteerism”. As we were explained by representatives of the Norwegian partner, the monitors that were first trained in 2008 have yet to fulfil their work obligations in a satisfactory manner, which caused the project management to implement a retraining of the monitors at the end of the year. In addition to the activities of the appointed monitors, employees of CODRA are carrying out monitoring activities as well.

The problem of free riders being selected for participation in project activities is not restricted to regular project participants and study circle facilitators. In several reported cases, members of the Steering Committees have clung on to their positions, in spite of no longer having an active role in the project or in spite of being viewed as illegitimate representatives of their political parties. This directs us to a fourth way in which the struggle among project participants to extract posho has come to shape the Haki and Vijana projects. Clearly, some of the actors that are involved in the projects have been elevated into positions of power vis a vis other project participants and local party organisations as “gate keepers” with regards to the scarce material and symbolic resources (money, education, prestige, contacts) that are released through the projects. Most obviously this would include the members of the

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4 In a comment to a draft version of this report a representative of CODRA states that all the 120 study circle groups meet regularly. A representative of the Norwegian project partner estimated that there are about 100 groups that meet regularly.
Steering Committees and employees of CODRA, but anyone that partake in decisions about the selection of project participants for seminar attendance, participation in study trips, or with regards to appointments for various functions within the projects belongs to the category. For instance we were given the impression that kikundi facilitators in many cases influence decisions about which project participants are selected for seminar attendance.

In some reported cases, it seems that such actors have used this power actively to further their personal interest. On a study trip to Dodooma for members of Haki na Demokrasia in 2008, representatives of the Norwegian partner discovered that some of the participants had been selected on the basis of promises of personal favours to a member of the Steering Committee. One of our interviewees claimed that a member of the Steering Committee was using this position as a leverage to increase his influence within his own party, threatening to shut it off from the project if it did not abide by his wishes. More generally, actors that hold such gate keeper positions can exercise this power in a passive and unspoken manner. Thus in one of the kikundi we visited, we were informed by the facilitator that the members of the group did not dare to air the complaints they had against CODRA. Employees of CODRA have made no direct treats of shutting the group out of the project, he explained, but the mere knowledge that they have this capacity keeps the study circle group members from making complaints against the organisation.

In our talks with the members of the steering committees, with CODRA employees and with representatives of the Norwegian partner it was often underscored that money issues have been a major problem in the Haki and Vijana projects, but that slowly but steadily things have improved over the years. Gradually, it is claimed, the message that the projects are of an educational nature and not about material rewards have sunk in among the project participants. In our experience, there are good reasons to question the correctness of this narrative of gradual improvement. Not only does it contradict much of what we saw and heard in our fieldwork in Magu. Given what has been stated above about conditions of poverty and lack of social capital in Magu, it is tempting to conclude that there is a strong element of wishful thinking to this story.
There are good reasons as well to question the appropriateness of the emphasis which is placed on project participants’ spirit of volunteerism in the Haki and Vijana projects. One of the derivative objectives of the Haki and Vijana projects, it seems, is to nourish attitudes among project participants that correspond to the Norwegian notion of “dugnadsånd” and hence to enhance the social capital of local communities in Magu district. In our discussions with members of the Steering Committees, CODRA representatives and representatives of the Norwegian partners, they highlighted “spirit of volunteerism” as an important criterion for selecting project participants for seminar attendance and other project functions. The same emphasis is found in study material booklets used in the project. The effect of this may be to impose a classification upon project participants, as either self-sacrificing and truly committed individuals or selfish opportunists. It should be emphasised again that the allowance culture we have dwelled at is the product of the international aid industry. The project partners of the Haki and Vijana projects have chosen to contribute to this culture. To provide economic incentives for participation in the projects and simultaneously demand that participation should be based on volunteerism is to invite hypocritical responses.

2.2.5 Focus on Norway

Study- or exchange trips to donor countries are a popular and seemingly obligatory component of projects of party assistance (Kumar 2004), and so too in the Haki and Vijana projects. Wherever we went in Magu district, members of study circle groups displayed a striking awareness about the possibilities for being selected as participants in exchange trips to Norway entailed in the Haki and Vijana projects. On numerous occasions kikundi members we met with made declarations about their desire to go to Norway and that there should be more exchange trips. A strategy we came to employ to “break the ice” with members of study circle groups that proved difficult to engage in conversations was to ask them if they wanted to go to Norway. Usually this would call forth affirmative comments and smiles and laughter from the kikundi members. On one such occasion, we told the members of a study circle group in a remote village of the district who had unanimously stated their desire to go to Norway that the country is freezing cold. Did they really want to go to such a place,
we asked the *kikundi* members jokingly. ”We are ready! We will bring our coats”, they promptly declared.

The exchange trips to Norway undoubtedly acts as an incentive for recruitment to the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects, and incidentally also for recruitment to political parties that are included in the projects. In an interview we conducted with the chairman of CHADEMA in Magu district, he pointed out that a positive effect of the projects is that they act as a stimulus for recruitment to CHADEMA. Having learned about the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects, people enlist as members of CHADEMA, he said, with the hope of getting the chance to travel to Norway.

A member of the Steering Committee of *Haki na Demokrasia* had been a visitor to Norway on one occasion, and had in particular been impressed by the level of gender equity in Norwegian society. She told us with astonishment about how one of her female hosts in Norway “lived in a big house, all by herself”. This emphasis on the relations between the genders in Norway was echoed by other project participant who had not visited Norway. When we asked the *vikundi* about what they had learned through the projects, several members highlighted the knowledge they had gained about Norway and in particular about the role of women in Norwegian society.

In the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects Norway take on connotations of a “Promised Land” in more than one sense: *Firstly*, the exchange trips to Norway are no doubt perceived by many as a “grand prize” of project participation. This may contribute to fuel unrealistic expectations among regular *vikundi* members about the rewards that are entailed in project participation. Those who have been selected to go on such trips so far are contact persons from the national offices of the three parties, CODRA employees and Steering Committee members. While ordinary project participants may have high hopes of going to Norway, their actual chances of being selected for such assignments are small. Considering the high-cost nature of these trips, one may also ask if this activity pays off in relation to the project objectives. Study trips abroad are highly prestigious in Tanzania, and may as such be of critical value as a component in the personal curriculums of aspiring top-politicians. But as a party official from CHADEMA’s national office pointed out, when it comes to development of the party
organisation such trips are usually of dubious value. In our view, this argument applies with equal force – or more – in a project that aims to empower the political grass roots. We will return to discuss this topic in the chapters below.

Secondly, there is a tendency among the participants of the Haki and Vijana projects to conjure up images of Norway as a socio-economic Utopia against which Tanzania is measured. Given the differences in wealth between the two countries, this is perhaps unavoidable, and there are obviously important lessons to be learnt from the Norwegian experience for Tanzanians, for instance with regards to policies on gender equity. This granted, there are nevertheless good reasons to caution against a strong focus on Norway in projects such as these. The stated objectives of the Haki and Vijana projects are to empower members of the grassroots population in Magu and to promote good governance. Implied in these objectives are the goals of sensitising project participants to their rights and duties as citizens and of encouraging them to actively further these values as public actors. What this must mean in turn, is that the projects should seek to promote a sense of civic patriotism or pride in being citizens of the United Republic of Tanzania among project participants – not a glorification of Norway.

2.2.6 Atmosphere of distrust

As noted, during our fieldwork in Magu district we were constantly reminded about the expectation among locals that visiting wazungu provide money or other goods to people they come in direct contact with. On one such occasion, we met with members of a Vijana na Ushavishi study circle group on a street corner in the vicinity of Magu town. At the start of the meeting we explained the members of the group that we wanted to air some questions with them collectively, and later have an individual talk with the group facilitator. Having completed the group session, we thanked the kikundi members for their time and told them that we now had a few more questions we wanted to discuss with the facilitator only. In spite of this, and another attempt on our side to politely dismiss the group members, they remained seated seemingly waiting for something to happen. It was only after being told more bluntly that they should now leave the place, that the youths took farewell
with us and left. After the group members had dispersed, the facilitator was visibly distressed and told us that he could tell we were inexperienced in this game, taking him aside like this. Now the other group members assumed that we would give him “something”, he told us, and this would get him into a lot of trouble as soon as we left the place. The *kikundi* members were all hiding in the nearby houses, waiting for us to leave, he said. Later they would confront him and demand their share of what they thought he had been given.

It should be emphasised that the Norwegian project partners have never given out money in meetings with study circle groups. The episode is illustrative of the general expectation regarding foreign visitors we described above, but also of the atmosphere of rivalry and distrust which characterise the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects. We have already noted the complaints of the Steering Committee of *Vijana na Ushawishi* that the project is being treated as a stepchild by the Norwegian donor in comparison to the *Haki* project. Members of the Steering Committee also told us that, because of the lack of resources, project participants accuse them of pocketing money from the project themselves. The existence of such suspicions was confirmed in our meetings with the *vikundi* from both projects. In several such meetings, facilitators and other group members confided to us that they suspected that the members of the Steering Committees were “eating” off the project budget. Similar accusations were levelled against CODRA. Study circle group members complained in particular that CODRA employees deduct money from the allowances they are entitled to receive for seminar attendance and buy food to them at a much lower cost. Other complaints were related to the selection of persons for seminar attendance. Thus, in one of our meetings, the chairman of a *kikundi* complained to us that the facilitator of the group, who was also a member of the Steering Committee, was systematically picking his own friends among the group members for seminar attendance. In another *kikundi*, female members accused the facilitator and other male members of the group of conspiring to ensure that only men were selected for seminar participation, and in yet another group, there were complaints that those among them that had gone to seminars were unwilling to share what they had learned with the rest of the group.
It is beyond the scope of this study to make detailed assessments of the truth value of any of these accusations. What can be asserted with certainty is that an atmosphere of distrust with regards to the distribution of the material and symbolic resources that are released through the projects is reigning among project participants. It seems that anyone who have a say in decisions about who-gets-their-share of project resources, or who are seen to occupy such positions, naturally come under the suspicion of other project participants. As was pointed out to us by members of the Steering Committees, many such complaints are based on erroneous understandings among project participants of the amount of money which is injected into the project by the Norwegian donor. Judging from the interviews and group discussions we carried out in Magu, the belief is widespread among people involved in the Haki and Vijana projects, and especially the regular study circle participants, that “somewhere” in the project organisation large material resources are hidden and that “someone” is reaping off rewards from these resources.

This should not, in our opinion, be dismissed as a matter of petty intrigues and envy. As several project participants testified to, this type of grievances poses a real threat to the legitimacy of the projects and may lead to the dissolving of study circle groups. Nor do we think that this problem should be seen as a “childhood disease” that will go away once the true nature of the projects is understood by the local population in Magu. There is a tendency in participatory development projects to assume that rural Africans naturally constitutes harmonious communities (Cooke and Kothari 2001), which often proves to be far removed from the actual situation on the ground. As long as one of the principal motives for participation in the Haki and Vijana projects is to accrue material rewards and as long as there is any scope for favouritism or self-enrichment in decisions about the distribution of goods among project participants, the atmosphere of distrust we have described is likely to prevail.

2.2.7 The role of CODRA

Above we have noted that some of the project participants we met with in Magu accused CODRA of withholding money the project participants were entitled to receive as allowance payment. Again it
should be emphasised that it is beyond the scope of this study to make thorough assessments of this type of allegations. It is worth underscoring that apart from the abovementioned accusations we have not been presented with any evidence that indicate irregularities on the part of CODRA in the financial management of the project. These allegations can in our opinion just as easily be attributed to the climate of distrust described above as to any actual wrongdoings of employees of the organisation. The routines of accounting and financial management employed in the project probably present employees of CODRA with opportunities to “eat” of the project budget. In interviews with a member of the Norwegian project team it was pointed out that the cash dealings with project resources was far from an optimal solution, but a practical necessity when operating in Magu district and that the Norwegian partner have chosen to put its trust in CODRA. On one occasion it was discovered that an employee of CODRA stole from the project. This person has been removed from the position. It should also be noted in this regard that representatives of the Norwegian project partners we talked to expressed great satisfaction with the work that has been carried out by CODRA for the projects.

The use of CODRA in the Haki and Vijana projects has been controversial in the NDS-system for several reasons. Partly, members of the NDS Board have been opposed to the use of NGOs in NDS project on grounds of principle. Partly they have questioned the use of an organisation with close ties to powerful political interests as the facilitator of a multiparty project. As noted, the idea for the Haki na Demokrasia project was born at a meeting in Magu between representatives of Senterpartiet and the Busega MP Rafael Chegeni. Chegeni has had a central role in the project since its inception, as the officially designated project coordinator, and through the use of CODRA in the day to day running of the projects. Chegeni has on two occasions been a guest at the National Congress of Senterpartiet in Norway as a representative of the project. He has participated in most of the workshops which have been conducted for the project, often giving the opening speech of the events. At the conference which was held for the project in Mwanza in 2008, Chegeni gave the opening and closing speeches. In our visits to the study circle groups, several facilitators presented the diplomas they had been
issued with to certify that they had completed different training modules as study circle facilitators. Some of the documents are co-signed by Chegeni and representatives of the Norwegian project partners. Some are signed by Chegeni alone. To be sure, this must be a powerful symbolic affirmation of the MP’s role as a provider of the projects to participants.

The MPs “ownership” of the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects was acknowledged directly or indirectly in many of the conversations we had with project participants in Magu. One project participant we spoke to complained that CODRA was behaving as if it was the organisation’s own money, rather than the Norwegian partners, which was spent on the project. Mostly, however, project participants expressed their gratitude to Chegeni for providing this opportunity to people in Magu, and several of our interviewees spoke of the MP in praise. Thus, a study circle facilitator from CUF explained in an interview that she did not consider it problematic to participate in a project which is “owned” by a MP from CCM, as long as the “project is good”. Another project participant from CHADEMA we talked to, spoke for long about her hatred of the CCM party. When confronted with the question of how she could participate enthusiastically in a project which is owned by a MP from the same party, she explained that this was a different matter altogether, since Chegeni is a very “good man” who have done “great things” for his community. The statement throws a new and disturbing light on the project’s teaching about the irrelevance of party allegiance when deciding on which political leader to support, touched on above.

The success of Tanzanian political leaders is often measured by their ability to attract donor funding to their local constituencies, and development projects have become common vehicles for dispensing political patronage to the poor (Lange 2008). As Hyden (2005) notes, in Tanzania political power is predominantly exercised through networks of informal relations. In such arrangements, which may extend from the national level of politics down to the local communities, public resources are distributed as personal favours of political patrons to clients, who respond with loyalty to the individual leaders rather than to the institutions they represent (Clapham 1992). Unlike market transactions, which, ideally, are balanced exchanges and where relations between the parties can be terminated once the transactions are completed, the
inequalities in wealth and influence which lie at the base of such patron-client relations places the recipients of the favours under a diffuse and lasting moral obligation to return to the benefactor. This type of power relations, it can be noted, is often sustained by a moral economy centred on notions of paternal care. As Scatzberg (2001) notes, one of the prototypical thought-models from which political legitimacy is derived in African countries is that of the father providing for his family. There are good reasons to assume that such patron-client relations conforms to local understandings of what “accountable leadership” amounts to in Magu. It should be emphasised, however, that this is a form of political authority which militates strongly against the notion of good governance which underlies the Haki and Vijana projects as well as the objective of contributing to the empowerment of the grassroots population. What is essentially at stake in a politics of clientilism, is the reproduction of asymmetric social relations between political elites and the populace and the manoeuvrings of “big men” to sustain or extend their followings. For these reasons, and regardless of the merits of CODRA as technical facilitators and of Chegeni as a political leader, we find the association of the Haki and Vijana projects with CODRA unfortunate.

2.2.8 Exclusion of UDP from projects

Several of our informants claimed that the Haki and Vijana projects are used as means to strengthen Chegeni's position and to neutralise the opposition in Magu. These assessments are supported by the fact that the opposition party UDP to a large extent has been excluded from the projects. In project documents from the planning phase of Haki na Demokrasia UDP figures as one of the parties that are to be included among the project partners, but as matters fell this did not happen. When asked about this, a representative of the Norwegian project partner explained that, at the time, Chegeni advised Senterpartiet that UDP was on the verge of breaking up in Magu district. UDP was therefore left out among the partners in the project. UDP members have been included in several study circle groups, the Norwegian partner pointed out in this connection. This was confirmed in our meeting with the study circle at Nassa Ginnery, where one of the kikundi members stated that he represented UDP.
Nationally, UDP is a marginal party with only one Member of Parliament. In Magu district it is the second largest opposition party. Party officials from the national office of UDP we talked to, claimed that the party considers Magu district as one of its strongholds which is to be given high priority in the upcoming election in 2010. According to the chairman of UDP in Magu, the party has branches and members throughout the district. In the ward elections in 2005 UDP won two seats against CUFs four and CCMs twenty one. CHADEMA is not represented in the District Council. In the Parliamentary election in 2005 in Magu Mjinji one of the two constituencies in Magu, the CCM candidate won the seat with 68% of the votes against the CUF candidates 23.8%. Here, the candidates for UDP and CHADEMA won 4.3% and 2% respectively. In Chegeni’s constituency Busega, he won the seat with 72.7% of the votes against the UDP candidates 23.8%. Here CUF won 3.5% and CHADEMA 0% of the votes.

This adds substance to the claim made by UDP officials that their party is Chegenis greatest rival in Magu district. When learning about Haki na Demokrasia, the chairman of UDP in Magu told us, UDP asked CODRA to be included in the project, but the request was denied. The UDP representatives from the national party office we spoke to, voiced similar opinions about the projects. They had been alerted about the Haki and Vijana projects in a meeting with representatives of the Norwegian project partner at the Tanzania Centre for Multiparty Democracy in 2008. At the meeting they had pointed out to Senterpartiet officials that, in their opinion, UDP was the strongest opposition party in Magu district and expressed their concerns about the fact that it was not included in the projects. The UDP party officials found it curious that in spite of this, UDP had not been invited to participate in the conference that was held for the project in Mwanza later that year.

Much has been made of the multiparty nature of the Haki and Vijana projects. We see no good reasons why UDP as an important opposition party in Magu district to a large extent have been excluded from the projects, regardless of which state the party may be in. This circumstance invites speculation about the
project being used as a scheme to further the interest of political actors.\footnote{It should be mentioned in this regard that we have not discussed the exclusion of UDP from Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi with project participants in Magu. It was only after leaving Magu we were alerted to this situation, and at no time during our fieldwork in Magu did any of the actors we came in contact with mention this matter.}

2.3 The sustainability of Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi

A request we recurrently encountered among vikundi members in Magu was that the Norwegian partners should provide them with visible insignia of their membership in the Haki and Vijana projects. In a meeting we had with a Vijana na Ushawishi study circle group in Sogesca, the members requested to be given “sare” ("uniforms"), like t-shirts and caps with the project logo, so that they could more easily identify themselves as representatives of the “Chama cha Vijana” ("Party of Youth") to other members of the local community. Considering that the youths had initially presented themselves as members of three different parties, we found this use of terminology puzzling. When asked to clarify the matter, the kikundi members told us that they indeed considered themselves to constitute a political party and that, nowadays, when attending public meetings they would do so as self-declared representatives of the Party of Youth.

This anecdote is telling, not only of the fact that the Haki and Vijana projects have encouraged youths to take on a more active role in the public life of their local communities, but of how in some cases project participants may develop a shared identity, even to the extent that they come to think of themselves as a political party, presumably in opposition to the parties from which they were originally drawn! While this identity affirmation was a singular occurrence in our fieldwork, it is indicative of a broader and important feature of the Haki and Vijana projects. As Lange (2008) notes, there is an inherent contradiction in contemporary policies to promote good governance in developing countries such as Tanzania. On the one hand, this objective is pursued through
donor supported local government reform programmes, which aim to devolve and decentralise political authority and power to local elect government bodies. On the other hand, donor funded projects aimed to promote good governance often seek to bypass the same local authorities, which are seen as sluggish and corrupt, in order to access the “people” or the “grassroots” directly. In particular, there is a tendency in projects that employ participatory approaches (such as the Haki and Vijana projects) to work through non-elected bodies, like NGOs, CBOs and appointed committees, which operate either in insulation from local authority structures or with weak linkages to them. As Lange shows, rivalries between ambitious actors belonging to such parallel structures and local government structures may serve to undermine policy goals of service production and good governance.

The picture of the Haki and Vijana projects which have come to light in the preceding pages is precisely that of a parallel structure which has emerged alongside and in separation from the already existing organisational structures of political parties and of local government in Magu district. As we have seen, there are reasons to believe that study circle groups have developed linkages to Village Councils in the district, but when it comes to the political party organisations in Magu the connection is arguably weak. CCM, which is the all-dominant party in Magu district, partakes in the Haki and Vijana projects, but as representatives of both CCM and the Norwegian partner testified to, it does so with less enthusiasm than CUF and CHADEMA. A measure of CCMs half-heartedness with regards to the projects is found in the fact that no national representatives of the party attended the conference which was held for the projects in Mwanza in November 2008. It is symptomatic too, that when we inquired to find contact persons for the Haki and Vijana projects at the national level of CCM to interview during our stay in Tanzania, it proved difficult to find anyone. As noted above, the secretary of the regional office of CCM pointed out to us that the Haki and Vijana projects belong to Chegeni and CODRA rather than to CCM. The party secretary referred in this connection to the local political “system”. Members of Parliament are important politicians he asserted, but not key actors in the local government structure, nor are they essential to the party organisation of CCM at the local level. In the party secretary’s opinion, the Haki and Vijana projects have not
properly recognised the historic and present role of CCM in Tanzanian politics, and are biased toward the opposition. In the conversations we had with the party secretaries of CCM in Magu and Mwanza it was pointed out that, unlike the opposition parties, CCM has the organisational capacity and the resources to implement the Haki and Vijana projects on a broad scale in Magu district and elsewhere. To this it can be added that the main opposition party in Magu, UDP, has to a large extent been excluded from the Haki and Vijana projects while CHADEMA, which has few voters in Magu, has been given a prominent role in the projects.

There are two problems in particular which ensue from the projects character as a parallel structure. Firstly, there is the possibility of conflict and rivalries between actors who belong to the Haki and Vijana projects and actors belonging to the party organisations and local government institutions in Magu. The time and resources available for this study have not allowed for a thorough illumination of this question. But as we have seen, there are indications that project participants who hold gatekeeper positions in the projects have used this power to gain leverage against their own parties. The second problem has to do with the sustainability of the Haki and Vijana projects, or lack thereof. It is worth reiterating that the basic idea behind the projects was to use the study circle methodology as a way of disseminating knowledge among members of the grassroots population in Tanzania. The attractiveness of this idea is that it envisages that large numbers of people can be educated on important matters of democracy in a near cost free way. In theory, the process of knowledge dissemination through study circles could be expected to proliferate in a self-perpetuating manner. In their actual operation, we have seen, the Haki and Vijana projects have moved in quite a different direction. The inputs of money and technical assistance from the Norwegian partners have been extensive since the start of the projects. The frequency of visits from Norway to conduct seminars is remarkable, yet these efforts have not enabled the project to operate independently of the Norwegian partner. A project organisation has been set up with various functions, all of which are remunerated, which is overseen and administered by a NGO, which is also compensated for its efforts. This situation has been further complicated by the establishing of a second separate
project with very similar objectives to the first and with a target group which is also difficult to distinguish from the first project. If the projects expand their membership along the lines that have been pursued up until today, the project organisations must also grow in size and complexity and the need for administration will increase as well. To be sure, this state of affairs is not compatible with the idea of cost free knowledge dissemination.

The projects can thus be described as “artificial” in the sense of an organisational structure which to a large extent is upheld by the resources which are injected into it by the Norwegian partner. There is much to suggest that in the event of a removal of the financial and technical assistance from Norway the structure which have been put in place in Magu will collapse. We have noted how the use of *mafogongo* funds and other economic activities in the study circle groups pulls in a different direction, and may provide a basis of sustainability for the projects. Yet in our overall assessment, this can hardly make up for the fact that, more than anything else, what keeps the wheels of the project turning at present is the drive to extract *posho*. This assessment, it is worth noticing, is widely shared by project participants in Magu. In some of our conversations with members of the Steering Committees, study circle group facilitators and other project participants we asked directly if they thought the projects could be carried on without financial support from Norway. The answers we received to this question were all negative.

2.4 Recommendations for *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi*

At this juncture it is worth repeating some of the points we made at the start of the chapter: We have seen that there are indications that the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects do have an impact on local politics in Magu district, and that the projects have contributed to several of their objectives. It is commonly reported by interviewees that the projects have improved working relations between the political parties in Magu. The projects are reported to have encouraged women and youth to take on a more active role as public actors. There are indications that the projects have contributed to promote more accountable conduct in the local
government organisation from the sub-village to the district level. The projects clearly respond to NDS’ primary objective of contributing to democracy building in new and unstable democracies as well as to its more specific aims of promoting participation among women and youth and of strengthening contacts between central, local and grassroots levels of political parties. All actors we have been in contact with in Magu, Mwanza and elsewhere in Tanzania with regards to Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Usbanishi concur in their basic assessments of the projects as potentially important contributions to the education of the grassroots population on issues of democracy and civic rights.

However, we have also seen that the Haki and Vijana projects are flawed in important respects. The reliance on technical assistance from the Norwegian partners is too extensive and the creation of two projects with overlapping objectives and target groups was an unnecessary manoeuvre, which have enlarged the project organisations and the engagement on the Norwegian side. Distracting visions of Norway as a “Promised land” have been fostered among project participants and the projects have succumbed to the allowance culture of the aid industry, which in turn have created problems of free riding on project resources and unrealistic expectations of material returns among project participants. The projects have taken on the character of a parallel structure along side existing structures of party and local government. In their present mode of operation the projects are not sustainable. We have seen as well that there is an element of arbitrariness in the inclusion of political parties in the projects. The second largest opposition party in Magu district, UDP, has to a large extent been excluded from the projects, while CHADEMA, which is not represented in the District Council, has been included. Even more problematic, the projects are likely to have come under the influence of partisan political interests in Magu district. Given this situation, continued funding of the projects in Magu can not be recommended.

The idea of using the study circle methodology as a means of empowering the grassroots population in Tanzania can still prove fruitful in our opinion. Clearly, the Haki and Vijana projects have addressed an important need. We have noted Shivji and Peters (2000) criticism that the Local Government Reform Programme in Tanzania has failed to target local authorities at the sub-district
level. To compensate for this, Shivji and Peters call for a comprehensive programme of civic education aimed to sensitise actors at the grassroots level of government about their democratic rights. For this end, they say, existing programmes of civic education in Tanzania, which tend to take for granted that the role of village and sub-village government bodies is restricted to the effectuation of decisions that are taken elsewhere, must be replaced by a programme which is premised on the experiences and concerns of the grassroots population itself. Their recommendations have to a large extent been adopted in the subsequent phases of the Local Government Reform Programme, to which the Norwegian government has strongly contributed as a donor (Braathen et al. 2005).

The study circle methodology is a potential bottom-up answer to the educational challenge posed by Shivjy and Peter. If projects related to Haki na demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi are to be implemented in other districts in Tanzania, they should incorporate lessons learned from Magu. Firstly, this must entail that projects should give stronger emphasis to the study circle methodology’s potential as a decentralised and low-cost tool of education. This would require a simplification of the project organisation and reduced dependency on technical assistance from the Norwegian partners. The Norwegian project partner should contribute to the training of trainers in districts where the project is implemented. Apart from this, the role of the Norwegian partner in the project should be restricted to tasks of production of study material, planning, peer-reviewing, and administration.

Secondly, clear-cut criteria should be developed for which political parties that are to be included in the project in districts where it is implemented. A reasonable suggestion in this regard is that the inclusion of political parties in the project should be contingent on their popular support in districts where the project is implemented. The target group of projects can for instance be specified as the district branches of political parties that are represented in District Councils where the project is implemented. To preserve the multiparty focus of the project, it should be implemented in districts where there is a relative balance of power between CCM and opposition parties. Thirdly, the project should avoid contributing to the fragmentation of governance structures in districts where it is implemented. The project should be
administered locally by the participating political parties themselves. This means in turn that the project should be implemented in districts where the political parties have the capacity needed to perform these functions.

An interesting alternative is to shift the focus of the project from party assistance to a broader support for local democracy. In such a case, the target group of the project could be the members of the Village Councils in districts where the project is implemented. Most of the project functions of training, monitoring, coordination and administration could be performed by the community development offices of the District Councils, which have resources and competence relevant to these tasks. Districts can be selected on the basis of documented efforts to promote democracy and accountability in local politics. With regard to NDS’ principal goal of promoting democracy and good governance, this approach might prove more fruitful than the approach which has been tried out in Magu district. What is lost in terms of direct capacity building of political parties can be outweighed by gains in terms of the strengthening of institutions of local multiparty democracy.
3 Democracy in Tanzania

In this chapter we describe the cooperation project between Høyre and CHADEMA *Democracy in Tanzania* which has been running since 2006. The project is mainly devoted to capacity building of CHADEMA members, and in particular women and youth, through seminar activities at various locations in Tanzania. As in the previous chapter we will highlight positive and problematic features of the project as we move through the sections, while saving some of our discussions to the closing section of the chapter.

3.1 Background

*Democracy in Tanzania* came about at CHADEMA’s initiative we were informed by the projects contact person in Høyre. The Tanzanian party contacted Høyre through the International Democrat Union (IDU) and requested a cooperation project with its Norwegian counterpart. In 2005 Høyre was granted financial support from NDS to carry out a pre-project in Tanzania. The purpose of the pre-project was to conduct seminars with CHADEMA and to allow Høyre to get to know the party better through meetings with party officials. In the pre-project report it is concluded that the Høyre delegation was given a positive impression of CHADEMA. A cooperation agreement was signed by Høyre and CHADEMA during the visit, and the *Democracy in Tanzania* project commenced the following year.

*Democracy in Tanzania* differs from the *Haki* and *Vijana* projects described in the preceding chapter in several senses. Most obviously it does so by virtue of being a bilateral “sister-party” arrangement between Høyre and CHADEMA. The budgetary size of the project is smaller, with annual budgets of about NOK
190 000. In 2008 the project was given an extra grant which made for a total spending of NOK 411 000. Project activities are of a time limited nature, and are usually carried out over a period of a few weeks every year in connection with the Norwegian partner’s visits to Tanzania. As we have seen, the Haki and Vijana projects are very much tied to a specific geographical location in Tanzania. Democracy in Tanzania is rather rooted in the top-leadership of CHADEMA and project activities are carried out in alternate locations. This points in turn to a difference in philosophy between the two projects: while the Haki and Vijana projects clearly reflect Senterpartiets ideology of decentralisation and the associated belief that “change must come from below”, a Høyre representative we interviewed with regards to Democracy in Tanzania rather stated his conviction that, in order to be effective in bringing about change in the party organisation, it is essential that a sense of ownership to the project is created in the top-leadership of CHADEMA.

3.1.1 Project objectives

Democracy in Tanzania departs from the observations that Tanzania is an emerging democracy with a corrupt government dominated by the CCM party and that the government seeks to impede the development of the political opposition. In project documents it is emphasised that CHADEMA is a stable and serious party, committed to the fight against corruption and as such the “cleanest” party represented in Parliament. To support CHADEMA is accordingly seen as a way of strengthening democracy in Tanzania. It is also emphasised in project documents that, like Høyre, CHADEMA is a party which is based on conservative values, as indicated by its membership in IDU.

In the application for grants from NDS for 2006, the stated objective of Democracy in Tanzania is to “help CHADEMA become a good, decent and effective opposition party”. It is also stated that if CHADEMA “alone or together with other political parties are able to challenge CCM in the next elections in 2010 or 2015, then our work is a success”. The present relevance of these objectives for Democracy in Tanzania was confirmed in conversations we had with the project’s contact person in Høyre, who emphasised recruitment of new members to CHADEMA and the voter
support achieved by the party in the upcoming elections as measures of the success of the project. In later project applications, these objectives have been supplemented by the goals of strengthening the role of women and youth within the party. More specifically, it is stated that the goal of the project is to encourage more women to contest for positions in the party and in Parliament, and to produce a larger group of young aspiring leaders within CHADEMA. In the application for grants for 2008 the goals are stated more modestly as: “To get a broader base of women and youth that is trained in political skills. And that they become active and ready to play a role in CHADEMA and in Tanzanian politics”. Commenting on these objectives, the Høyre representative, highlighted women and youth as categories of the population who are “untainted” (“ubesudlet”) by the “corruption of the past”.

An additional goal of the project, which was highlighted in our conversations with the Norwegian contact person, is to promote learning about Tanzania in Høyre’s party organisation.

3.1.2 Rooting in party organisations

In Norway the International Office of Høyre is responsible for Democracy in Tanzania. The project has been approved by the leadership of the party, which is regularly updated on developments in the project. Several persons have been responsible for the implementation of the project on the side of Høyre. At present the project is administered by the leader of the secretariat of the party’s programme committee. In CHADEMA the Party Leader and the Director of International Affairs are responsible for the project, which is administered at the party’s International Office. The cooperation agreement with Høyre has been approved by the party’s Board of Directors. It was underscored by both partners that all project activities are anchored in CHADEMA’s Strategic Plan.

It can also be noted that throughout the pre-project and project period, Høyre has implemented Democracy in Tanzania in cooperation with other international actors. In the pre-project and the first year of Democracy in Tanzania, Høyre cooperated with the British Conservative Party/Westminster Foundation for Democracy. In 2007 project activities were carried out in
cooperation with the Swedish Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, and in 2008 project activities were carried out in cooperation with the Swedish party Moderaterna. On the whole, Høyre views these partnerships as fruitful since they have allowed the party to draw advantages of accumulated experience from party assistance work in Tanzania. Another reported advantage of the cooperation with Moderaterna is that it allows the two parties to pool resources when implementing seminar activities in Tanzania.

3.1.3 Project activities

As noted, Democracy in Tanzania is for the most part devoted to seminar activities. In 2006 two seminars were conducted; a two day “youth training” seminar and a three days “training of trainers” conference. In 2007 Høyre carried out two seminars in Tunduru in the South Western part of Tanzania, one for the parliamentarian group of CHADEMA and the other for the party’s Women’s Movement. In 2008 the team from Høyre and Moderaterna visited Tanzania two times, and implemented project activities in Dar es Salaam and Mbeya. On both occasions the team gave two seminars for youth and two seminars for women. Two prominent women from Høyre headed one of the seminars. One seminar was devoted to the strengthening of the different management levels of the party organisation in Dar es Salaam. The focus of the seminar in Mbeya was on the imparting of campaign skills to women and young party members.

As the Norwegian contact person explained to us, since 2007 Høyre has in effect developed a “basic course” (“grunnkurs”), which is run at the different seminars. The main teaching components of the seminars are: recruitment of members, communication skills, campaigning skills and SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis. What Høyre tries to convey to participants at the seminars, it was explained, is a set of general tools for party work. It is left to Tanzanian partner to appropriate the teaching and elaborate the tools in ways that make them relevant to the local circumstances. In line with this, CHADEMA brings two types of interpretation expertise to the seminars. A condition for seminar attendance is that participants are competent in English, but in actuality this is rarely the case. Therefore the talks given by representatives of
Høyre/Moderatarne are translated simultaneously into Kiswahili by local interpreters. In addition, CHADEMA brings local resource persons to the events, who seek to adapt what is taught by Høyre to the Tanzanian reality in separate seminar sessions.

In advance of the seminars, Høyre contacts CHADEMA and ask the party to prepare a proposal for seminars within the available financial limits. When the partners have agreed on the topical contents and the time and venue of the activities, CHADEMA takes care of all practical arrangements including the recruitment of local resource persons and seminar participants. The selection of seminar participants is made by a committee consisting of the party’s Director of Training, Director of Youth and Director of Women, who contacts local level party organisations and asks them to nominate candidates for participation in the events. The candidates must submit their personal CVs, and a shortlist is presented to the committee, out of which it selects the participants to the seminars. As we were informed, the persons chosen for participation are typically potential leaders. At the end of seminars, participants are asked to fill in evaluation forms. Since 2008 evaluation reports, which summarise teachings and makes assessments of the activities, are prepared by the Tanzanian partners after the implementation of the seminar activities. These documents are to be distributed to the party leadership in CHADEMA and to the Norwegian partner. A bill for the project activities is presented to the Norwegian partner and settled during the visit.

In addition to the seminar activities, Democracy in Tanzania includes exchange trips to Norway for CHADEMA members. Beginning in 2006 the Party Leader of CHADEMA and one more party representative, have visited Norway each year and held meetings with various party officials from Høyre, participated in the party’s National Congress and visited municipalities with Høyre chairmanship.

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6 We were shown the report from the seminar in June. The report from the December seminar was still in preparation at the time of our visit.
3.1.4 Project participants’ assessments of activities

In this section we account for assessments of Democracy in Tanzania which were forwarded to us in interviews with party representatives of Chadma. Mainly these were party officials from the CHADEMA’s national headquarter. In addition, four regular party members who had participated in seminars in 2008 were interviewed.7

On the whole, the interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the project. Several party officials emphasised that, apart from the time limits (an issue we will return to in section 3.1.6 below), the dialogue between the two partners about project activities is working well. It was reported in this regard that the contact persons from Høyre listen to the wishes of CHADEMA in the planning of activities, and that they show flexibility in allowing CHADEMA to draw its own agenda in the seminars through the use of local resource persons.

When it comes to the party representatives’ appraisals of project activities, most of our interviewees reported that the skills and knowledge that are imparted at the seminars are relevant. In particular, seminar participants found the skills of recruitment and campaigning they had been taught to be useful. Several interviewees said they had employed these skills successfully to recruit new members to the party. Another positive effect of the project activities, which was highlighted by party officials, is that the seminars stimulate networking among party members. As was pointed out to us by a party official, CHADEMA lack the capacity to sustain continual lines of communication with the membership at different organisational levels and in different geographical locations. To gather party members in a region, or from the whole country, is highly valuable in terms of familiarising oneself with the party organisation, the official emphasised. An associated effect of the seminars is that they contribute to the cohesion of the party’s membership. When party members are invited to seminars such as these, a party official explained, they feel that they are “given something important” from the party, and therefore they become

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7 These informants were selected by the CHADEMA national office at our request. One of the informants does not fit the description ”regular”, as she in fact was a member of the National Executive Committee of the party.
more loyal to the party. Party officials from the Women’s movement pointed out that at one of the seminars the Høyre representatives had encouraged the seminar participants to find practical ways of attracting members to the party. This had given birth to the idea of using SACCOs, savings associations similar to those described in the previous chapter (c.f. section 2.2.3), as a means of recruitment and membership cohesion. The use of SACCOs within the women’s movement was considered by the party officials to be successful.

Yet another perceived positive effect of the project activities that was highlighted by interviewees, is that relations with foreign actors such as Høyre lend prestige to CHADEMA. Thus, one party official pointed out that CHADEMA always issue press statements in connection with the study trips to Norway to promote their image as an internationally connected party. It was also pointed out in interviews that seminars have been helpful in terms of promoting an image of CHADEMA as a powerful party at by-elections in Tanzania. Several seminars which have been conducted for the Democracy in Tanzania project outside of Dar es Salaam have been tied to parliamentary by-elections. “When people in the villages see that we are coming with wazungu, this shows them that CHADEMA is a big party”, a party official stated in this regard, adding that: “This has a big impact on people because it shows them that we are an international party”. As can be imagined, there are mixed views on this practice among Tanzanian political actors. In Tunduru in 2007, a seminar with Høyre was conducted during the campaign period. Commenting upon the seminar, a party official noted that this was “very controversial”. The presence of foreigners “in the middle of the campaign” had served to “raise eyebrows” among their competitors, he explained, adding that while some “perceive that we are a powerful party, others rather see that we are being used by whites”. According to CHADEMA officials, the episode sparked negative commentary in local news media. Two members of the Norwegian delegation were arrested by the police during the visit to Tunduru. The contact person for Democracy in Tanzania in CHADEMA emphasised that, to avoid controversy, seminars with Høyre which are held in connection with by-elections must be conducted some time in advance of the elections. Thus, the
A seminar in Mbeya in December 2008 was held two weeks before the campaign period started.

### 3.1.5 Beyond women and youth

We have noted how the seminars conducted for *Democracy in Tanzania* feature sessions headed by the Norwegian/Swedish partners in combination with sessions headed by local resource persons. According to the contact person for the project in CHADEMA, the “grounding” in the Tanzanian experience of the teachings of the Scandinavians that is provided by local resource persons is essential with respect to the productivity of the seminars. On the whole, the contact person found the combined use of local and Scandinavian resources at the seminars to be working well. He did however underscore that it is time for the project partners to develop new training concepts. By now, CHADEMA’s local resource persons are well trained in the concept which has been used since 2007, he pointed out. It would therefore be a waste of resources if Høyre carries on with the standard concept in future visits. The contact person underscored that CHADEMA want to take the project “beyond training of women and youth” and rather focus on trainings on campaign skills for the party’s electoral candidates in the run up to the next elections. This would imply that the target group of the activities is in effect shifted to middle aged men. Judging from our talks with the Norwegian contact person, such a shift of focus in the project activities is seen as interesting by Høyre as well.

“To support women and youth” has without doubt become a mantra in discourses on party assistance and democracy support, and may as such act as a constraint on the development of other legitimate areas of party assistance. Given *Democracy in Tanzania’s* goal of helping CHADEMA to increase the party’s representation in Parliament, a shift of focus onto training of electoral candidates is probably an effective way of spending project resources. By doing so, however, the reformist ambitions of the project would be reduced to that of helping CHADEMA winning elections alone, and this ambition hinges on an analysis of Tanzanian politics of questionable validity we will return to below. It can be noted, however, that CHADEMA needs capacity building in other topical domains. The contact person from CHADEMA pointed in
particular to three such potential areas of assistance. *Firstly*, the party needs assistance in the form of research activities and expert advice to develop comprehensive policies and the party “brand”. *Secondly*, there is a need for assistance to develop the information infrastructure of the party, for instance with regards to the membership records. *Thirdly*, there is a need for assistance on core issues of “party building” or “party organisation”, such as internal elections and management functions. The last area is targeted in cooperation project CHADEMA has with other donors, such as Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, IMD/TCD, Westminster Foundation for Democracy and Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, but in spite of this there is a great need for more support on matters of party organisation, we were informed.

3.1.6 Ad hoc nature of activities

The main objections to the way *Democracy in Tanzania* is carried out which we encountered among party officials in CHADEMA were related to the lack of continual communication with Høyre, and the ad hoc character of project activities. It seems that the seminars that have been conducted for the project have been organised on very short notice. What happens prior to seminars, we were explained, is that Høyre contacts CHADEMA with information about the amount of money available for a seminar in the near future. Then it is left to CHADEMA to prepare a project proposal and make the necessary practical arrangements, sometimes within a time span of a week. In between seminars, it seems, there is little communication between the project partners. As a party official from CHADEMA remarked in this regard: “Now we hear nothing. And we know nothing about what will happen in 2009”.8

CHADEMA officials highlighted several problems which ensue from this lack of communication. *Firstly*, it was complained that the project takes the form of a series of singular events rather than a cumulative process. One party official in CHADEMA we spoke

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8 In a comment to a draft version of this report, a representative of Høyre pointed out that Høyre is not the only cause for this lack of communication. It has often proved difficult for Høyre to get in touch with the Tanzanian project partner.
to, emphasised that he would much prefer that the cooperation with Høyre was of a more programmatic nature. The way things work in the project, he explained, CHADEMA can evaluate but not monitor activities, since these are unique one-time occurrences. Secondly, the short planning horizon of the activities makes it difficult for CHADEMA to see to it that the right people are invited to the seminars, and hence to ensure that the activities are as efficient as possible in terms of developing the party organisation. As the projects contact person in CHADEMA made clear to us, the drive for posho we described in the previous chapter (c.f. section 2.2.4) is a major concern in the Democracy in Tanzania project as well. In his estimation, about 60-70% of the youths and 50-60% of the women who are invited to seminars are serious participants. With more time at their disposal, he asserted, it would be possible for CHADEMA to carry out a more careful screening of candidates for seminar attendance. Talking about the seminars which were conducted in December 2008, another party official explained that for one of the seminars the national office had two days to select the participants and for the other seminar just one day. A third problem ensuing from the lack of communication with Høyre is that it makes it difficult for CHADEMA to coordinate the activities of the project with the party’s other engagements with foreign donor organisations. If CHADEMA was given a yearly schedule of activities for the project, it would be easier for the party to identify thematic gaps in the support it receives for capacity building and to get the best out of all the projects, it was pointed out in this regard. Fourthly, several party officials of CHADEMA we talked to emphasised that the project would be more rewarding to the youth and women’s movements of the party if there was continual communication and exchange of experiences with their counterparts in Høyre.

3.1.7 From events to learning process

We have noted the objection that project activities take the form of singular events. In the continuation of this point it is worth noticing too that several party officials from CHADEMA complained that the seminars are too packed with learning tasks and that the high numbers of participants at the seminars (usually 40-80) makes it difficult to have thorough discussions on the various topics. Talking about the seminar that was conducted for
the women’s movement in June 2008, a party official noted that so much was to be covered in three days, and that time did not allow the participants to digest what was being taught. From a pedagogical perspective this is not effective, the official noted. Along with several other CHADEMA officials we spoke to, the party official attested that international resource persons hardly ever bring written material to the seminars they conduct, not even hand-outs at presentations. In the party officials’ opinion, the seminars would have been more rewarding to participants if the verbal teaching had been coupled with written study materials, for instance in the form of booklets.

These statements find resonance in comments we received about the seminars conducted for the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects (c.f. section 2.1.5 above), and in the findings of other studies of international party assistance. In a survey of party assistance in Kenya, Henningsen (2006) found that a recurring objection to these activities among local party officials was that the activities have the character of events rather than learning processes. As Kumar (2004) notes in this regard, this type of training is usually of a short term nature, rarely exceeding three to four days, with little follow-up: “At most, it seems that a small summary of discussions is prepared and distributed among the participants after an event is over” (2004: 17). One way of compensating for the short term nature of donor engagements, Kumar points out, is to focus activities of trainings of trainers. As he goes on to state: “Developing a core group of trainees at party headquarters who can train regional and local units of the party is crucial to the effectiveness of any training program” (2004: 17). According to project documents, Democracy in Tanzania did include “training of trainers”-activities in its first year of operation. In our opinion, a shift of focus to this type of activities could be an interesting way of ensuring that the project as far as possible works to stimulate comprehensive learning processes among CHADEMA members. We will return to this topic in the closing section of the chapter.

3.1.8 Study trips vs. Exposure trips

As noted, since 2006 the Party Leader and other top politicians from CHADEMA have visited Norway on three occasions as a
part of *Democracy in Tanzania*. In a senior party official’s opinion, study trips such as these are crucial learning experiences for Tanzanian politicians. To travel to Scandinavia and see that people there actually practice what they preach at seminars in Tanzania adds an important flavour to the teachings, he underscored. Another party official we spoke to was of a more mixed opinion with regards to such trips. In particular, he was concerned that the visitations should be used as study trips properly speaking, which can be of benefit to the party organisation and not as “exposure trips” for individual politicians. If such trips are well planned and if there are follow up activities in CHADEMA afterwards to disseminate the knowledge gained abroad, this can be useful to the party organisation, the party official asserted. Usually however, there is no feedback to the party organisation in connection with study trips to donor countries. In these cases, the only purposes served by the trips are related to the image building of individual politicians, and as such this is not an efficient use of project resources. For the prize of sending a single politician to Norway, CHADEMA could have arranged a workshop with thirty participants, the party official noted. Talking specifically about the *Democracy in Tanzania* project, the party official said that the invitations from Høyre should be directed to the party and not to individual politicians, as happened on one occasion. In his opinion, NDS should establish a “qualifying mechanism” to determine which party members are selected to go to Norway, and CHADEMA should establish routines to ensure that feedback is given to the party organisation in connection with such trips.

### 3.2 Recommendations for *Democracy in Tanzania*

*Democracy in Tanzania* is a less complex project than the *Haki na Demokrasia* and *Vijana na Ushawishi* projects described in the previous chapter, and with a smaller scope for intrigue and subversive processes. We have seen that CHADEMA officials express a general satisfaction with the project and with the flexibility of the Norwegian partner. Clearly, *Democracy in Tanzania* contributes to the project’s stated objectives of making CHADEMA a more effective party and of strengthening the role of women and youth within the party. It is reported that the skills
and knowledge that are imparted to CHADEMA members in the seminars are useful, especially with regards to recruitment and campaigning. The seminars with Høyre are seen to contribute to integration of the party organisation and to the projection of a favourable external image of the party. We have highlighted shortcomings of the project tied to insufficient planning and ad hoc nature of project activities, the lack of continual communication between the project partners and the event-character of the trainings. It seems that the need for more rounds of Høyre’s “basic course” has been exhausted in CHADEMA and party officials make requests for the development of new seminar concepts. We have noted the criticism against study trips to Norway as mainly a matter of career enhancement of individual politicians.

We have seen that project activities of Democracy in Tanzania are geared towards the imparting of campaigning and recruitment skills to CHADEMA members, and that the project partners want to focus future activities more directly on training of electoral candidates. In view of the project objective of helping CHADEMA to become an effective party this is a legitimate and reasonable choice of focus. A principal function of political parties is after all to be instruments of voter mobilisation in elections, and as we have seen there is a reported need in CHADEMA for such training. If Høyre and CHADEMA are to proceed with the project in this direction, it is advisable that activities are of a nature which do not invite accusations of foreign interference in Tanzanian election processes. Common rules of etiquette in international engagements aside, it is clearly stated in the NDS Regulations that the organisation does not support electoral campaigning and that a cautious approach should be taken to activities in connection with elections.

The extent to which a focus upon campaigning is congenial with NDS’ primary objective of promoting representative multiparty democracies in new and unstable democracies is debatable. The analysis upon which Democracy in Tanzania rests, partly affirms the ideological affinity between Høyre and CHADEMA, partly it affirms that CHADEMA is the “cleanest” party represented in Parliament in Tanzania. It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to assess the seriousness of CHADEMA as a political party. It can be noted, however, that, in general, African political
parties’ claims to be rooted in ideologies on the Western left-right spectrum are superficial and theories that envisage politics as a struggle between corrupt and anti-democratic actors on the one side, and “clean” and democratically minded actors on the other, are poor guides to African politics. As we have noted several places above, analysts of political power in Tanzania underscore the relative insignificance of formal institutions of government and political party and the importance of informal patron-client relations. Local notions of political legitimacy often correspond uneasily with Western liberal-democratic understandings of good governance and accountable leadership. In line with these considerations, it can be noted that the reformist profile of the project would be strengthened if the focus of activities was shifted onto the other topical domains where CHADEMA has needs for capacity building (policy development, information infrastructure, party organisation) that we identified above.

We have noted the criticism that project activities of Democracy in Tanzania tend to be of an ad hoc nature. In light of this, several suggestions for the improvement of the project can be made: Firstly, Høyre and CHADEMA should prepare yearly activity plans for the project, which would allow for better planning of project activities and coordination with other projects. Secondly, project activities should take the form of training of trainers. Given the modest scale of the project, this is probably the most effective way of spending resources. Thirdly, to ensure the educational effectiveness of project activities the project partners should develop written manuals for the seminar concepts in a low-cost and durable format which can be disseminated among the CHADEMA membership. Fourthly, to improve communication between the project partners and to ensure the continuity of the project, it is advisable that Høyre establishes a project team with representatives from the women’s and youth organisations of the party. With regards to several of these suggestions, Høyre can profit from an exchange of experiences with the project teams of Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen.

For understandable reasons, representatives of the Tanzanian political parties are wary about making criticisms against their Norwegian partners. This adds weight to the objections against the exchange trips to Norway we noted above. Such trips may be rewarding to individual politicians and may serve to strengthen
relations between political parties in Norway and Tanzania. But in our opinion the high cost nature of these activities and their dubious value with regards to development of the party organisation does not justify their inclusion into NDS-projects.
4 Concluding remarks

The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support was formally shut down on May 5, 2009. Nevertheless, as we noted in the introduction, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has signalled that it will carry on with the funding of a programme of Norwegian international party assistance. This opens up for debate about the form of organisation that should be employed in the future scheme of Norwegian party assistance. Donor countries use different types of organisation to channel party assistance to recipient countries, and some of these may serve as models for a future programme of Norwegian party assistance. We will leave this question to the planned evaluation of the NDS system, which is to be ready by the autumn 2009. In what remains of this report we will put forward some other general suggestions with regards to the design of a future scheme of Norwegian party assistance.

In spite of having been in existence for several decades, international party assistance can still be described as an emerging field of international development aid. According to Caton (2007), party assistance is generally characterised by a simultaneous lack of systematisation and contextualisation. Projects of party assistance have often been based on idealist engagement rather than on professionalism. Apart from the overarching goal of promoting democracy, there is no agreed general framework among the actors operating in this field about what party assistance is supposed to achieve and how it should be implemented. At the same time, actors operating in this field tend to apply the same solutions everywhere rather than to tailor the content of the assistance to the local political, social and cultural context in the places where they operate.

The NDS projects we have considered in this report can hardly be described as the products of a consistent Norwegian strategy to
promote multiparty democracy in Tanzania. The projects of Høyre and of Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen have come about as separate initiatives which have been brought under the NDS umbrella. There is little connection between the projects in terms of the approach to party assistance they employ. While the project of the Conservative Party is based on a conception of Tanzanian politics as a struggle between democratic and undemocratic actors, those of Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen are rather premised on the belief that lack of democracy is caused by a lack of knowledge and dialogue among political actors. Above we have noted Hyden’s (2005) assessment that clientilism is the very backbone of politics in Tanzania. Accordingly, it is the economic resources of rivaling elite actors rather than the power of informed arguments or of party ideology and party allegiance which matters in politics. If this assessment is correct, one may question the relevance and realism of the approaches employed both by Høyre and by Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen.

A future programme of Norwegian party assistance should develop comprehensive analyses of the political situation in the countries to which party assistance is directed. While projects of party assistance that are implemented in a country may be of different size and nature, they should be based on a common set of goals and a strategy for how Norwegian party assistance should be applied, which is derived from the analysis of the political situation. In this connection it is important as well to ensure that Norwegian party assistance is coordinated with that of other international actors and to consider if there are particular areas or niches to which the Norwegian contribution should be directed.

In the continuation of this point it is relevant to ask if the present practice of leaving the implementation of projects to the political parties is a good way of meeting the complex challenges involved in international party assistance. As was pointed out in our interviews with the Norwegian project partners, exchange of experience between Høyre and Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen about the implementation of the projects have been minimal. Apart from the processing of applications for funding the NDS secretariat has had little bearing on the projects. Some of the mistakes made in the projects we have highlighted in preceding pages could probably have been avoided if the projects to a larger extent had been based on expert advice. A better solution might be
that projects to a greater extent are implemented by professionals with relevant competence and that the Norwegian political parties rather take on a role as dialogue partners with political parties in cooperating countries. What this suggests in turn is that the organisation responsible for the Norwegian programme of party assistance must command a greater amount of resources than what has been the case in NDS, or alternatively that it should concentrate its activities in a few projects in a few countries only.

Another question that should be given attention in connection with the establishing of a new programme of party assistance, is whether political parties should be targeted directly, as has been the case up until now in NDS, or whether assistance should be given in more indirect ways through assistance for legal and regulatory reforms, the strengthening of electoral commissions or capacity building of parliaments and locally elected government bodies. In countries where there is little to be gained in terms of promoting democracy from direct support to political parties, these indirect forms of assistance can be a more viable way of channelling resources.

Lastly, the forms in which party assistance is delivered should be taken up for consideration in connection with the establishing of a new programme. In the report we have dwelled at the problems and challenges that are tied to the use of seminars and workshops in the NDS projects, and there are good reasons to assume that these are not unique to Tanzania. Workshops and seminars are well established methods of channelling resources to the recipients of party assistance, perhaps to the extent of being seen as a “natural” solution, but this is not necessarily the most effective way of strengthening political parties in cooperating countries. One alternative we have pointed to in the report is to concentrate activities on training of trainers. In connection with the establishing of a new programme of party assistance other forms of support should be explored as well.
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Framework of Governance at Sub-District level in the Context of local Government reform Programme”.
University of Dar es Salaam
Appendix 1

List of interviewees:

In Mwanza and Magu
Steering Committee of *Haki na Demokrasia*:
Manyanza Staslaus
Dominique Bubesh
Amina Chediel
Marco Kahuluda
Zena Zacharia

Steering Committee of *Vijana na Ushawishi*:
Mshemasi Bahayi
Samweli Bulayi
Emmanuel Sabuni
Teddy Kachilu
M. Mayandikiya

Study circle groups from *Haki na Demokrasia*:

**Time and place:** Nyamikoma 13/1
**Facilitator/party:** Sylvestre Ntobi CCM

NIBR Report: 2009:16
Number of persons present in group interview: 22

Local leader interviewed: C. Kicmka, Chairperson School Committee

Time and place: Nassa Ginnery 13/1
Facilitator/party: Ramadhan Msoka CCM

Number of persons present in group interview: 14
Local leader interviewed: N. Mbuba, Chairperson School Committee

Time and place: Kisesa 14/1
Facilitator/party: Amina Chediel CUF

Number of persons present in group interview: 11
Local leader interviewed: A. Marore, Chairperson School Committee

Time and place: Matela 14/1
Facilitator/party: Mashiku Kamata CHADEMA

Number of persons present in group interview: 12
Local leader interviewed: T. Nicus, Village Executive Officer, D, Shija, Chairperson Village Council

Time and place: Itumbili 15/1
Facilitator/party: Fatuma Omari CUF

Number of persons present in group interview: 4
Study circle groups from *Vijana na Ushawishi:*

**Time and place:** Sogesca 13/1  
**Facilitator/party:** Monica Mwelevu CHADEMA  
**Number of persons present in group interview:** 13  
**Local leader interviewed:** J. Luzerera, Village Executive Officer

**Time and place:** Nyamahanga 14/1  
**Facilitator/party:** Peter Lupasha CHADEMA  
**Number of persons present in group interview:** 8  
**Local leader interviewed:** M. Mariko, Chairperson School Committee

**Time and place:** Nyalikungu 15/1  
**Facilitator/party:** Emmanuel Sabuni CCM  
**Number of persons present in group interview:** 6

**Time and place:** Nyalikungu 15/1  
**Facilitator/party:** Dotto Guloli CHADEMA  
**Number of persons present in group interview:** 8

**Magu District Council:**  
The District Commissioner  
The District Executive Director  
The District Planning Officer

NIBR Report: 2009:16
Politicians:
J. Ngongosiki UDP
N. Lupondije CHADEMA
B. Abdallah CUF
S. Masinde CHADEMA
K. Ndaghine CCM

CODRA:
Samuel Ibambasi

In Dar es Salaam

CHADEMA:
John Mnyika
John Mrema
Hamadi Yosuf
Anthony Komu
Regia Mttema
Deo Meck
David Kafulia
Naomi Kaikula
Stephen Mbogo
Victor Kimesera
Dady Igogo
Ally Shaibu
Anina Litaka
Farida Moniba
Esther Jacob
UDP:
Isaac Cheyo
John Nkolo

TCD:
Daniel Loya

Royal Norwegian Embassy:
Kjersti Tromsdal

In Norway:
Rune Aale-Hansen
Inger Bigum
Erlend Fuglum
Hilde Søraas Grønnhovd
Anne Marie Lerfall
Appendix 2

Letter from Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support
Invitasjon til deltakelse i anbudsår

Norsk senter for demokratistøtte (NDS) gir støtte til nye demokratier i utvikling. Vårt hovedmål er å bidra til framveksten av flerpartidemokratier og frie valg i sør. Dette gjør vi ved å kanalisere støtte gjennom norske politiske partier til partier i sør. Ideen er at den demokratikompetansen norske partier besitter, kan brukes i utviklingen av sterke og stabile demokratier i andre deler av verden.

NDS skal høsten 2008 foreta en eksternevaluering av tre av sine prosjekter, alle i Tanzania. I den forbindelse inviterer vi Norsk institutt for by- og regionsforskning (NIBR) til å delta i en anbudsår for gjennomføring av evalueringen.

Prosjektene er samarbeidsprosjekter mellom h.v. Senterpartiet, CCM, CUF og Chadema, Senterungdommen, CCM, CUF og Chadema og Høyre og Chadema

Formålet med evalueringen er å lære av de erfaringer som har blitt gjort i prosjektene.


For ytterligere informasjon, ta kontakt med NDS ved Eva Langslet.

Med vennlig hilsen

Anja Rjiser
Sekretariatsleder

Vedledd: Rammedokument for evaluering av prosjekter i Tanzania 2008, NDS strategi 2007-2010
Rammedokument for evaluering av prosjekter i Tanzania 2008

1. Bakgrunn, hensikt og mål for evalueringen
1.1 Bakgrunn for evalueringen
Evaluering er et av flere læringsverktøy for NDS. Strategi for 2007 – 2010 fremhever at NDS skal tilrettelegge for en ekstern evaluering i året. NDS ønsker å evaluere tre av fire prosjekter i Tanzania, SP/CCM/CUF/Chadema, SPU/CCM/CUF/Chadema og Høyre/Chadema.

1.2 Hensikt med evalueringen

1.3. Mål (Undersøgelsesmål identificeres i samarbeid med evaluator og prosjektpartnerne)
Evalueringen har som mål å belyse følgende resultatmål

1. Bidrar prosjektene til h.h.v. å hjelpe Chadema å bli ett mer effektivt parti (H-Chadema-prosjektet), styrke grasrotas innflytelse i de politiske partiene, med spesiell fokus på kvinner og ungdom (SP/SPU – CCM/Chadema/CUF). Det er ønskelig at evalueringen også belyser hvorvidt studiesirkelmetoden er hensiktsmessig i den lokale konteksten.

2. Har NDS og partnene rutiner som sikrere kvalitet og effektivitet hos prosjektene, herunder også budsjett- og regnskapsmessig etterrrettelighet.

2. Rekkevidde, nivå og kriterier
2.1 Rekkevidde
Økonomisk kostnadsramme er NOK 300 000,- inkl. moms. Dette skal dekke konsulenthonorar, reisekostnader, kostnader i forbindelse med utarbeide rapport og presentasjon for NDS styrende organer, inkl ev. oversettelser. Arbeidet består av intervjuer med prosjektkoordinatorer, tillitsvalgte i partiene, prosjektdeaktakere, sekretariatet, styret, dokumentgjennomgang og analyse av funnene. Arbeidet skal utføres i Norge og Tanzania.

2.2 Nivå
Det legges opp til at evalueringen skal fokusere på hvorvidt prosjektdeaktakene bruker den kunnskapen og kompetansen de har tilgjengelig (outcome-nivå). NDS ønsker at det skal vurderes sammenhengen mellom innsatsfaktorer og resulter. Det skal tas hensyn til prosjektene ulikhet både i forhold til størrelse og når de ble etablert.

Det er også ønskelig med en kort vurdering av sammenhengene mellom NDS overordnede mål og prosjektmålene.
2.3 Evalueringsskriterier
NDS ønsker at evalueringen vektlegger relevans, produktivitet og måloppnåelse. Bærekraft har ikke vært et tildelingskriterium, men er relevant i forhold til vurdering av i hvilken grad prosjektene har bidratt til endring av holdninger og adferd.

3 Kontekst/bakgrunn
3.1 Kontekst
Se NDS overordnede målsetning og strategi (vedlegg)

3.2 Institutionell kontekst
Å sikre godt styresett er et hovedmål innenfor norsk utviklingspolitikk. Norsk senter for Demokratistøtte (NDS) ble opprettet for å styrke dette arbeidet. NDS er et partipolitisk nøytralt organ, hvis hovedmål er å bidra til framveksten av fjerpartidemokratier og frie valg. Hovedtanken bak etableringen av NDS er at den kompetansen norske politiske partier besitter kan brukes i utviklingen av sterke og stabile demokratier i andre deler av verden.

NDS består av et råd, et styre og et sekretariat. Rådet består av general- partisekretærer og to representanter for alle de politiske partiene med representasjon på Stortinget. Rådet møtes hvert annet år. Styret består av en representant fra hver av de politiske partiene med representasjon på Stortinget samt tre uavhengige representanter. Styret møtes to til fire ganger i året for å behandle søknader om støtte og legge den videre strategien for senterets virksomhet. Sekretariatet har ansvaret for den daglige driften av NDS. NDS har en total økonomisk ramme på NOK 8,5 millioner for inneværende år. Partiene er ansvarlige for gjennomføring av bilaterale prosjekter.

Høyre ble etablert 1884, og har ca 67 000 medlemmer. Partiet er representert i 19 fylker og har ca 600 lokallag. Øverste organ er landsmøtet, som avholdes hvert år. Landsmøtet velger partileder og to nestledere hvert annet år. Landsmøtet velger også sentralstyret, som består av partilederen, arbeidsutvalget og en representant fra hvert fylke. Høyre fikk 14,1 % av stemmene ved siste stortingsvalg.

Senterpartiet ble etablert i 1920 og har ca 25 000 medlemmer. Partiet er representert i alle 19 fylkene og har ca x lokallag. Landsmøtet er øverste organ og avholdes hvert annet år. Landsmøtet velger partilederen. Mellom landsmøtene er landsstyret partiets øverste organ, og består av sentralstyret, fylkesorganisasjonenes ledere, to representanter fra Stortinget, en representant fra Sametinget, tre representanter fra Senterkvinnene, tre representanter fra Senterungdommens Landsforbund, to representanter fra Senterpartiets Sekretærforbund, en representant fra styret i Samepolitisk Råd. Senterpartiet fikk 6,5 % av stemmene ved forrige stortingsvalg.

3.3 Sosiopolitiske kontekst
Det skal tas hensyn til den sosiopolitiske konteksten i området.

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1 OECD har definert fem DAC-kriterier for evaluering av utviklingssamarbeid; Relevance (relevans), efficiency (produktivitet), effectiveness (måloppnåelse), virkning (impact), sustainability (bærekraft)
3.4. Gjennomføringsarrangement
NDS ved Sekretariatet er oppdragsgiver. Sekretariatet skal fungere som tilrettelegger for prosessen, og opprette kontakt med de ulike partene og bistå med praktiske arrangementer i Norge og Tanzania.

Prosjektspartnerne: Partiene og deres partnere har ansvaret for å delta på de møtene sekretariatet i samarbeid med evaluatørene ber om. Prosjektpartnerne er også ansvarlige for å skaffe tilveie all tilgjengelig dokumentasjon relatert til prosjektene.

Evaluators rolle: NDS ønsker å tilrettelegge for at evaluators rolle skal kunne være så fri og uavhengig som mulig. Evaluerer har taushetsplikt om prosess, rapport og resultater av evalueringen. Eventuelle uenigheter om resultat skal reflekteres i rapporten. Offentliggjøring av rapport vil besluttes av NDS styre etter fremleggelse. Resultatene fremlegges gjennom en foreløpig rapport (muntlig), en slutt rapport (skriftlig) og en presentasjon for NDS.

Den økonomiske rammen er inntil NOK 300 000,- inkl moms.

4. Evalueringsmetode
4.1 Forklaring av metoden
Sekretariatet ønsker å tilrettelegge for en inkluderende prosess, der partene har mulighet til å komme med innsfall og bidra med å utforme evalueringsspørsmålene. Evalueringen skal gjennomføres gjennom intervjuer og dokumentgjennomgang både i Norge og Tanzania. Evalueringen bør baseres på både semistrukturerte og åpne intervjuer, samt utarbeidelse av spørreskjemaer. Det er ønskelig at rapporten kommenterer eventuell påvirkningsproblematikk, hindringer, problemer møtt og hvilke konsekvenser dette måtte ha for datainnsamlingen og uavhengigheten av resultatene.

5. Prosess

6. Kompetansekrav og levering av produkt
NDS vil innhente anbud hos organisasjoner som har erfaring med evalueringer innenfor området sivilt samfunn/demokrat/politiske systemer/institusjonsbygging. Videre er det et krav at de har erfaring fra evalueringer i Øst-Afrika, og helst Tanzania. Det er et ønske, men ikke et krav at teamet behersker swahili.

\[\text{Alle tidsfrister er tentatív}\]
Appendix 3

Project proposal

Project proposal

Evaluation of NDS projects in Tanzania

Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research
1/10-2008

Introduction

NDS has invited NIBR to submit a project proposal for the evaluation of three cooperation projects implemented by Høyre, Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen and their respective partners in Tanzania. The principal goal of the evaluation is to promote learning from project experiences among partners involved in NDS-projects. More specifically, the aim of the evaluation is to illuminate the following questions:

1. Does the projects contribute to make Chadema a more effective political party and to strengthen grassroots influence in CCM, Chadema and CUF? With regards to the last question, the evaluation should consider the usefulness of the study circle approach employed by Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen.

2. Do NDS and its partners have routines to ensure quality and effectiveness in the projects, including budgetary and financial accuracy?
In what follows we present NIBRs approach to these research questions, our plan for the study, the project organisation and budget.

The transition to multiparty politics in Tanzania

After nearly thirty years of one-party rule under Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) multiparty politics was reintroduced in Tanzania in 1992. In the wake of the constitutional reform, efforts have been made by the Tanzanian government to separate the civil services from the structures of the CCM-party, to create a space of operation for civil society actors and to achieve devolution of political power through a local government reform programme.

The ‘second wave’ of political liberalisation in Africa was in most places strongly induced by international donor pressure, but in Tanzania the transition to multiparty politics came about mainly as a result of domestic political processes. The call for multipartyism emerged from within CCM, what some commentators view as a tactical attempt to secure the party’s future dominance in the country. Tanzania differs from its neighbouring countries, also in the sense that ethnicity does not feature prominently in party politics. The policy of national unity which was pursued by CCM under the one-party era has been carried forward successfully in Tanzania after the introduction of multipartyism, through a ban on regional and religious parties. Important exceptions to this are Zanzibar and the Kilimanjaro district, where communal identities are a major source of political mobilisation.

In other respects Tanzania conforms to the contemporary pattern of party politics in Africa. Political parties in Tanzania are generally described as weakly developed democratic institutions. Partly, this point to their centralised, top-down, structures of decision making, which gives members at the grassroots level little scope for exerting influence. Partly, it points to the tendency that political parties come to serve as the personal instruments of wealthy individuals rather than as institutions of political mass mobilisation. In a recent study from the Mwanza region, Lange

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9 In the last two elections Zanzibar has been rocked by political violence. CUF is involved in two of NDS projects that are to be considered in the evaluation, but the scope of the evaluation does not allow us to dwell on the Zanzibar situation.
(2008) notes that growing class polarisation since the 1980ies have served to amplify tendencies of patron-client politics in local politics. As a consequence of this, women and youth, who are generally less resourceful economically than men, are effectively excluded from competition for political positions.

Appeals to values of liberal democracy among political actors in Tanzania may thus be little more than a rhetorical wrapping of actual political processes. Understanding and coping with differences in political culture is an important challenge to Norwegian political parties who want to enter into cooperation with parties in Tanzania.

**NDS-projects in Tanzania**

The projects which are to be considered in the evaluation are:

*Democracy in Tanzania*, a cooperation project Høyre carried out with its partner Chadema in 2007. The project consisted of two seminars held in Tunduru, one with the parliamentary group of Chadema and the other with the woman’s movement of the party. The activities were carried out in cooperation with the Jarl Hjalmarsson Foundation. Included in the project was a visit to Norway for the party leader and a MP of Chadema, who where official guests at Høyre’s National Delegates Conference, had meetings with party representatives and visited the municipality of Oppegård. The stated goal of the project was to make Chadema a more efficient party.

*Haki Na Demokrasia* is a more extensive ongoing cooperation project between Senterpartiet and CCM, Chadema and CUF in Magu district, Mwanza region. The project has been running since 2006, following pilot activities in 2002, 2003 and 2005. The aim of the project is to strengthen the political parties through capacity building of the grassroots membership in Magu district. The project makes use of the study circle methodology to stimulate learning and discussions on issues of democracy among party members. Project activities include training of study circle leaders, training of local study material writers and the production of study-material booklets in English and Kiswahili. Included in the project is also “training of trainers”, to ensure that the activities are carried on in the future independently of the Norwegian partners. The project is overseen by a steering committee with members
from the three parties. Project activities are facilitated by CODRA, a local NGO. The study circles which have been established operate continuously at the village level. In 2008 about 60 study circle groups with a total of about 1200 members were active in Magu district.

*Vijana na ushawishi* is an offshoot of *Haki Na Demokrasia* which has been run by Senterungdommen in partnership with the youth branches of CCM, CUF and Chadema in Magu district since 2006. The goal of the project is to empower the local youth branches of the three political parties and to strengthen young people’s role in the local party organisations. As with *Haki Na Demokrasia*, the project relies on the study circle methodology and project activities have in the main focused on the training of study circle leaders and the production of study material.

While all three projects fall into the category of ‘capacity building’ they present us with two markedly different approaches to achieve this end. With respect to the overarching goal of the evaluation of promoting learning among NDS partners, it will be interesting to draw comparisons between the Høyre-Chadema project and the Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen CCM, Chadema and CUF projects as contrasting case studies.

The Høyre-Chadema project employed a conventional approach to capacity building of political parties. In a study of donor funded activities to support political parties in Kenya, Henningsen (2006) found that the bulk of these activities consisted of workshops/seminars with external facilitators directed at representatives at the national executive level of the political parties. To throw light on the Høyre-Chadema project, it will be important to make project participants specify how and in what ways the activities have contributed to strengthen Chadema. One reported problem with this type of activities is that they tend to take on the character of singular events rather than learning processes. As Green (2003) notes in a study of workshops as the standardised tool of ‘participatory’ development activities in Tanzania, participants to these events are often motivated by other concerns than the stated goals of workshops (e.g. prestige, material benefits) and workshop facilitators are often ignorant with regards to the socio-cultural context in which they operate.
Most of our efforts will be devoted to document the Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen-CCM, Chadema and CUF projects in Magu. Partly, this is because these projects are more extensive with regards to the number of people involved, their budgetary size and their duration. Partly it is because these projects can be described as innovative in several respects. As the study from Kenya indicates, the grassroots membership of political parties has to a large extent been neglected by NGOs and institutions who work to strengthen political parties. The study circle approach is an interesting attempt to embed learning processes in political parties in a more thorough manner than what is often the case in capacity building projects. In our study we will strive to document the ways in which the study circle groups have functioned, and describe mechanisms that make them successful or that works to subvert them. In this connection it is important to consider whether the competence gained by grassroots members through participation in study circles works to enhance their political influence. Capacity building of woman and youth may be of little consequence if the structures of exclusion which keep them out of political positions remain intact.

Method

To illuminate these questions, we will carry out a study based on semi-structured interviews with persons involved in the projects in Norway and Tanzania and a review of relevant documents. More specifically, we will carry out fieldwork in Tanzania in December 2008 over a period of two weeks. Four to five days will be spent in Dar Es Salaam and/or Dodoma, where we will conduct interviews with MPs and representatives of the woman movement of Chadema who participated in the cooperation project with Høyre. Here, we will also interview national representatives of CCM and CUF with regards to the national impact of the projects of Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen. The rest of our fieldwork will be spent in Magu district in Mwanza region. In Magu we will carry out interviews with members of the steering committee from CCM, Chadema and CUF, project facilitators from CODRA and study material writers. Based on consultations with the steering committee and CODRA we will select three well functioning study circles from the Senterpartiet project and three from the Senterungdommen project, and carry out interviews with study circle leaders and two or more members of each study circle. Prior
to and after the fieldwork in Tanzania, we will conduct interviews in Norway with representatives of Høyre, Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen who have had central roles in the projects.