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Rio de Janeiro: Favela policies and recent social mobilizations
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Abstract: This report addresses public policies and social mobilizations in informal settlements (favelas) of Rio de Janeiro. The report presents case studies from three ‘subnormal’ settlements - Morro da Providência (favela), Manguinhos (favela) and Vila Autódromo. Each case study depicts the history of the settlement as well as the recent encounters between government and residents. The report focuses on a 5 year period until the aftermath of the historical mass protests in June 2013.

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Preface

The EU-funded project *Chance2Sustain: Urban Opportunities – Urban Growth and The Sustainability Challenge* (2010-2014) has produced case studies from four countries – India, South Africa, Brazil and Peru. One of the aims is to understand better to what extent, and how, citizens and governments mobilize and co-operate to reduce urban inequalities. A special work package (WP3) has dealt with these issues. This report is an updated and improved version of the WP3 report on Rio de Janeiro written in 2012 [Braathen, E. (ed.), *Addressing Sub-Standard Settlements*. Bonn: European Association of Development Institutes. Published on www.chance2sustain.eu].

The report is mainly based on data collected from August 2011 to June 2012. However, in light of the municipal elections in September 2012 and particularly the mass demonstrations protests that shook Brazil in June 2013, we felt the need to update the report as these events had noteworthy impacts on our cases. We thus ask the reader to bear in mind that the report has been written in several stages. For further updates about the development in Rio de Janeiro and the favelas dealt with in this report, please check our blog and website: [www.nibrinternational.no/Brazilian_Urban_Politics](http://www.nibrinternational.no/Brazilian_Urban_Politics).

_Einar Braathen_ (senior researcher, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, email einar.braathen@nibr.no) has been the project leader and main author of the report. He was responsible for the Vila Autódromo and Morro da Providência case studies. _Celina Sørboe_ (research assistant, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional research) helped to write the updated version of the report. _Timo Bartholl_ (Phd student, Dept. of Human Geography, Universidade Federal Fluminense) was responsible for the Manguinho case study, where he was assisted by Ludmila Cardoso de Almeida. _Ana Carolina Christovão_ (researcher, Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano e Regional - IPPUR, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro) contributed to chapter 2 and the Vila Autódromo case study. _Valéria Pinheiro_ (master student, IPPUR, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro) was co-responsible for the Morro da Providência case study.

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Oslo, December 2013

Marit Haug
Research Director

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Summary

Einar Braathen with Celina Myrann Sorhøe, Timo Bartholl, Ana Carolina Christovão and Valéria Pinheiro.

Rio de Janeiro: Favela policies and recent social mobilizations
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This report addresses public policies and social mobilizations in ‘subnormal settlements’ (usually ‘favelas’) of Rio de Janeiro. Recent government programmes and decisions – many of them related to the coming mega sports events (FIFA 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games) – have intervened directly into the daily life and future of the settlements. The public policy statements that accompany the interventions express an interest in reducing urban poverty and assisting the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the city. However, the interventions have not been based on participatory and empowered planning within the targeted communities themselves, sparking social mobilizations. The report has three sections:

The first section introduces the background and context in Rio de Janeiro, including the history of urban development and favela politics, post-dictatorship policies addressing urban poverty and inequality, and urban development in Rio since 2010. The second section presents case studies from three favelas - Morro da Providência, Manguinhos and Vila Autódromo. Each case study depicts the history of the settlement as well as the encounters between government and residents. The third section draws comparisons between the cases, commenting on how and why the governmental interventions have unleashed different forms, levels and patterns of social mobilization. In Vila Autódromo the unity of action has been strong, and every new attempt of removals has been met by adequate and high level of mobilization. In Manguinhos the unity of collective action has been weak, and after 2009 a steady decline of social mobilization has been observed. Morro da Providência has offered an intermediate case of uneven mobilization.

In a longitudinal perspective, one can suggest at least two different interpretations of the recent encounter between public authorities and poor communities. These two interpretations may serve as competing hypotheses, or ideal-types, for further empirical and analytical work.

The first one emphasizes how the legacy of one type of tyranny after the other (military rule, armed drug traffickers’ rule, military and police occupation of the favela after 2008) has created a certain governmentality. This legacy resulted in a modernized repressive regime after 2010; the tyranny of time, science and force. This configuration combines the capitalist-managerial expediency in handling urban renewal, paternalist middle-class concern for the environment and the residents’ health, and soft community policing. Thus, the ‘subnormal’ settlement is not capable
of acting as a social collective. Still, there is room for individual adaptations to the prevailing regime, assisted by human rights activists and judicial devices of a partially democratized and liberal state.

The second is more optimistic. In Foucauldian terms, resistance against the destruction and repression caused by modern urban governmentality is found in many favelas. Identity politics, centered on Afro-Brazilian and cultural heritance, can be been anchored in a delimited territory from which social mobilization could be launched. The conflict is been successfully socialized and politicized. An alliance with all-city and even national civic networks is established, and the struggle becomes a symbol for the resistance of a radical(ized) civil society against neo-liberal urban plans in Rio de Janeiro and globally.

In other words, what has been observed is the conflictual political-social transformation of metropolitan Brazil.
1 Introduction

According to the data provided by the 2010 Census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 22% of Rio de Janeiro’s population lives in ‘subnormal settlements’ or slum areas – the favelas. In the entire metropolitan region there are 1,702,073 people living in slum areas, which shows the high concentration of favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro. However, not all the households in the favelas are poor, and there are many clusters of poor households located outside the favelas.

Urban poverty is spread out in the whole metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. Different to most cities, Rio de Janeiro presents a close proximity between rich and poor neighbourhoods. Historically, the favelas originated on the steep hillsides (morros) that are a common aspect of Rio de Janeiro’s topography. The difficulties to build proper infra-structure on those areas made them less appealing for the development of real estate projects. Gradually, the contrast between the poor and rich areas of the city was popularly consolidated in the dichotomy ‘favela x asfalto’ (slum vs pavement) - in a reference to the fact that most slums did not have paved (asphalted) streets.

Figure 1.1 Distribution of favelas in Rio de Janeiro and location of the three settlements selected for case studies.
Despite the fact that slums are present virtually everywhere in Rio de Janeiro, it is possible to distinguish a spatial organization of socio-economic conditions in the city. The traditionally rich areas in which upper and middle classes live are the south zone (Zona Sul with e.g. Botafogo, Copacabana, Ipanema), the beach area of the west zone (Zona Oeste with e.g. São Conrado and Barra de Tijuca), and areas of the north zones (Zona Norte) close to the downtown (e.g. Vila Isabel and Tijuca). The inland parts of the west zone, areas of the north zone far away from downtown, and the Baixada Fluminense are typically areas in which lower middle classes and poor families live.

Looking at the history of the urban development of the city, the favelas were an organic result of the patchy urbanization process of the city. Following the consolidation of new middle-class neighbourhoods, the favelas were providers of cheap and near-by available labour force. The inhabitants of favelas would have different types of menial jobs in richer areas (from housemaids and cooks to doormen, waiters, and many others), while conveniently living close to their employers. As a result, wages could be kept relatively low and investments in infra-structure in other areas of the city indefinitely postponed.

This report presents three case studies. While some residents in the focused settlements have objections against adopting the sometimes derogatory term favela in their case, they share three main characteristics: Firstly, their populations are much poorer than in the upper middle class neighbourhoods. Secondly, the property and tenure rights of their residents have not been duly recognized by the public authorities. The settlements have at most a semi-legal status. There is little or no regular urban infra-structure, secured by the public authorities. Thus they are what we define as ‘sub-standard settlements’, reflecting the deep socio-spatial inequality in the city. Thirdly, recent government programmes and decisions intervene directly into the daily life and future of the settlements, implying removal and/or resettlement for a large part of the residents. These interventions have sparked social mobilizations within and around the settlements, and the mobilizations are the main reasons for them being selected for this study. The three settlements are:

- **Morro da Providência**, the first favela of Rio de Janeiro, located in the central part and historical downtown of the city. It has been indirectly affected by the large urban renewal programme for the old port area of the city, Porto Maravilha, which is linked to the development plans for the 2016 Olympic Games. It takes a direct part in a grand upgrading programme for the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, *Morar Carioca*.

- **Manguinhos**, a cluster of sub-standard settlements in a (des-)industrialized area in the Northern zone of the city. It has been subject to a large federal programme designed in 2007, the Growth Acceleration Programme (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC*). PAC became even more important with the global financial crisis in 2008, to counter the negative economic effects on Brazil. PAC includes a large programme for urban infrastructures and housing.

- **Vila Autódromo**, a fishing village which developed into a working class neighbourhood during the construction of the upper middle class boomtown

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1 The resident of the Vila Autódromo, the third case, emphasize that their settlement is not and has never been a favela (slum).
Barra de Tijuca in the Western zone. This is where the main sports arenas and accommodation centres for the 2016 Olympic Games are to be located. Vila Autódromo is threatened by collective relocation.

Each case study depicts the history of the settlement as well as the recent encounter between government and residents. The trajectory of social mobilization is analyzed. In Vila Autódromo the unity of action has been strong all the way, and the residents have been able to respond to any new approach by the government with adequate forms and levels of mobilization. In Manguinhos the unity of action has been weak, and after 2009 a steady decline of social mobilization has been observed. Morro da Providência provides an intermediate case, of uneven mobilization: the unity of action has been weak, but there have been repeated surges of high mobilization by the dwellers most directly affected by government interventions. While obvious social-structural factors (size, ethnic heterogeneity, exposure to outside world) may explain some of the variations in terms of mobilization, our analysis tries to identify elements of the history embodying the settlement as well as its relationships to social movements and politics – power relations between the state and society at the local level – in order to understand the different courses of action in the three cases.
2  Background and context

2.1  A brief history of urban development and favela politics in Rio de Janeiro.

The history of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro began after the urban reform implemented by mayor Pereira Passos (1902-1906). The Reforma Passos promoted a radical redesign of the downtown area of Rio de Janeiro in order to open broad boulevards and avenues. Henceforth, many tenements (cortiços) were demolished leaving many poor families homeless. As a result, these families began to occupy the hillsides close to downtown, which would later become the favelas.

Since its origins, the favelas represented a problem for the elites and city-planners and raised multiple concerns. Sanitation, public security and aesthetic issues are some of the common arguments raised in favour of removing the favelas. The general agreement that the favelas were a public issue that should be addressed inspired the Public Works Code of Rio de Janeiro. Elaborated in 1937, city-planners would use the code to build “working class housing blocks” (parques proletários) for the population living in favelas. The aim was to build areas where former individuals living in favelas could be “re-socialized” through proper housing conditions. As a reaction to this process, residents of favelas founded the first “residents’ committees” (comissões de moradores) with the support of the Catholic Church to contest the removals of favelas.

Although many civil society organizations were severely repressed during the period of the military dictatorship that began in 1964, the residents associations did not disappear. They became, to a large extent during this period, part of the state apparatus receiving support from the state in order to support the accelerating removal process. During 1960s, the removal of favelas was boosted by the support of foreign development agencies, such as USAID. The American development agency funded the construction of housing for former favela residents in Cidade de Deus, Vila Kennedy, Vila Aliança and Vila Esperança. In general, these housing projects were located in areas far away from downtown and other richer neighbourhoods of the city.

Despite the repression by the authoritarian regime, there was a strengthening of a discourse against the removals and in favour of up-grading the favelas. During the re-democratization period that began in the 1980s, this discourse gained political support after the election of Leonel Brizola as governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro. As a member of the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), Brizola elaborated a social agenda for the favelas – despite the lack of support from the federal government. The premise of this agenda was the need for integrating the favelas with
the city and to avoid removals. During his first mandate (1983-1987), Brizola promoted programmes to improve housing sanitation and electricity provision in favelas. In addition, a small-scale programme called *Mutirões* (‘community self-help’) was responsible for improving urban infra-structure in 60 favelas. These programmes would be important experiences for the implementation of the more ambitious programme *Favela-Bairro* during the 1990s.

2.2 Post-dictatorship policies addressing urban poverty and inequality in Rio

The *Favela-Bairro* programme offered in-situ rehabilitation\(^2\) implemented during the administrations of the mayor Cesar Maia (1993-97 and 2001-2008). Its main objective was to improve the infra-structure of the favelas. The programme started in 1993 and lasted until 2008 and was conducted by the Municipal Housing Secretariat (*Secretaria Municipal de Habitação*). The programme was mainly funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) responsible for providing more than US$180 million for infra-structure improvements in the favelas. The programme also had the ambition to promote the residents’ legal ownership in the favelas through the establishment of Areas of Special Social Interest (AEIS). However, only a few had their situation regularized. The *Favela-Bairro* programme, focusing only on the urbanization of the existing slums, did not promote the construction of new houses. Consequently little was made to address the chronic housing deficit in Rio de Janeiro during those years. Another important characteristic of the programme was the lack of popular participation during the design of the urbanization projects in the favelas. Most projects in particular favelas received little input from the local residents, even creating conflicts in some cases. The underlying logic driving the whole project was to improve favelas closer to richer neighbourhoods and touristic areas in order to improve the attractiveness of Rio de Janeiro to the private capital.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) In Portuguese: *(programme de) ‘urbanização’. Although the emphasis is usually more on infrastructure development than on house up-grading, it can be translated to in-situ rehabilitation. We will also use the translation ‘urbanization’.

\(^3\) The Favela-Bairro was part of a strategic plan elaborated by the Catalan architect Jordi Borja during the first administration of the mayor Cesar Maia.
In 2007 Rio de Janeiro was declared the main host of the 2014 Football (FIFA) World Cup, and in 2009 the International Olympic Committee chose the city for the 2016 Olympic Summer Games. The city of Rio de Janeiro has therefore been the preferential target of national policies aimed to address problems of public security and lack of infra-structure. The state and municipal administrations have received the financial support of the federal government to implement big infra-structure improvements in several favelas in Rio de Janeiro, such as Manguinhos, Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha, through the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). At the same time, many favelas have received Units of Pacification Police (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora or UPPs) in order to reduce the presence of drug-trafficking and other criminal activities in these areas. Even though the state government has promoted some housing and urbanization projects in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, its main focus has been on policing. From the first UPP unit was created in the favela Santa Marta in December 2008 until the end of 2013, the state government had installed UPPs in 37 favelas around the city, including Morro da Providência and Manguinhos. The official goal is to bring the police presence closer to the residents of favelas and break the territorial control of ‘drug lords’. However, the programme has been criticized for prioritizing favelas in the central and southern zone – the traditional middle-class and business districts – and favelas surrounding the main arena for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the famous Maracanã Stadion. By June 2014, 40 UPP units were to be installed, covering approximately 200 of the around 900 favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

The government has developed several other measures to support the community policing. In August 2010 the Executive Office of Social Welfare and Human Rights announced the project UPP Social. UPP Social is the social component of the UPP pacification policy, and it is supposed to coordinate the municipal interventions in the pacified favelas. One of the programmes primary goals is to “involve residents of the community in the process of integrating them into the city at large.” So far the project has had no significant impact on the territories where it was implemented. It has focused mainly on punctual cultural actions or cooperation with charity (corporate social responsibility) programs of the private sector.

In 2010, the mayor Eduardo Paes, a politician from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), announced a new urbanization programme called Morar Carioca. The programme has the goal to urbanize all the favelas in Rio de Janeiro by 2020, as a legacy to the city promoted by “mega sports events” such as the World Cup (2014) and the Olympic Games (2016). One of the innovations of the programme was to promote a public tender in order to select architecture offices that would propose individualized urbanization projects to each favela. In those proposals, the competitors had to present ways to include the participation of local residents in the elaboration and implementation of the projects. During the first round, 40 architect offices were selected. Another innovation of Morar Carioca was

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The project was taken to the municipal government after the State Secretary, Ricardo Henriques, was transferred to the municipal Pereira Passos Institute for Urbanism.

There are 900 favelas in Rio (Bittar, 2011). It is not realistic that the programme can reach all of them.

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the provision of new houses for people who had to be relocated because of upgrading works in the favelas (Bittar, 2011).

However, in the initial phase of Morar Carioca none of the projects proposed by the architecture offices had been implemented. The preliminary urbanization projects implemented under the programme have been repeating previous patterns: 1) the lack of transparency of the urbanization projects and the low participation of local residents in their implementation; 2) the mismatch between the large number of removals and the new houses built to be offered to the former residents of the favelas; 3) the houses were usually built in the peripheral suburbs and not near the favela where the removed people had resided. Thus, the policy resembled the old eviction and resettlement policies.

Criticisms of the Morar Carioca, however, have had small impacts due to a unique political context in Rio de Janeiro. In the recent past, Rio de Janeiro experienced frequent political conflicts between the federal, the state, and the municipal levels as opposing parties would occupy the different levels of government. Since 2008, however, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes has the support of both the state and federal government. The party of ex-president Lula, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, The Workers’ Party) has since 2009 participated in the government at all three levels. Although a junior partner in the city of Rio de Janeiro, PT has occupied government positions important for this study, e.g. the Municipal Housing Secretariat.

2.3 Relevant aspects of the urban governance system

a) Reorganization and multiple levels of government

The city of Rio de Janeiro has gone through several changes in its political and administrative status. After losing the position of national capital to Brasília in 1960 it became a federated state, the State of Guanabara, side by side with the State of Rio de Janeiro. Later in 1975 these two states were merged and the city of Rio finally became the capital of the State of Rio de Janeiro. These changes affected the city economically and financially. The following processes are worth mentioning: firstly, with important industries and businesses restructured in the 1970s and 1980s, the city lost its position as an important financial centre in the country; secondly, public funding and common action was hampered by the lack of cooperation between municipal, state and federal governments throughout the 1990s. The city municipality faced serious financial problems.

In response to aspirations of social reform and decentralization, the 1988 Constitution granted more power to Brazilian states and municipalities. Thus Brazil implemented a collaborative and decentralized federalism instead of a centralized federalism. In this form of federalism responsibilities are shared and negotiated between the different levels of government. This arrangement concerns social policies in particular. Yet the Federal government defines the forms and the mechanisms of cooperation and confers responsibility and control to other government authorities, especially at the local level (Almeida, 2000). In the context of a collaborative and decentralized federalism, the efficiency of social policies depends
strongly on the Federal government’s position. As a result, Brazilian municipalities differ in their capacity of providing public goods and ensuring local democracy.

The municipal government is responsible for health and basic education policies and it receives specific federal funds and incentives for these purposes. However, sanitation, housing and social welfare policies were for a long time neglected by all the spheres of government. New institutions engage the local civil society in the implementation and supervision of public services and policies. The 1988 Constitution guarantees public participation. The inclusion of new stakeholders in local processes provides a variety of forums for participation. Both the 1988 Constitution, which requires local governments to create their own Organic Laws, and the 2001 City Statute⁶ are important frameworks for the municipalities (Souza 2004).

The 1988 Constitution also brought about significant changes in the tax system. From a financial perspective, local governments were to gain ground. The Constitution allows municipalities to freely allocate federal funds. However, new federal programmes earmarked for certain activities and ends have flourished under the Lula and Dilma governments. The mentioned PAC programmes, the housing programme Minha Casa Minha Vida and the conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Família are the most well-known examples. Put together, they have changed the intergovernmental power relations. The federal government has become stronger. As a result, many public interventions in the urban and metropolitan areas are decided upon and managed outside the arenas for public participation envisaged by the Constitution. This has been clearly observed in Rio de Janeiro.

b) Democracy and the “right to the city” in Rio

In Brazil the notion “right to the city”, Direito à Cidade, emerged from social movements’ struggle for urban reform. The “right to the city” refers to the recognition of all city residents as rights holders. Some progress has been made on legal and institutional levels. The inclusion of the right to the city in the City Statute is an example of a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, people living in Brazilian cities still have to push for the implementation of instruments such as master plans, laws regulating land distribution and use, zoning, etc.

Since the re-democratization in the 1980s, the country has made significant progress in its urban development policies. From the 1988 Constitution to the City Statute’s approval in 2001, legal instruments to ensure the right to the city, as well as participation rights and control by the civil society, have improved. Lula’s administration (2003-2010) created institutions such as the Ministry of Cities and Council of Cities. This measure stimulated the creation of local level councils and public participation in national, state and local housing and sanitation projects. However, the same cannot be said about the local level in Rio de Janeiro. A new public managerialism has ruled the city since the mid 1990s, using the deep financial problems inherited from the 1980s as a justification for a new urban strategy. The city management decided to turn to the private market forces, locally and globally, to make Rio de Janeiro a ‘global city’ and ‘modernize’ it by means of private-public

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⁶ Law 10,257/2001; it regulates articles 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution, which refer to urban policies.
partnerships. This process started with César Maia’s administration (1993). The Municipal 10-Year Master Plan, *Plano Director*, is an example of the new state of affairs. As stated by federal law it was designed in a participatory and democratic way. Nevertheless it was dismissed after a Catalan company’ was hired to design a strategic plan for the city. The new plan was no longer guided by the right to the city and social participation principles. Instead, the strategic plan was steered by business demands and interests and its goal was to make the city more “attractive” in the international market. In the 2000s the city managers pursued this neo-liberalist strategy in a skillful way. The city went through yet more transformations linked to the public discourse of hosting mega sports events (Mascarenhas, 2012). Through intense socio-spatial reorganization, Rio de Janeiro has been transformed into what a leading academic urbanist labels a “merchandize-city, business-city” (Vainer, 2011).

c) Urban development in Rio since 2010: ‘Integration’ and popular resistance

In the late 90s authors like Zaluar and Alvito (1998) claimed that “the favelas have won”. One of their arguments was that favelas were no longer at risk of removal and most people defended its urbanization instead. On the other hand, Machado da Silva (2002) responded that the battle was not over yet, because the “favelados” had never been really heard. Throughout the 100 years of existence of favelas, their residents had never been seen or respected as right holders like any other citizen.

Recent public policies have emphasized favela urbanization or in-situ rehabilitation, in order to enhance “integration” of the favelas into the city. It is the case of the *Multirões* project developed in the 1980s by state governor Brizola; Project *Favela-Bairro* created by former mayor César Maia in the 1990s; “PAC Moradia” – the housing component of the federal programme PAC created by Lula in the 2000s; finally *Morar Carioca*, the current municipal administration’s programme.

Nevertheless, the word removal (‘remoção’), which was broadly used during military dictatorship, is again back in the agenda. Powerful groups support this type of policy, including government leaders, major businessmen, dominant media as well as members of middle and upper class. They defend the so-called integration principle. In the opinion of some civil society leaders, this ruling coalition wants the integration of the favela territories, but not of its residents (the *favelados*).

Inhabitants of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro have found various ways of defending themselves against removals and taking part in local decision making. Several residents’ associations have been revitalized, as demonstrated in Vila Autódromo. In addition they have invented many new spaces of participation and contestation: People’s forums, committees and councils have been created over the years - in this study the examples are the Manguinhos Social Forum, the Community Forum of the Port (*Fórum Comunitario do Porto*) and the new Resident’s Committee in Morro da Providência. Despite difficulties, these communities created cross-city networks through which they could discuss and participate in urban politics. The main example is *Comité Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas*, formed after the World Social Urban Forum in 2010. It defends people’s rights in the run-up to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.

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7 This consultancy company, headed by the famous Catalonian architect Jordi Borja, was also responsible for the planning of the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games.

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The street demonstrations in June 2013 – the largest ever in Brazil’s history – took place in 400 cities spread all over the country and gathered more than 10 million people. In Rio de Janeiro they helped the Comité Popular and favela residents to unite with students and middle-class residents from other parts of the city and articulate common demands. Among the banners carried by protesters in Rio during the protests, recurrent slogans were for police reform, against removals and against the mass spending on the World Cup and Olympics. While earlier demonstrations met little adherence by the government, the massive mobilizations of the June uprisings forced the politicians to listen, with important impacts for two of the settlements analyzed in this study – Morro da Providência and Vila Autódromo.

Throughout this report we look at when and under which circumstances people in the favelas were able to join forces. Did they achieve positive outcomes? Why?
3 Methodological issues

The study in Rio de Janeiro is primarily based on interviews with residents and community leaders in the three selected settlements. The interviews have been accompanied by observations of meetings and other semi-public events in the settlements. There have also been complementary interviews with government representatives (elected and non-elected), elected politicians (councillors) from the opposition, civil society organizations (with connections to, but not based in the selected settlements) and academics.

Relevant academic literature as well as public documents have been collected and studied.

The main data collection took place from August 2011 until June 2012. Complementary data were collected from June-October 2013. The research team has consisted of, in addition to the project leader Einar Braathen, young scholars recruited from the Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbana e Regional (IPPUR) at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. In addition, young university students living in the first two settlements (Manguinhos and Morro da Providência) were recruited in order to facilitate the access to informants.

Certain caution and security measures had to be taken in these two settlements, above all in Manguinhos, and this slowed down the data collection process and limited the access to informants. After the first round of data collection, the team decided to include a third settlement, Vila Autódromo which was acknowledged for its secure and non-violent environments, as well as high degree of social mobilization, but without factors which the team considered to pervert social demobilization: organized crime, drug trafficking, high profile police interventions and subsequent violence.
4 The case of Morro da Providência

4.1 Introduction

Morro da Providência is the oldest favela in Rio de Janeiro, with a rich Afro-Brazilian legacy. It is located in the centre of the city, between the port and the main train- and metro station. The favela was included in the study because it was a meeting place between two large-scale prestige projects and the mobilized citizens.

The period from 1968 to 2008 was, on the one hand, characterized by the establishment of a neighbourhood association (associação de moradores) and many initiatives to improve living and housing conditions. Clientelistic politics helped to improve its infrastructures (paved roads, water, and sanitation) significantly. With the gradual re-introduction of electoral democracy in 1983, populist politicians put an end to the type of violent slum demolition and mass evictions that had been typical under the military rule. On the other hand, particularly since the 1980s, unemployment and dependence on informal commerce (including drug trafficking) led to a deterioration of the social fabric. The access to, and level of, education remained at an extremely low level. Social mobilization became difficult. The community also saw military and armed police interventions into the community. The police station (UPP) that opened in 2010 represented the first permanent presence of a public agent in the favela.

The period from 2010 has been marked by the urban renewal programme for the port area, Porto Maravilha and the cross-city programme to urbanize the favelas, the Morar Carioca programme. The residents have organized protests against what they perceive as lack of a democratic-participatory process and a neglect of their constitutional rights. They have criticized the investment profile of the public interventions and, in particular, the manoeuvres to relocate dwellers. Commissions have been set up by the residents and by the city government alike in order to handle the disagreements. However, by mid-2012, the public works had proceeded without any active consent of the community. Communications and negotiations between the city government and the residents have not produced consensual decisions, and the community has lacked an association which could legitimately unite those threatened by evictions with the other residents. There have been signs of resignation, individual exits from the area and social demobilization. Nevertheless, key activists stay on with a relatively secure future in the area, and a certain segment of the community keeps mobilized. The run-up to the local elections in October 2012 produced certain new concessions and promises from the city government. The same happened after the June 2013 demonstrations. The final outcomes of this favela-government encounter remain to be seen. Yet, Morro da Providência provides a case of uneven social mobilization with defeats as well as gains for the citizens of the settlement.
4.2 Settlement profile

**Geographic location and population.** Morro da Providência is located near Rio de Janeiro's city centre, in the district of Gamboa, the first administrative region and Rio's harbour zone. It borders with the Cemitério dos Ingleses to the North, Pedra Lisa to the South, Vila Portuária to the West and Ladeira do Barros and Ladeira do Faria to the East. It surrounds a hill next to the main collective transport hub of Rio de Janeiro, the Central do Brasil, with train, metro and bus stations.

According to the 2010 census, the total population was 3,777 of which 51.5 per cent were females. In the early stages of the settlement the majority of the residents were afro-descendants, while in recent times the majority has origins in the North-east of Brazil. According to the 2010 census, 48.5 per cent regard themselves racially as ‘mixed’ (Pardo), 17.6 per cent as ‘black’ (Negro) and 33.7 per cent as ‘white’ (Branco). In terms of religion, there seems to be similar number of followers of catholic, evangelical and African-rooted believes, with the latter decreasing in number in recent years.

**The origins and evolution of the settlement.** The Morro da Providência is the oldest favela of the city of Rio de Janeiro, dating back to 1893. It is located close to what had been, until the abolition of the slavery in 1889, the point for importation and slave trade. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the port expanded and offered employment to a high number of dock workers. Almost all of them were afro-descendants, and many of them lived in Morro da Providência. As a consequence, the favela had great importance for Rio's cultural life of the 20th century, as the home of some of the city's most famous samba dancers and musicians (sambistas).

Apart from the port, a significant source of employment was offered in rock extraction activities in stone pits on the boundaries of the hill. Since the 1960s, the migratory process towards the big urban centres, mainly in Brazil's South-west, brought new inhabitants to Providência. The majority were from the north-eastern parts of the country, seeking to make a living as construction workers. Besides the migrants from rural areas, the favela also received new residents from other favelas in Rio and the tenements (cortiços) that were being removed throughout the city centre. The new heterogeneity of habits, cultures and attitudes provoked changes in the construction of identity of the favela and its residents.

From the late 1970s onwards, Brazil and particularly Rio de Janeiro were marked by economic stagnation. Combined with structural changes of the ports (containerization) and of the international trade and economy (neo-liberal globalization), the economic downturn led to a sharp decrease of access to formal sector employment in Morro da Providência and its surroundings. In this context, the informal economy and criminal activities such as drug trafficking expanded and became an increasingly important factor in the daily life of the favelados.

Throughout its history, the development of the favela was the product of the initiatives and interventions of the residents themselves based on self-construction and improvements in autonomous processes without or with very little planning.

**Poverty and housing characteristics (incl. legality, regularity), 2010.** The average income per household in Morro da Providência according to the 2010 census.
was BRL 439\(^8\), slightly below the minimum salary set by the government. 10.6 per cent were classified as extremely poor (‘indigente’), with a household income less than approximately a quarter of a minimum salary. 28 per cent were classified as poor, belonging to households with less than half a minimum salary in income.\(^9\) The inequality within the settlement, measured by the Gini coefficient, was relatively low (0.395).\(^{10}\)

**Table 4.1  Poverty in Morro da Providência**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income</th>
<th>BRL 439.10 per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population considered extremely poor (less than 25% of the minimum wage)</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population considered poor (less than 50% of the minimum wage)</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini – Index</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling of residents above 25 years of age</td>
<td>5.8 years of schooling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE 2010

There are some very precarious areas on the hill, especially the areas Pedra Lisa and Toca. But in general, constructions have a reasonable quality and nice outside appearance. Data from the report of Monitoring Urbanization Programmes in Low Income Areas (central auditing authority of the municipality 'Tribunal de Contas do Município' – 2009), reveal that Providência is one of the most dynamic favelas considering vertical growth with buildings reaching up to 4 floors or even more.

Since most houses originate from occupation, squatting or sales without register in a notary's office, the major part of the housing in Providência is informal/illegal.

**Infrastructure (urban and public services).** Development of the infrastructure on the hill was made possible due to the interventions of the residents themselves. The paving of a path that gives access to the favela (1970) and the connection to the water reservoir in Cruzeiro (1974) are examples of self-constructed, collectively organized constructions. Methodist missionaries from the U.S. also contributed by constructing several access roads to the favela, pavements, sanitation and waste water installations. Because of that, the favela has reached a relatively decent level of urban infrastructures services. However, the access to public social services leaves a lot to desire.

**Access to public transport:** Connection to other parts of the city mainly functions by the use of the city buses. To get to the bus stops, residents make use of alternative minibus and motor-taxi services or in case of not being able to afford these services, they walk.

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\(^8\) Brazilian Real (BRL) was in 2010 worth approximately 0.5 US Dollar.

\(^9\) The so-called ‘IBGE-IPEA-CEPAL Comission’, set up by the federal government, defines the poverty line and the indigence (extreme poverty) line. See: [http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/doc/metodologiaLP(Revisada).pdf](http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/doc/metodologiaLP(Revisada).pdf). The commission defined in May 2010 the extreme poverty line to be BRL 117.54 and the poverty line to be BRL 235.08.

Urban services and infrastructures: Morro da Providência is located within the site of the country’s first public-private partnership (PPP) for urban revitalization — the project called Porto Maravilha. In November 2010 the management of public services was overtaken by the Porto Novo Consortium (formed by the construction companies OAS, Odebrecht and Carioca Engineering). Over a period of 15 years, the consortium will receive $R 7.6 billion from the municipality towards investments in construction works and to perform services such as garbage collection, illumination and traffic management in the region.

Before, the community garbage collectors were local residents trained for the job, employed by the municipality and with responsibility for the supervision of cleanliness of the streets and paths of the hill. This way of treating the garbage issue was abandoned when the Porto Novo Consortium overtook responsibility for the public services in the region. The community garbage collectors were dismissed and then re-employed under worse working conditions by the Consortium.

There are paved access roads, and all the streets of the hill have lights. According to the informants most houses have free electricity, either by manipulating the power consumption meters or by connecting illegally to street power lines without any use of a meter.

There are two water tanks: one in Cruzeiro and the other one at Américo Brun Square. They are public and so far the public water company, CEDAE, has not charged any fees for the water supply. Some residents report 24 hour availability of tap water, while others confirm frequent periods without any water supply [the situation might differ from area to area on the hill]. According to the 2010 census (IBGE 2010), there are 15 houses without toilets for the exclusive use of the household, 14 of which are located in the area of Pedra Lisa.

The majority of the houses have some access to a sewage and drainage system. All streets and paths are paved and there are few complaints about this issue.

Social/welfare services: In terms of access to health and education, there are some facilities near Providência, but their capacity and functioning do not meet the demands of the local population. To get to a local Health Clinic residents have to walk for up to 40 minutes. There are no pharmacies or medical doctors in Providência. In the area of education the supply seems to be better, with some private institutions offering educational services. Residents however complain about the precarious conditions of the state school, which only functions in the evening. There is also a technical school.

In Providência there are some educational projects with philanthropic backgrounds, a daycare centre, and initiatives of local churches. An autonomous base group, GEP (Group for People’s Education) is also mobilizing people politically. Some projects are related to the Unity of Pacifying Police (UPP) - 'UPP Social' inaugurated an evening school in collaboration with a private sector welfare fund, SESI, attracting a great number of students. In spite of these initiatives, the population of Morro da Providência had the lowest level of education in an inquiry of 10 favelas with UPP. The population younger than 25 on average had 5.8 years of schooling (FIRJAN 2010).
Local state (administrative and political) presence in/around the settlement. In Morro da Providência a police station (UPP) was installed in 2010. That is the only permanent presence of the state in the favela.

4.3 The antecedents that shaped the settlement(s) politically

Table 4.2 Milestones in the recent history of Morro da Providência

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Landslide buried 58 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Creation of the Neighbourhood Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Start of the Favela-Bairro project, an urban infrastructure programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Cimento Social works initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Three boys from the community killed by a drug trafficking fraction, after the police handed them over to the gang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Installation of a Pacifying Police Unit (UPP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The work of the quarries had opened a gap in the hill which was a hundred meters deep and more than fifty meters long, and in 1968 a landslide buried more than 50 people from the community. Despite the newspapers’ constant alarms about the threat of landslides, the government only put an end to the exploitation of rocks (in the entire urban area) after this accident. GEO-RIO reports classified some areas of the Morro da Providência as in risk of collapse, and recommended the immediate removal of all the shacks on the slope of Central do Brasil, which is a part of Pedra Lisa. The threat of removal caused a climate of insecurity among the residents, who resisted the possibility of being moved to remote areas of difficult access. In 1975 another landslide occurred, causing the removal of shacks near the Américo Brum square. In spite of these occurrences the favela continued to grow because of its privileged location.

In this context the Neighbourhood (or Residents’) Association (Associação de Moradores), which was created in 1968, played an active role. It had a committed leadership, and it was part of a new urban social movement which emerged with the support of the Catholic Church under the military dictatorship. Although there had been a “disinvestment” in the port zone since the 80s on behalf of the public authority, and a population reflux in the lower part of the area inclusive in the slums, the community of Morro da Providência managed to attract certain public programmes. What mobilized the local population were the issues of education and health care. Claims were made through proposals to candidates for elections. It was also mentioned that in the 1980s, Dona Iraci (leader of the Neighbourhood Association), was able to make the power supply company and a project of the federal government attend problems in the neighbourhood. The Favela-Bairro project, coordinated by the Municipal Board of Housing (SMH) and funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), started in 1994 and aimed to implement urban infrastructure, services, public facilities and social policies in the communities. The project improved access roads and staircases to the community, which ensured
greater mobility on the hill. It did however not reach its main goal, which was to incorporate the urban slum in the formal city. The Cimento Social was a project led by Senator Marcelo Crivella in partnership with the Army and the Ministry of Cities. It began in December 2007, and sought to revitalize the facades and roofs of 780 houses, in addition to implementing a sewerage network and constructing nurseries, community centres and urban facilities. To sum up, for more than 30 years the favela had not only resisted the threat of evictions, but also seen important improvements in its infrastructure (with some public assistance) as well as in the standard of the housing constructions.

From where did the community get the force to accomplish these achievements? We think it is brought about by external (political) and internal relations of the community. Firstly, democratic changes brought some relief to the daily life of the poor. The governor elected in 1983 in the first free elections for 20 years, Leonel Brizola, reintroduced a type of populism which prevailed before the military coup in 1964. His party, the Democratic Workers’ Party (Partido Democratico Trabalhista (PDT)), was particularly popular in Rio de Janeiro. One resident says that the PDT was important in the port area in the 1980s. "The irregular constructions gained strength under the PDT government. To defend its popularity, the government adopted a non-removal policy related to a lack of control over the urban growth and the emergence of new slums" (TCM-RJ 2009).

Secondly, the elected politicians reintroduced another important feature of Brazilian politics, namely clientelism – the distribution of public favours in exchange for votes. César Maia, heir of Leonel Brizola and mayor in 1992-1996 and 2000-2008, was particularly clever in playing the card of clientelism. He made Morro da Providência one of the exclusive beneficiaries of the Favela-Bairro programme. But what made Morro da Providência interesting for politicians like Mr. Maia? Providência was a politically peripheral community in comparison to other favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Its electorate was small. Hence, what was attractive in Morro da Providência was not the number of votes, but its cultural legacy and symbolic value for the Afro-Brazilian population and for Rio de Janeiro as a cradle of samba. When asking the informants what organizations and/or individuals were important for the social and political history of the neighbourhood, they cited characters that are notably related to the carnival and samba. Examples are entities linked to black culture who claim to be the bearers of historical and cultural memory of the region, such as Afoxé Filhos de Gandhi, ArqPedra Quilombo and the Pedra do Sal Quilombo. Publicly funded projects and activities in these areas could give politicians prestige which could help them in the electoral campaigns in high density areas in the periphery with a majority of black votes.

There were also other associations which were more directly involved in politics, and which therefore could exploit the prestige of the Morro da Providência and make deals with public managers and politicians. Not only has the Neighbourhood Association stood out here. The Dock Workers’ Union (Sindicato dos Estivadores), which has an historical importance for Brazil in the formation of the working class, is worth mentioning. Last but not least, there is a dense church network in the community. When talking about important institutions in the social and political history of the neighbourhood, the work of the Paróquia da Sagrada Família (the Catholic Church), which distributed clothing and food baskets, is emphasized as well.
as the Instituto Central do Povo (IPCI). The IPC was established by Methodist missionaries, and was the first social services institution in Brazil, helping those who were arrested or got sick. In general, in clientelistic politics they could provide local distribution of aid offered by the government. The religious networks in the favelas became increasingly marked by a Pentecost revivalism, also present in the port zone. The mentioned programme Cimento Social was brought to Morro da Providência by a politician, Senator Marcelo Crivella. He was a bishop in the neo-Pentecostal ‘Universal Church of the Kingdom of God’ (IURD) and the leader of its political party, Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB). (In 2012 he was appointed Minister of Fisheries in the federal government of President Dilma Rousseff). We should add that Cimento Social was no big success. It was subject of many denunciations, for example for the use of army soldiers to construct houses. The criteria for the selection of the houses were at no point explained. The project was interrupted by numerous allegations of corruption.

Finally, the role of the drug traffic – os traficantes - has to be mentioned. The dealers injected resources into the community; it was the traffickers who were the first to develop a system of sanitation. They also brought in other services to Providência. According to many people we talked with in the community, the Neighbourhood Association became closely controlled by the drug squads. After some time, rival drug fractions put darker spots on the favela. From 2007 the army started to intervene in the favela to hunt down traffickers. The residents protested the presence and the brutality of the Army in the community. During the night of June 13, 2008, the Army delivered three boys to a rival fraction. The boys were executed, and this incident led to massive manifestations on behalf of relatives and neighbours, claiming justice. In 2010 a Police Pacification Unit (UPP) was installed in Morro da Providência. It is seen as a positive measure by most residents, despite the increasing number of criticisms regarding its performance. Some people however have a very cynical view on the UPP;

"The state has always massacred Providência. The actions of the state here have always been the actions of the police "(resident).

“The entrance of the army was harmful; it was to kill. The memory of the military in Providência is of death, contempt ... The latest was the incidence of the three boys. This has consequences for the installation of the UPP in the territory 11.”

4.4 Overview of the recent public interventions.

The ‘Morar Carioca’ programme. Morar Carioca is a programme aiming at the upgrading (urbanização) of all of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro by 2020, and offers multi-sector territorial interventions. Selected ‘sub-normal’ settlements are to receive “in-situ projects such as sanitation, infrastructure, sewage, paving, street layout, accessibility and street lighting, as well as social facilities such as kindergartens, health clinics and squares of knowledge”12 (Bittar 2011). It is part of the “World Cup legacy

11 Interview with a professor in social services at the university.
12 Multi-purpose / multimedia information technology centre.
plan” and the Porto Maravilha project (Bittar 2011). The responsible public authority is the municipality, represented by the Municipal Board of Housing (SMH).

The Morro da Providência was among the first favelas to be selected for the programme, probably to provide a social component to the Porto Maravilha project launched in 2009. The urban intervention projects in Morro da Providência include the following:

- The construction of a cable car (teleférico)\(^{13}\);
- A funicular (plano inclinado);
- A ‘Knowledge Square’ (multi-purpose IT centre), an amphitheatre and a kindergarten.

There were two controversial parts of the plan:

Firstly, the emphasis on expensive transportation infrastructure. The teleférico is part of an intermodal mobility plan to resolve the challenges related to connecting the hill with the city. It was to be inaugurated by the end of the first half of 2013, at the costs of BRL 40 million. According to the Municipal Board of Housing, residents of the hill will have discounted prices and one roundtrip ticket free of charge per day. According to the municipality the teleférico is something the city of Rio de Janeiro needs and demands. The Plano Inclinado seeks to connect the Barroso stairway, of great historical value, to the square of the Cruzeiro church at the summit. For its construction, some houses along the Barroso stairway were to be removed. The justification is that the project will facilitate the movement of people within the favela.

Secondly, the massive relocation of residents. The programme implied housing improvements, the opening of roads, and the removal of 800 dwellings whose families will be resettled in Minha Casa Minha Vida housing units in the surrounding area.

“The most urgent needs of the community today are water and sewage, lighting, and decent housing for the decent residents that live here\(^{14}\). But what the municipality presented to the community was the construction of the cable car; we will lose an historic place, and the funicular\(^{15}\).”

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\(^{13}\) Morro da Providência is situated next to Cidade do Samba, one of the main touristic destinations in Rio. The cable car will connect the Cidade do Samba, Morro da Providência, and the new port region. This project therefore has a great touristic value.

\(^{14}\) “Moradia digna para esses moradores que são pessoas dignas”.

\(^{15}\) Interview with community leader.
Table 4.3: Chronological description of local upgrading events between 2009 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Start of the Porto Maravilha works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 January</td>
<td>First presentation of the Morar Carioca to the residents. Formation of the Fórum Comunitário do Porto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Start of the marking of the houses to be demolished by the Municipal Secretariat of Housing (SMH). Visit from the UN International Reporters on the Right to Housing, and elaboration of the first report of denunciations of rights’ violations in the Port zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Start of the construction works on the Américo Brum square. First meeting in the Commission of Mediation of Conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Election of the Residents’ Commission. The municipality held a meeting presenting a technical report on the state of risk of the houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of a course about the historical/cultural value of the port zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November/December</td>
<td>SMH starts the election of representatives per area, after pressure from the Municipality. Rearticulation of the Fórum Comunitário do Porto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 March</td>
<td>SMH initiates the work on the Plano Inclinado along the ancient staircase. The works around Praça Américo Brum for the cable car (teleférico) reach a point of no return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Mobilization among Pedra Lisa residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Re-election and re-constitution of the Residents’ Commission. “Ciranda do Morro da Providência” as part of People’s Summit/Cupula dos Povos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Documentation/registration of residents’ exclusive use of their houses (‘registro de posse de casas’).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Public hearing; the residents receive promises/guarantees from the SMH regarding relocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>The Morar Carioca works (except the cable car) are suspended by the Court due to lack of fulfilment of public hearings before the construction began.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We here present the course of local events in some more detail:

*January 2011 (a): Morar Carioca was presented to the residents for the first time.*

*January 2011 (b): The Community Forum of the Port (Fórum Comunitário do Porto, FCP) was established.*

*May 2011 (a): Start of the marking of the houses to be demolished in MdoP. This unleashed unrest among the residents, who entered into contact with the FCP. FCP informed the press and human rights organizations.*

*May 2011 (b): Visit from the UN International Observers of the Right to Housing and DHESCA, and the FCP’s elaboration of the first report of denunciations of rights’ violations in the Port zone.*

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May 2011 (): the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro arranged a ‘Social Housing Fund Manager Council’ (CGFMHIS), where participants from social movements, trade unions, representatives from the general society and the Municipality itself discussed housing policies. The council created a "Committee for Prevention and Conflict Mediation" to monitor threats of eviction and removals within the municipality of Rio de Janeiro (CGFMHIS 2011). The aim was to "discuss and resolve situations where there were doubts or disagreements, in order to ensure respect for the human rights of all citizens." (Bittar 11.11.2011). The first meeting was convened in July 2011.


August 2011: Election of the Residents’ Committee. Meeting where the SMH / PMRJ present a technical report that states that there are houses in risk zones which need to be removed, especially in Pedra Lisa.

October 2011: Cultural circuit in Providência and the start of a class about the cultural-historical legacy of the port zone. The SMH advances individual negotiations with residents.

November-December 2011: SMH starts electing representatives by area, driven by the PMRJ. Difficulties of dialogue within the Commission of Mediation of Conflicts. Reorganization of the Fórum Comunitário do Porto.

March 2012: SMH initiates the work on the Plano Inclinado along the ancient staircase. The works around Praça Américo Brum for the cable car (teleférico) reach a point of no return.

May 2012: Mobilization among Pedra Lisa residents. A main focus is the documentation/registration of residents’ exclusive use of their houses (‘registro de posse de casas’).

June 2012: Re-election and re-constitution of the Residents’ Committee, “Ciranda do Morro da Providência” as part of the People’s Summit in parallel to the Rio+20 conference.

September 2012: In the wake of the local elections a well-attended public hearing was held, and the audience witnessed several concessions, promises and/or guarantees by the head of the municipal housing department.

December 2012: The Morar Carioca works (except the cable car) are suspended due to lack of fulfilment of public hearings requirements before the construction began.

4.5 Analysis of the local state-society encounter

The programme 'Morar Carioca.” Since January 2011, the intervention of this programme has created many changes that have provoked social unrest. According to the official guidelines, Morar Carioca guarantees the right to “the participation of organized society (…) in all stages of Morar Carioca through assemblies and
meetings in the communities” and through the “presentation of works and debates open to the participation of civil society and citizens.”

The Morar Carioca programme has been divided in two phases: Phase I (2010-2012) and Phase II (from 2012). Despite discussions of the program beginning in 2010, the official guidelines for Morar Carioca were only published in a document signed into city decree on October 29th 2012.

The second phase (from 2012) was developed by architects that were selected through a public bidding process in partnership with the Institute of Brazilian architects (IAB). The first phase of Morar Carioca however used firms contracted outside of the IAB competition to intervene structurally in favelas with no participation. The reported investments of more than BRL 2 billion during the Phase 1 were thus not planned with the communities. In Morro da Providência, there were no consultations with the community prior to the drawing up of architectural plans. Rather, the SMH has been using plans left over from the Favela-Bairro program. According to Grazia da Grazia from the municipal housing secretariat;

“This first phase that is being executed we did not plan anything, (…) In the case of Providência, it comes with all the mistakes that one can imagine: the money arrives at the last minute, with a minimum term to accomplish the work, and with pressure from the real estate sector.”

The residents also complained about the lack of participation during this initial phase of the project, as the following statement demonstrates:

“SMH arrived here with the project (…) and gathered people in the square, showed a presentation that you could not see because of the brightness, with the representatives of the firms … They were already communicating to us what would be done, with the promise of constructing housing around the hill. It’s as if I came into your house, took a beer, and sat down on the couch without consulting you at all.”

For the second phase of Morar Carioca, over eighty architecture firms from around the world presented sample designs for favela upgrading. Forty winning firms were chosen, and each was assigned a grouping of favelas to create plans specific to their topography, layout, and social service needs. De Grazia claims that

“In the second phase, technicians did the planning and organized discussions in partnership with IAB (…) and hired IBASE for the social work … all by the book.”

Morar Carioca was frequently mentioned during Eduardo Paes’ re-election campaign in October 2012, in which Paes said that 55 favelas had received Morar Carioca works

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16 Interview with the Municipal Secretary of Housing, Jorge Bittar, 29.08.2012.
17 Interview with Grazia de Grazia, 10.03.2012, the spokesperson from the Cabinet of the Municipal Secretary of Housing.
18 Interview with resident, 18.10.2011.
19 Interview with Grazia de Grazia (date?) the spokesperson from the Cabinet of the Secretary of Housing.
so far and that the next step was to urbanize 100 more, which was also the information listed on the municipality’s webpage at that time. This however solely refers to \textit{Morar Carioca} Phase I, since no favela upgrades at that point had been done using the IAB-sanctioned participatory process. In fact, the contract with a NGO, \textit{Ibase}, to undertake the public consultation aspect of the IAB-selected upgrades, was cancelled in January 2013. After that, the works in Morro da Providência have been halted by a court injunction due to a public defender’s charge of lack of public hearings before the work began.20

The main concerns with \textit{Morar Carioca} in Morro da Providência can be grouped around three issues: Relocations, inflated house prices, and degradation of the public spaces.

Firstly, the interventions of \textit{Morar Carioca} increased the number of people without places to live. Families removed in July and August 2011 had to take their children out of school, and they ended up losing the school year. There has been no guarantee that these families would have their children accepted by the schools near the areas they were forced to move to. Claims were also formulated towards the forms of registering and the alternative housing facilities. The SMH offered the residents the following option: Either they accept to receive a 'social rent'21, while the new housing units near-by were still under construction, or they accept a compensation of at least BRL 9,000.22 Yet, in fact, the amount offered seemed to be below the minimum (reports mention BRL 6,000). It has been revealed that the housing units that are being built will not reach 200, covering only one fourth of the households living in houses marked for removal. There was no guarantee that the 'social rent' would actually be paid the full period of time until the families could move in to the new apartments.

Furthermore, information on the proposed location of the housing blocks, as well as the way in which families have learned that they are threatened by removal, has been controversial. The municipality has used a strategy of marking houses for removal without consulting the residents beforehand:

“What the residents question is: they leave for work and when they return home, they see numbers marked on their houses. The proposal of SMH is to place the residents within the social rent program and then construct housing units for the transfer of these families. But many ask: why don’t they construct first and transfer afterwards?” 23

“There are marks on the houses of some people, and we do not even know what it is about. Afterwards, they (the municipality) come with a map with various red dots on it, saying that they are risk areas. Even

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20 See section 4.6., “The situation by the end of 2013”.
21 The BRL 400,- offered as ‘social rent’ by the SMH was clearly not sufficient for a family with several children.
22 Interviews with residents, August 2011.
23 Interview with resident.
after we asked for the report many times, they never presented it to us.\textsuperscript{24}

“The map that they (SMH) are presenting, with a lot of red, that’s one thing I’ve learned in the meetings that I went to - we’ll have to leave. The project has so far not presented any documents, there has to be a report from the architects and engineers. It’s all wrong. Done within the cabinet, over the head of the residents, marking everything red\textsuperscript{25}.”

Secondly, residents and supporters were preoccupied with the change of the social profile of the area. There was already an increase in the attraction of the area to the real estate capital. Traditional residents cannot afford paying rising rents and the houses they leave behind rapidly get occupied by those, who can afford them, such as students that have less bureaucratic barriers to rent a flat (they do not need a ‘guarantor’). This process of 'forced' or 'planned' gentrification was best marked by new residents from the \textit{Zona Sul}, who were moving away for even much higher rents in that zone. In order not to move all the way to the \textit{Zona Norte} they seek houses near the city centre, such as Providência. There were also foreigners reported to fill the houses left behind by the lower class former inhabitants.

Thirdly, people were concerned with the degradation of the built environment and public spaces caused by the new transport devices. As of June 2013, forty-six percent of the money spent on Morar Carioca in Providência had gone toward the cable car, which Mayor Eduardo Paes stated to become “a second Sugarloaf Mountain.”\textsuperscript{26} None of the other projects promised by Morar Carioca - such as the construction of housing units, sanitation works, an open air museum and the a funicular – were finished. The cable car project did not seem to be intended to primarily benefit Providência’s residents, and neither did the funicular. The cable car station came to occupy the main open space, Praça Americo Brum, and destroyed the play ground and arena for sports and cultural activities built there.

“The city government wants to create ascenery ‘for the English to see’\textsuperscript{27}, for the tourists. What they call revitalization is to create a life not as it was, generate wealth at that place that is not for those residents that live there” (member of the FCP). “Yesterday i saw on the television how the Port zone will become, and it is something from the first world. I think they don’t want the Providência here, the contrast is big”\textsuperscript{28}.

“Less than 10% of the residents of Complexo do Alemão are registered to use the free travels with the cable car, that was inaugurated [in Complexo do Alemão, Northern Zone of Rio] in July of last year [in 2011], announced as the great solution to local mobility. (…) This cable

\textsuperscript{24} Interview with resident.
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with resident.
\textsuperscript{26} \url{http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/teleferico-do-morro-da-providencia-passa-pelprimeiro-teste-7115734}
\textsuperscript{27} ‘Para o ingles ver’ - for the outside (English-speaking) world, e.g. the foreign tourists.
\textsuperscript{28} Interview with resident.

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A non-democratic regime. In addition to the changes of the physical and social profile of the settlement, the public interventions have been accompanied by certain discourses which suggested a new regime – a configuration of certain forms of tyranny imposed upon the residents:

Firstly, the tyranny of time (“profit protection”). The Morar Carioca project was managed like any other projects in the modern engineering and civil construction industry. Technical norms of efficiency and expediency led to an obsession with time schedules, because time is money for the real estate developer. The project was being realized “the way these circumstances permit its execution. Money comes at the latest moment, with minimum time limits to realize the works and under pressure on the sides of the real estate sector” (public authority representative).

This project management model undermined social participation, because time is the critical factor for the community to process information and to provide meaningful consensus to the project. Citizen participation, as prescribed by the constitution and several federal and municipal laws and regulations, was weakened.

Secondly, the tyranny of science (“health and environment protection”). ‘Urbanization of favelas’ has brought back into the favelas the concept of ‘risk areas’ - the revival of the discourse on the risk of diseases (to justify urban interventions). In the case of Providência, tuberculosis has been used as an argument for interventions, reminding of the hygienist reforms of the beginning of the previous century. In order to diminish the risk of tuberculosis, it would be necessary to ventilate the narrow paths, i.e. remove houses. The problem was that these scientific arguments were general, and no evidence based on empirical data from the areas has been presented. The city government argued it possessed an assessment of the environmental risks of the area, without sharing it with the public. The residents felt provoked rather than convinced.

Third, the tyranny of force (“armed protection”). The drug traffic has been very determinant for the history of Providência, serving at some point as protection and for social assistance. The drug trafficking is still a strong reference for the residents in spite of the presence of the UPP police, who have been denounced for having connections with the traffickers. In March 2013, the Public Prosecutor of Rio reported that 73 people were suspected of involvement in drug trafficking and conspiracy in Morro da Providência. These accusations launched the Operation Fortress on March 8th, when 21 military policemen were arrested suspected of having connections with traffickers. In addition, 25 alleged traffickers were arrested. In June 2013 Târcia Diogo de Oliveira Santos, the head of the boca del fumo in Morro da Providência, was shot dead in a confrontation with the UPP police. On June 6th, other traffickers imposed a mourning period in the community, forcing all stores to remain shut inside and around Morro da Providência. Those who did open their stores reported to have received a visit from two traffickers who threatened to burn their stores down if they refused to follow orders. As these incidents show, the drug trafficking continues to be present in the community. This has a direct influence on the community participation of the residents.
A direct implication for social mobilization is that the UPP regime has created an absence of public meeting places. The ones that existed were Américo Brum Square, which was closed down to give room for the cable car, and Nova Aurora, which has been taken under UPP control. In addition, there is no community radio, which can spread information more widely, and no community journal with further reach, which could serve as a means of communication.

“To use the toilet at the ‘Nova Aurora Space’ we have to pick up the keys at the UPP. That’s absurd. That space is ours, it was our grandparents and parents that built it!” (resident) …

While the UPP is seen in a rather positive light by a large part of the residents, there are more and more claims about the behaviour of the police.

“Not even the military occupation, carried out during parts of the implementation of the project ‘Social Cement’, brought the residents tranquility – the violence remains in subtle ways, considering that, for many, living under permanent control is not a synonym for security” (resident cited in Palhares 2009).

Ups and downs of mobilization. The public interventions first provoked a large and relatively spontaneous mobilization among the residents, in May and June 2011. That resulted in the formation of a Commission of Mediation of Conflicts in July and of a Residents’ Committee in August 2011. We note that there are two elements that made the mobilization of the residents increase: a concrete threat of removal, and the physical presence of the public authority. When there was a public hearing at the headquarters of Rio de Janeiro’s federal attorney (Ministério Público Federal) the presence was massive, even though the event was outside the Morro. The same is noted in the FCP’s most crowded meetings, when they were summoned because of further incursions of the SMH for registration and negotiation, which increased the residents’ sense of disinformation and fear of losing their houses.

Then there were almost ten months of demobilization. The more the public works proceeded, the more people tended to give up and drop out from the struggle. Some persons who were notably active in the mobilization left the Residents’ Committee. By March 2012, the construction of the cable car station and the funicular had reached a point of no return. The residents had lost the battle of the profile and design of public works in the area.

In this context, against all odds, the residents managed to make a come-back in their struggle. The Residents’ Committee (Comissão dos Moradores) was reorganized and strengthened, once the summer holiday and carnival season had ended in March 2012. This was in response to the SMH’s attempts to negotiate individually with each family to be relocated. The committee closed ranks with the Foro Comunitario do Porto (FCP), which assembled civil society organizations and concerned citizens not based in the favela. However, the UPP Social is also present within the Foro Comunitario do Porto, demonstrating a certain ambiguity when it comes to the autonomous civil society character of this space (FCP). A group of student activists, Grupo de Educação Popular (GEP), set up to offer adult education in Morro da Providência, was also active in this networking process. This local coalition managed to link up with external political events such as the Rio+20 conference 2012, the Peoples’ Summit in
June 2012 and the local (municipal) elections in September 2012. In addition to the civil and political society, they brought in the ombudsman and other public legal experts dedicated to the defence of the citizens’ rights. Furthermore the Residents’ Committee involved experts who, on a voluntary basis, produced a counter-assessment showing that the environmental risks were already much reduced thanks to prior public works in the settlement. Finally, in cooperation with Foro Comunitário do Porto, they started to think of the struggle in Providência from a perspective of historical heritage. There were sites of historical-cultural value in the area. The fight to preserve these sites could facilitate new kinds of alliances (Ministry of Culture, IPHAN29) and call the attention of the Rio civil society in general.

This mobilization had been prepared by two meetings with the elderly persons in Providência, to record their memories. This resulted in certain ways in the course ‘Living in the port zone: history, memory and urban conflicts’ (“Viver na Zona Portuária: história, memória e conflitos urbanos”) in the second half of 2011.

Hence, although the residents as a collective lost the first round, a combination of politicization and judiciarization of the struggle strengthened the bargaining position of the individual residents threatened by relocation. There were signs that the city government stopped trying to sideline the Residents’ Committee, and the municipal Commission of Mediation and Prevention of Conflicts seemed to become more effective in finding rights-based responses to the complaints of the residents.

Nevertheless, there are two categories of residents who seem to have weak ties with the struggling faction the settlement. The first category comprises those who are fenced off from relocation and who calculate gains from the public intervention programmes. There is a significant offer of jobs in the construction works that can be seen as a strategy of the city government to co-opt a fraction of the residents. At the same time, jobs is a demand coming from the residents. Quite many house owners also realize that they can benefit from a gentrification process and rise of housing prices.

The other category consists of people who see no alternative but accepting relocation on the terms offered by the municipality. Informal conversations indicate there were many people who did not really care about what was going on, and who were not directly affected by the works. There were also many influenced by the promises of high compensation payments. They were not interested in resisting removal; they wanted to leave the community with the perspective of changing their life, leaving the favela. Some also mentioned that people knew little about their rights: “They believe in what the State says, for them the State is God” (resident). Some residents consider themselves as intruders. Since they did not buy their land, they thought they had no rights. They always lived with the expectation of having to leave one day. Also, the high degree of turn-over of residents has to be considered, since it impedes the creations of linkages with the community and its territory:

“There is a lot of individualism. But some of us want the favela residents to have a community life, different from the one in apartment

29This strategy has become problematic, since recent reports on the IPHAN made by some of its technicians, have pointed at authoritarianism, lack of efficiency, and failure to meet the objectives of the institution.
blocks, and different from the bourgeoisie society. But many don't care about the city projects [which threaten the favela way of life].

4.6 The situation by the end of year 2013

In the heated debate after 2011 the Neighbourhood Association distinguished itself by its total silence. The residents’ committee had therefore sought support from a wider network established to fight Porto Maravilha, the urban plan for the old port area. The resistance network, Foro Comunitario do Porto, was driven by urban human rights activists and progressive NGOs who fought for ‘The right to the city’, and supported by councilors belonging to the left and green opposition parties. They managed to involve the Public Defenders Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro. Thus, while partisan politicization of the struggle was in the air, a more technical and judicial stage of the struggle took the upper hand. By mid-2012, the public works started without the consensus of the residents. Henceforth, the residents was helped by the Public Defenders to file a case against the municipality, accusing it of neglecting the residents’ constitutional rights of popular participation in urban planning. Initially, the municipality stated that 830 families would have to be removed in Morro da Providência because of environmental risk or Morar Carioca projects. The residents themselves, however, hired engineers and independent experts, who provided a counter-report proving that the vast majority of the houses in Morro da Providência was not located in ‘risk areas’. To handle disagreements, a joint commission was set up by the residents and the city government alike, on the initiative of the Municipal Council of Housing where half of the members are civil society representatives. By late 2012, the number of families threatened by removal was reduced to 671, of which 475 had still not agreed to leave.

Moreover, a collective victory for the cooperation between the residents and its outside supporters was celebrated in December 2012. Following the support of the Public defender, the residents of Providência obtained an injunction granted by the Judge Maria Teresa Bridges Gazineu, who suspended the works of the Morar Carioca in Morro da Providência due to “lack of fulfilment of public audience requirements” before the construction began. Only the construction of the cable car could proceed.

The injunction represented a momentary relief to the residents. It did not mean, however, that the city municipality had abandoned the plans for Morro da Providência and the removal of the affected families. When the Secretary of Housing, Pierre Batista\textsuperscript{31} discussed the suspension of Morar Carioca in Providência in a meeting on December 17\textsuperscript{th} 2012\textsuperscript{32}, he stated that there had been no need for prior public consultation as ordered by the judge as this is only a legal requisite in contracts exceeding R$150 million, and the original budget was just R$131 million. He did acknowledge there had been no meetings in the favela before the project, but argued that in previous meetings the plans had been open to changes, as had happened with the funicular. Furthermore, the Municipal Secretary of Housing insisted that the

\textsuperscript{30} Interview with a resident, October 20, 2011.
\textsuperscript{31} Pierre Batista replaced Jorge Bittar as Municipal Secretary of Housing in the 2012 municipal elections.
\textsuperscript{32} http://rioonwatch.org/?p=9344
works were progressing “in rhythm” with the negotiations with the 475 families who had refused to leave their houses, and that “there is no pressure, there is dialogue”. Residents on the other hand reported that municipal agents were approaching residents on an individual level and arranged meetings in small groups in an attempt to persuade residents who aren’t aware of the court proceedings to sign up for replacement housing. Moreover, the municipality did not follow up its earlier pledges to use IAB-sanctioned the participatory process sanctioned by the Brazilian Institute of Architects (IAB). In January 2013 the contract with a progressive NGO, Ibase, to carry out proper public consultation, was cancelled. The municipality was also on the judicial offensive, appealing the injunction decision and taking it to the Civil Chamber if the Court of Rio de Janeiro. The Morro da Providência community was again hit by frustration and social demobilization.

However, the street demonstrations in June 2013 – the largest ever in Brazil’s history – changed the mood completely also in Morro da Providência. The demonstrations included demands for a moratorium on forced evictions due to the public works for the mega sports events. A new generation of activists were networked in the various mobilizations dominating Rio de Janeiro for the rest of the year 2013. In the old port area, they met in weekly assemblies and organized in August a local march starting from a building squatted by young anarchists and ending in Morro da Providência. People in the old Port Community Forum were more than willing to hand over the leadership of the struggle to younger community activists, who also participated in all-city networks such as the People’s Committee of the World Cup and the Olympics, Copa Popular da Copa e das Olimpiadas.

On August 28th 2013 the 6th Civil Chamber of the Court of Rio de Janeiro considered the Municipality’s appeal, but upheld the decision to freeze the Morar Carioca works. The city was authorized to continue the work on the cable car only, which was finished by October 2013 but not operational. Following the court decision, and not least the street demonstrations, the mayor sent his right hand advisor to the community of Morro de Providência and offered informal talks to reach a consensus about the upgrading of the favela. By the end of 2013, this consensus was still an unfinished business, but the number of families to be evicted had now been reduced dramatically – only 70 families remained on the list for relocation. In the same vein, the funicular plan was about to be modified to avoid demolitions. Thus, the community activists were more self-reliant, and they participated in all-city networks of activists never seen before in this particular favela.

By way of a conclusion, we have observed that the struggle in Morro da Providência has involved a gradually smaller portion of the settlement. Yet with time, the mobilizations have become more intensive and and been part of city wide mobilizations, thus more politicized. Support from activists and civil society organizations outside the favela has compensated for the indifference shown by favela residents who did not feel direct threats from the municipal interventions. The mobilizations evolved through three stages, each with its ups and downs (signs of demobilization): first, a very localized and spontaneous struggle against the top-down intervention of the municipal urban upgrading program, Morar Carioca; second, as part of the mobilization of the Community Forum of the Port against the mega project linked to the Olympic Games, Porto Maravilha; third, as part of city-wide and national demonstrations for improved public services and citizenship in the wake of the mega sports events.
5 The case of Manguinhos

5.1 Introduction

Manguinhos is a large and densely populated area in the Northern Zone of the city. The area consists of a cluster (conjunto) of 16 neighbouring favelas with around 50,000 inhabitants and with quite distinct ways of how they were initiated and then developed. The Morro do Amorim is the oldest one with its origin dating back as far as 1901 and has taken form over the decades without significant public sector interventions. It is quite different from the so-called People’s Housing Neighbourhoods – like DSUP, Embratel or CCPL, which were the results of illegal land occupations that recently were demolished. They were substituted by public housing projects within the reign of the PAC (‘Programme for the Acceleration of Growth’) – with public financing, mainly from federal funds (BRL 509 billion in 2010) and under execution partly of the state and partly of the city government.

Taking into consideration that Manguinhos is by far larger than this research project could cover, it was decided to focus on some key issues and territories, on which we would concentrate our field work.

On the one hand, seeking to capture processes of social mobilization of residents in their relation to the multiple impacts of the PAC-Manguinhos, an important focus became Manguinhos Social Forum. We tried to understand of how the PAC was implemented in Manguinhos since 2007 with its specific characteristic of a large-scale federal infrastructure project, executed at sub-municipal level with some involvement of the city government, but coordinated by the State of Rio de Janeiro. How did the interaction of the residents with the different scales of government institutions take place?

On the other hand, we decided to focus on one of the PAC social housing projects, Embratel, which was visited several times for observing the socio-territorial relations and organization during the first months of its functioning.

5.2 Settlement profile

Geographic location. Manguinhos is located west of the Avenida Brazil in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. The administrative district of Manguinhos consists of an area of about 262 hectares, yet considering the total area taken in by the favelas of Manguinhos, one has to consider a total area of about 400 hectares. As the map shows well, Manguinhos is characterized by a fragmented topography, with avenues,

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33 All three of them named after the former land owners – companies that abandoned their terrains.

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rivers and railway lines cutting subdividing the territory. The favelas of the 'Conjunto' border with the neighbourhoods of Higienópolis, Bonsucesso, Benfica and Manguinhos. They are not far from the favela clusters of Maré and Alemão. Besides that, Manguinhos embraces the area of Fiocruz, Brazil's main center for health research and education.

The residents of Manguinhos are, mostly, migrants of first, second or third generation originating from rural areas of Brazil's North-east and having come to Rio on the search for work opportunities in industry and construction works from the 1960s onwards (Freire and Souza 2010). The overall population is 50,000, of which 53 per cent are women.

Figure 5.1  Map of Manguinhos cluster of favelas

Source: www.wikimapia.org

**Historical circumstances that shaped the development of the settlement.** The first settlement activities in the area of Manguinhos date back to the end of the 19th century, when the Leopoldina Railway was constructed, cutting through the area in its way from the Central Station to the municipality of Caxias north of Rio. The area was initially the property of João Dias de Amorim. Since the 1920s different parts of the territory, frequently flooded by the rivers Faria-Timbó and Jacaré, were dried out and different housing projects have been implemented throughout the history of Manguinhos (Freire and Souza 2010).

Pessoa (2006: 108-116) identifies six cycles of occupation in the area of Manguinhos and the Maré. The first cycle was initiated by the construction of the railway line in 1886 and is marked by the first settlements in the Amorim area.
The second cycle, from 1927 to 1933, refers to the activities of the Company of Improvements of the Baixada Fluminense\(^3\) (EMBF) and the National Department of Sanitation Works (DNOS), preparing the Manguinhos area for the urban and industrial expansion to come in the following decades. In the same context within what Pessoa (2006) identifies the third cycle from 1934 to 1946, the Avenida Brasil was completed. Like other infrastructure projects of this kind it attracted rural workers migrating to Rio on the seek for jobs. Manguinhos' second favela, Parque Carlos Chagas, finds origin in this cycle, in 1941. According to Pessoa (2006: 110-111),

“The fourth cycle initiates in 1954, with the implementation of the Manguinhos Refinery. At that moment, with the Avenida Brasil already functioning […] the population density increased significantly in the communities of the area.”

A significant part of the favelas that form Manguinhos until our days date back to this decade. They surged under very precarious conditions and yet it took another three decades for a significant project of urban intervention to take place in the area. That occurred with the Favela-Bairro project in the 1990s. In the same period a new cycle of land occupation took place coming to an end with the occupation of Embratel and CCPL in the first decade of the 21st century.

Different interviewees underline Manguinhos' character of a transitional territory, with high degrees of mobility of its residents which can be related to the uncertainty created by the city government and its executive branch – a relation of denial and discontinuity of plans. The name of favela ‘CHP2’, as a social housing project, expresses this relation well: Built in 1951, it has kept its original name: Improvisatory Housing Blocks.

Characteristics of poverty and habitation (including legality and regularity).

Each favela of Manguinhos has its own context of origin and development leading to its specific structures. Some favelas are the result of government interventions, others took shape due to popular organization without external support. It is frequent that the settlement originated as a social housing project and later on adapted to the resident's needs and demands, resulting from the increase of demographic density and many times leading to verticalization of houses.

In general, many of the self-constructed houses did reach the point of external finishing. As is the case in many other favelas, the houses in Manguinhos were subject to continuous adaptation, transformation and rebuilding at a rhythm that responded to the financial situation of the residents. Seeking to guarantee the minimum conditions for a reasonable living, improvisation and building upwards were keywords within theses dynamics of improvement of the existing structures.

\(^3\) Baixada Fluminense nowadays refers to the zone and municipalities just north of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and geographically it refers to the lower plains north of Rio that lead to the mountain ranges to the north.
Table 5.1  *Manguinhos: Demographic and poverty indicators (ENSP/Fiocruz 2012)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reproduction rate</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population aged 14 or less</td>
<td>&gt; 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls between 15 and 17 years of age with children</td>
<td>15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>0.65% (among the five lowest of Rio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td>BRL 188.00 per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live on less than three minimum wages per month</td>
<td>75% of the residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live on less than 1 minim wage per month</td>
<td>20% of the residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>~30% (reaching up to 50% in some of the favelas)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2  *Matrix of housing structure and status in substandard ('subnormal' - IBGE) settlements- Classification of the favelas in Manguinhos (Braathen, 2011)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Impoverished quarters; inner-city decay, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-urban development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>i.e. resettlement colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.e. inner city squats</td>
<td><em>The older favelas of Manguinhos with a more reasonable structure and infrastructure such as Amorim or Vila Turismo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social housing blocks such as Embratel, DSUP and CCPL ('semi-legal')</td>
<td><em>Most precarious settlements, squatter camps, backyard dwellings, etc.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorer and more recent favelas such as Mandela or Varginha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupations of abandoned factory terrains as was the case of Embratel or CCPL before the construction works of the PAC-Manguinhos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In reference to the matrix of housing structure and status in sub-standard settlements as provided by Braathen (2011), in Manguinhos we can identify different types of classification. All the residences have been registered in one of the community associations, but usually they are not in the General Real Estate Registration (RGI) of the state. Thus, the vast majority of the residences in the more precarious areas correspond to a combination of ‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’. In the slightly better-off neighbourhoods a combination of ‘semi-legal’ and ‘as-good-as-regular’ prevail. We find that in the case of the new social housing blocks, such as DSUP and Embratel. As is the case in the majority of social housing projects in Rio de Janeiro, the residents move into their residences without receiving the necessary documents to become the legal owners (no registration at RGI).

**Infrastructure (urban and public services) around year 2010.** Each favela in Manguinhos has its specific set of accesses to urban services and infrastructure, depending on its location within the territory and its socio-territorial and historic context. There are several bus lines, two metro stations (Maria da Graça and Triagem) in nearby formal neighbourhoods, as well as a number of vans, minibuses and motor-bike-taxis, in most cases informal ('alternative transportation'). This
privatized public transport system is not very affordable. Ten travels per week, to and from work, and forty per month add up to an amount equivalent to 20% of the minimum wage. And yet the residents of Manguinhos, compared to inhabitants of the western zone and the more peripheral Baixada Fluminense, are privileged in terms of accessibility to the centre of Rio.

The quality of urban services varies widely among different parts of Manguinhos, from reasonable (with a minimum standard) to extremely bad (sub-standard). The most precarious services are water and sanitation, with most of the waste water going directly into the rivers and open canals that cross Manguinhos transporting the waste untreated into the Guanabara Bay. Most houses have showers, a toilet and access to water supply. Electricity is supplied by the licensed private company 'Light', although many residents have illegal connecting devices, *gatos* (‘cats’), manipulating their meters to pay less than the actual use.

There are different schools in the area, and with the intervention of the PAC-Manguinhos, four child day-care centres, one school, a youth centre and a big community library were built. There is a chronic undersupply of places with overfilled class rooms of up to 50 students per class. Regarding public health services, the nearby *Fiocruz*, a federal health institution of national reach, has great importance. Besides offering basic health services (*Sistema Único de Saúde* – SUS), there are schools and specialized areas of treatment and research with some opening for Manguinhos residents. There is also a recently installed UPA (‘Unity for Immediate Attendance’). Nevertheless, considering the number of residents, there is a constant undersupply of health services. The public health in general is precarious.

**Local presence of the State.** In addition to the public institution *Fiocruz*, a so-called “City of Police” was been installed on the former terrain of the company ‘Souza Cruz’, in order to house a number of specialized police departments, in January 2013. A year later a UPP (Unit of Pacification Police) was to be installed in Manguinhos.

5.3 The precedents that gave shape to the settlements in political terms

In general, cycles of industrialisation and de-industrialization mark Manguinhos' 20th century history. Throughout those cycles, different plans and projects for urban development for the area never came to be implemented:

> “On the contrary to what was proposed for this area [Manguinhos] in the Project Parkway, to make it 'one of the best urbanized zones' (Reis 1943:94), the process of illegal house occupation intensified since the 1940s. The zone was transformed into the city's second most polluted and one of the most precarious ones in terms of infra-structure and spatial organization, not leaving doubts about how the public administration relegates the urban project to utopia.” (Fernandes and Costa 2009).

With the coming to an end of the military dictatorship, in the 1980s social movements came back into scene. Favelas like Manguinhos reappear as spaces of
collective claims. They became territories of dispute and conflict after two decades of repression and hiding away of social mobilizations in the favelas. One of the persons interviewed, a protagonist of mobilizations in the 80's and 90's, lists some of the main conquests in Manguinhos:

After severe flooding in the 1980s affecting many residences and inhabitants, a small group of community militants joined forces to carry out a research within the communities in order to find out the main and most urgent needs to be addressed. The main needs identified were 1) waste water and sewage, 2) public street lighting and 3) waste. These findings were presented to and discussed with the community members in assemblies in order to work out strategies to fight for improvements. Starting with the least difficult problem to attack, the core group of the mobilizations collected 1,500 signatures claiming for public lights in the streets of Manguinhos. The claim was directed straight to the responsible institution in order to avoid clientelistic relations with politicians. The city company 'Rio-Light' was challenged directly, and after a first attempt to only partially meet the demands, the resident were united and mobilized again. At the end of the day, the streets were duly lit. Other mobilizations lead to some partial improvements of other aspects of the precarious situation of Manguinhos' favelas.

These mobilizations might have involved the neighbourhood associations at some points of the process, but they did not have significance as starting points or spaces of democratic networking. According to interviewed activists, the neighbourhood associations represented much more the state and its interests towards (or against) the residents. Their presidents were named 'traditional leaders', expressing a critical view of their function. On top of the fragmentation of the territory, the presence of a diversity of neighbourhood associations seemed to have slowed down rather than facilitate social mobilization.

Two installations of urban-infrastructure have presented permanent obstacles for living in the favelas of João Goulart, Vila Turismo and CHP-2. A high tension power line and an over-ground water pipeline cross these favelas. They have caused several accidents. Moreover, for security reasons and as prohibited by law, they inhibit the construction of houses in its proximities. Still there have been constant cycles of house construction - by dwellers not finding other option and pieces of land to build on - and demolition executed by the city government.

An interviewee reports that one of the eviction and demolition processes led to wider mobilizations of the community, pressing the city government to improve the conditions of the housing alternatives. The residents of the houses to be removed were resettled in the neighbouring favelas called 'Nelson Mandela' and 'Samora Machel'. The mobilization was a result of the unwillingness to be removed to faraway places.

“We called the responsible city officials and the CEDAE [the city water company], we had a commission to address the municipal secretary of housing, and at that time many people mobilized and even more so after a flooding in 1988”.

By the mid-1990s, political mobilization and networking had been weakened, while a new phase of land occupation initiated. Social housing was constructed by the city in
collaboration with the state government and with co-financing by the Inter-American Development Bank, giving birth to the favelas ‘Nelson Mandela’ and ‘Samora Machel’. The land for the social housing projects was bought by the city government from Embratel, which had already abandoned their property. With this process a new cycle of ‘favelization’ started, with the occupation of land abandoned as a result of des-industrialization (Pessoa 2006:114):

“In 1995 part of remaining Embratel lands are occupied, to give room for the new favela Mandela de Pedra. In 2001 another favela is installed, Samora II and in 2002 the occupation of sheds abandoned by CONAB (National Company for Goods Supply), situated across the Brazilian Postal Services, initiates the favela 'Vitória de Manguinhos' (or 'CONAB'), under coordination of residents of the Mandela de Pedra favela, on the other side and some hundreds of meters up the streets.”

Similar dynamics happen with other abandoned land and factories in the region, some of which were included in the PAC-Manguinhos to build social housing facilities. Following the example of Embratel, in January 2012 works to erect another popular housing section started. Former industrial installations and self-constructed houses of squatters were demolished.

We can read these occupations as informal mobilizations. They are not politically articulated or in dialogue with the public and government sphere, but they are responses to the immediate need of housing. In addition, in terms of political mobilizations before the decision to direct resources of the PAC to Manguinhos, there were some large gatherings in Leopoldo Bulhões Avenue, so called ‘Walks for Peace’ with a key role played by the local activist group 'Agenda for the Reduction of Violence in Manguinhos'.

5.4 Recent public interventions and social mobilizations

When it was known in year 2007 that Manguinhos would be included in the Programme for the Acceleration of Growth (PAC), a new cycle of mobilizations was initiated. With the announcement of the project, social agents already active in Manguinhos joined with residents to form the Manguinhos Social Forum. The residents claimed a democratic implementation process of the large-scale urban development project. Madureira et al (2009 unpublished) summarize the purposes of the Forum as 'constructing social networks to address the challenges of de-territorialisation of government politics'. According to the authors of the document, the Forum...

“... came up bringing together diverse segments of local social actors (neighbourhood associations, religious leaders, socio-cultural groups and organizations, communitarian university preparation classes, educational programmes for teenagers and adults, among other collective actors) in the form of weekly meetings with an average of 50 participants per meeting.”

And, according to Araújo (2010: 35):
Quite soon after its formation, in reference to the federal “City Statute” and its guidelines for democratization of urban development, the Forum came up with a proposal to form and institutionalize a Committee for the Supervision of the execution of the PAC-Manguinhos, widely ignored by the city government.

“When PAC arrived, we already knew it would overrun us as this is how other governmental interventions have arrived. There has always been non-participation. We organized ourselves so that history would not repeat itself. We believed that organized we could get some kind of participation, and the proposal to form a monitoring committee of the PAC surged. (...) this committee would have legitimacy to follow the works and intervene if there were any problems. (...) (...) It is legal to form a committee, but not an obligation to institutionalize the committee, and therefore the committee wasn’t formalized! The government fragmentized this union by not legalizing the committee”

In sequence the 'traditional leaders' left the Forum and government officials established their dialogue directly with those leaders, neglecting the Forum and its significance as a collective space of mobilization. This led to a fragmentation of the collective process and putting carriers of more critical voices at risk by exposing them individually through weakening the collective dialogue.

35Interview with Michele, participant in the Social Forum, teacher at PEJA/Fiocruz
“When the Public Power realizes that the Forum is a space where the residents ask questions and take up the fight, the government does not want to participate in the Forum, because it was a space of participation, and the government doesn’t want more of that. It dialogues directly with the traditional leaders. When the government moves away from the Forum, the traditional leaders do the same.”

'Traditional leaders' were linked to, influenced or controlled by local drug trafficking groups. The 'traditional leaders' received armed support to secure their local power. Government officials sought direct dialogue with them, as if they were carriers of a collective voice of the community residents (everybody knowing they were not). The government reaffirmed the leaders in their role and weakened and put at risk any individual or group with positions and opinions in opposition to the interests of the 'traditional leaders'. As a direct result the Forum suffered from signs of demobilization. Later on the decision was taken to construct the Forum as a space of formation not directly addressing the issues of the PAC-Manguinhos, clearly a result of the indirect and direct forms of repression. The critical voices had been silenced in public.

This severe accusation on part of the protagonists of the Forum was expressed by one of the interviewed activists as follows:

“It’s not abstract violence, it’s concrete violence, life at risk. If we stick our heads out of the window too far, there comes a hand, like, of iron. Oh: you over there, stay in your place where you belong, you understand? And that is what we [residents with critique towards PAC, protagonists of the Forum] live through.”

Researcher: “Hand of iron, how does the city government react?”

“The city government in fact reinforces. (…) City government inhibits participation and it’s obvious that it needs several strategies to inhibit, because it can’t just, it would be ugly, you know, inhibit participation just straight forward. But, it uses strategies inherent to the communities to inhibit this participation. When the government neglects the dialogue with the social movement and dialogues directly and exclusively with the traditional leaders (…) it understands that this leader doesn’t represent the community. (…) It does know that. The dialogue takes place exactly with the intention to inhibit the participation of the residents, the social movement, you know. And the internal networks that the traditional leaders have access to are numerous, so they use these powers, just as power of violence. So (…) the government has a strong influence”.

The defeat of the mobilizations in their struggle for people’s democratic participation in the PAC-process was clearly showed in the way the Embratel Popular Housing Project was executed. At no point of time there seems to have been a link between the implementation process and critiques formulated by civil society actors. One rare exception which can be recognized is that the city government corrected the number

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36 interview with Michele, ibid.
of planned housing units upwards, after the Forum had pointed out that more residents would be affected negatively (removals) than what the plan for new housing units indicated. In general, the social function of the PAC-Manguinhos in terms of addressing the most basic needs in the settlements is illustrated by the fact that more than half of the funds invested in the works were directed to the elevation of a railway line crossing the area. This work was in the government discourse defended as an initiative to “unite the communities” and make place for a large urban park.

Table 5.2  *PAC and Manguinhos Social Forum - Important events*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The abandoned land of Embratel is occupied twice by residents of the neighbouring favelas (Freire e Souza 2010: 14-19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Decision to use resources of the PAC for Manguinhos, formation of the Manguinhos Social Forum as a direct response of civil society actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/03/2008</td>
<td>President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva inaugurates the construction works of PAC-Manguinhos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/09</td>
<td>The Social Forum of Manguinhos publishes ‘Manifesto of Pro-positive Evaluation – 11 months of PAC-Manguinhos. For the respect of the Principle of Democratic City Management of the Statute of the City’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>According to data of the Company for Public Sector Construction Works of the State of Rio de Janeiro (EMOP, 2009) 1,239 families have been evicted from Embratel lands, to begin the construction of the social housing blocks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 25/10/2010 | Inauguration of the 'Conjunto Habitacional Embratel'
| 2012       | Construction works within the PAC-Manguinhos continue (Social Housing CCPL and railway). In June: inauguration of the new Manguinhos train station                                                        |
| 2012/2013  | Occupation by Bope and inauguration of UPP, construction of the “City of Police”                                                                                                                      |

5.5  The situation by the end of year 2013: PAC-Manguinhos and beyond.

When debating the topic of favelas, it is common that the issue of public security dominates any other issue. In Rio de Janeiro, the tendency is an increasing level of militarization and specific forms of territorial control of the favelas by installing UPP's (Units of Pacification Police). In this context, some interviewed persons presume that the choice to direct PAC-resources to Manguinhos was primarily part of a project of public security related to an urban development project, designed to meet the demands of the mega-events to come. This impression gains substance with the construction of the “City of Police”, which brings together the departments of a diversity of specialized police forces. The creation of the complex was announced in the end of 2009 by the state secretary of security Beltrame. The inauguration was first
promised to be in 2010, but has been delayed several times and took finally place in September 2013.

In October 2012, Manguinhos was occupied by Bope (Special Forces Battalion) as a first step towards installing a UPP unit, which was inaugurated January 16th 2013. The relationship between the new UPP police and the residents has been tense, and several cases of police abuse of power have been reported. In March and April 2013 two men aged 16 and 22 were killed by the UPP police in Manguninhos and nearby Jacarezinho, raising debate over citizenship, racism and security in the favelas.

**Cracolândia.** The city government has recently increased its interventions, with great attention paid by the media, to address the so called *Cracolândia*, a vast area of drug selling and consumption of crack. It is situated between the favelas of Manguinhos and Jacarezinho and crossing the several railway lines in the area. The consumers live in highly precarious conditions of homelessness and addiction. The public sector interventions are basically restricted to picking up the people living in the streets and bringing them to public shelters, where the vast majority only stays a few days before finding their way back to the streets. In an operation in April 2012, some shacks that homeless people had built next to Jacaré River near the favela Vargininha were destroyed. The police forces called the shacks the starting point of the “a new favela.”

According to recent reports from residents, the situation in the area of the elevated train lines and in the surroundings of the high-tech train station, recently inaugurated, is highly precarious. Houses near the area have been evacuated to give space for a the planned ‘urban park’ while others continue to live in their homes. Due to the delay in demolishing the empty houses, homeless people and drug consumers seek protection in the left behind houses, extending “Cracolandia” towards the neighbourhoods near the railway.

**Removals.** Since the announcement of the PAC projects 2009, a brutal, drawn-out eviction process has affected the community. The authorities have strategically employed an expulsion tactic where they demolish some houses and leave the ruins, and thereby garbage, rats and hazardous conditions, behind. This makes life unbearable for those residents who remain, while sending a strong message that their eviction is imminent. As a resident from CHP2 recalls;

“There was a removal in CHP2 where there were various apartments and they were removed in a very brutal manner. One day, the Special Forces of the PM together with the Leão XII Foundation arrived saying that you have to leave because your house is condemned. Afterwards, the people went to COHAB apartments that were constructed all over Rio so there are people from Manguinhos spread all over Rio.”

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37 Jornal do Brasil 15.03.2012.
38 TV O Dia 23.09.2012
40 Interview with resident and member of the Manguinhos Social Forum
In total, 900 families were to be removed along the edge of the river in the Beira Mar community in Manguinhos. The site was used to build a sports centre and a MCMV apartment complex to resettle the removed families, with social rent assistance while the apartments are built. However, residents repeat that the quality and size of the MCMV resettlement housing units do not qualify as dignified housing.

“Here in Manguinhos they are very small, with 37 m². A family with two or three kids- somebody will have to sleep outside.”

In addition, the compensation offered to Beira Rio residents was very low. Initially residents were offered around R$6,000-R$6,500 Reais with the option of assisted purchase or an apartment in a public housing development. With continued resistance, the compensation offered rose to R$30,000, which still fell far short of being able to afford an equivalent property within the proximity. With the PAC works and installation of the UPP, house prices in Manguinhos, as in the rest of the city, have sky-rocketed.

**Infrastructure.** On Thursday July 25th 2013, Pope Francisco visited the Varginha favela in Manguinhos. Preparing for the visit, the community went through a rapid clean-up process where roads were paved, sidewalks created and garbage collected. This was however far from sufficient to address the precariousness of health and sanitation infrastructure that persist in the community in spite of various government projects. Even though the community has received investments worth millions of dollars through PAC I and PAC II, the programmes have failed to effectively address the community’s most urgent needs.

Along with nearby Complexo do Alemão, the region’s sewage is precariously channelled into the Faria-Timbó River which carries it to the Guanabara Bay. At the launch of the PAC programme in Manguinhos in 2008, then-president Lula promised to address the favela’s need of basic sanitation. However, five years later, it remained neglected, and numerous announced improvements were yet to translate into results. In June 2012, the President of Caixa Econômica, alongside Governor Sérgio Cabral and Cedae president Wagner Victor announced a R$176 million financing of the installation of the Faria-Timbó sewage collection tube, a promise repeated in October 2012, this time with a R$250 million budget with construction to start within the next three months. This however never happened. The latest announcement by Cedae’s President on June 4th 2013 merely spoke of “reducing the waste that comes from the Faria-Timbó River and flows into the Guanabara Bay.” There was no mention of the sewage collection tube.

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41 Interview with resident and member of the Manguinhos Social Forum
42 [http://rioonwatch.org/?p=8612](http://rioonwatch.org/?p=8612), [http://odia.ig.com.br/portal/rio/obra-do-pac-vira-cen%C3%A9rio-de-guerra-em-manguinhos-1.510591](http://odia.ig.com.br/portal/rio/obra-do-pac-vira-cen%C3%A9rio-de-guerra-em-manguinhos-1.510591)
45 [http://rioonwatch.org/?p=10494](http://rioonwatch.org/?p=10494)
To conclude: Manguinhos has been an example of the defeat of the struggle for people’s democratic participation in the larger public interventions, such as the PAC. The demoralization and demobilization of people observed in Manguinhos after 2009 has reduced the pressure from below and increased the number of unfulfilled promises from the government.
6 The case of Vila Autódromo

6.1 Introduction

Initially this study proposed to carry out two case studies in Rio de Janeiro; in Morro da Providência and Manguinhos. Throughout the study we however felt the need to include a third case study, that of Vila Autódromo. The fragile networks in Morro da Providência and Manguinhos have not been able to represent a force capable of positioning itself against the local government and its current form of intervention in the slums, whose official slogan is integration. To a large extent, the interventions are characterized by the same attitude which has prevailed over the last century, that of urbanization and removals. Vila Autódromo however differs from the two originally selected cases.

6.2 Settlement Profile

Geographic location. The community of Vila Autódromo is located in the Jacarepaguá neighbourhood in the western zone of the city. It is close to Barra da Tijuca, one of the principal municipal vectors of urban expansion over the last decades. The small community is enclosed by the Ambassador Abelardo Bueno and the Salvador Alende Avenues, the Jacarepaguá lake and the Autodrome - race tracks for automobiles.

Origins and evolution of the settlement. The area where the Vila Autódromo is located today was traditionally inhabited exclusively by fishermen due to its proximity to the Jacarepaguá Lake and other small lakes. With the real estate expansion in the 1970s, including the construction of the nearby race tracks and the Rio Centro convention centre, the surrounding lakes were either filled in or became too polluted to allow fishing in the area. The remaining fishermen together with construction workers employed by the projects that were evolving in the zone joined together and developed the Vila Autódromo in the 1970s. In 1989 the municipal government authorized the settlement of a large number of new families that had been removed from the Cardoso Fonts community. Through a system of voluntary work, organized by the inhabitants themselves, the community expanded and was able to guarantee minimum condition of health and urbanization. According to the residents the public authority never made any investments in the area, in spite of charging many of them land property taxes. Several actors are important references when discussing the case of Vila Autódromo, particularly those active in the first organizational form of the community, namely the Association of Residents and Fishermen Vila Autódromo (AMPAVA), which dates back to 1987.
Poverty and housing characteristics. As in the case of other precarious settlements in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, the official data on Vila Autódromo are quite outdated. The Pereira Passos Municipal Institute of Urbanism has released data with open access to the general public, based on the 2000 census from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. It is however problematic to base an analysis on these figures today, as the community has gone through numerous changes over the last decade. According to the Residents’ Association, there were approximately 350 documented lots, and an estimated 600 families living in the community46. Most of the people have employment, but the profile of the families varies when it comes to the number of residents per dwelling, the level of income and education level.

The majority of the houses are constructions of bricks. While some of the structures are sturdy and well maintained, others are in worse shape, a typical profile for low-income settlements. According to the MOREI programme released by the Pereira Passos Institute, approximately 90 percent of the houses are owned by the dwellers. Almost all of the houses are meant for residential purpose.

Urban infrastructure and public services. We did not observe any kind of drainage system in the community. It is the residents themselves who organize collective efforts to clean the streets and the lake, at least superficially. All access to the water supply network is also a result of the labor of the locals.

The entire neighbourhood in which Vila Autódromo is situated does not have access to sewage network and treatment, hence the massive pollution of the surrounding lakes. Most of the houses have resorted to rudimentary septic containers for sewage. According to data from Morel (2000) there were also a few households without any kind of toilet facilities in the community. The garbage collection is however done regularly by the city three times a week.

Despite the pollution that prevents fishing in the Jacarepaguá Lake, the region still has a rich vegetation. There is a high environmental awareness among the residents who are active in the ecological preservation of the area. Throughout the community one finds plaques appealing environmental preservation.

According to Altair Guimarães, the president of the Residents’ Association, there has not been any registered flooding in the community the last few years. On the other hand, there is a constant occurrence of pockets of water logging in the streets during rainy periods, precisely because of the lack of sanitation and infrastructure up-grading in the area. This impairs the coming and going of the residents.

The public transport system in the area is primarily served by buses which, according to the residents, are not only overly crowded and worn down, but also very expensive, leading them to acquiring vehicles of their own. Inside the settlement, the road network is a fruit of the labor of the residents themselves, and therefore quite precarious. The street lighting is public.

46 Interview 26-04-2012 with a leader of the neighbourhood association of Vila Autódromo. In a notification sent to the local Olympic Organizing Committee (COI) in May 2010, the State Public Defender of Rio de Janeiro claimed that there were approximately 950 families in Vila Autódromo. One reason for the discrepancy is that 'family' and 'household' tend to be conflated – many 'family' lots might contain several households, or generations and branches, of a family.
There are no schools or hospitals in the community, nor kindergartens or health clinics. There are few commercial properties, most of them small bars/cafés. There is also a small grocery store and a beauty salon. For other services one must leave Vila Autódromo. The settlement includes some leisure areas, such as a small playground for children and a soccer field right next to the Residents’ Association which also serves as a meeting place for the community and the Association itself. There are also a few small evangelical churches and one Catholic church. The race tracks on the margin of the community did not necessarily attend the residents themselves, the same went for the small flight club situated on the other side of the community until 2013.

**Presence of the public authorities.** The State of Rio de Janeiro is the owner of the land on which Vila Autódromo is situated. Under the leadership of Governor Leonel Brizola, the State government recognized the use of the site for housing purposes and developed a project to regularize land titles and grant them to the families who had lived there for decades. In this process the work done by the Institute of Land and Cartography of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the ITERJ, is worth mentioning. Nevertheless, since 1992 the principal form in which the public authority has made itself present in Vila Autódromo has been through continuous threats of removal of the settlement.

### 6.3 The history of public interventions in Vila Autódromo.

The principal justifications for removal throughout the years have varied, but they have all been disapproved by the local inhabitants assisted by the State Public Defender.47

The first attempts of removal by the municipal government were in 1993, led by the then sub-prefect of Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá, Eduardo Paes (who has been the city mayor since 2009). The argument of the municipality was that Vila Autódromo represented an “aesthetic and environmental damage” to the region because of its proximity to Barra da Tijuca, which was rising as a new centre of the city. It was precisely because of this episode that the community decided to organize and respond to the threat of removal by becoming a member of a land regularization programme linked to the State government, which at that time was in the political opposition to the municipal government. During this period several neighbouring communities were evicted.

Vila Autódromo however struck back. The settlement passed through a process of land regularization in the 1990s which granted land titles to numerous residents. This provided them with essential assets in the struggles later on. Moreover, the community obtained legal and political recognition from the municipality who, in 1995, proposed to transform the area into an *Area of Special Social Interest*. This did not happen until 10 years later, through the by-law no. 74/2005. According to Gaffney and Melo (2010: 20) the municipal government later withdrew Vila Autódromo from the list of Areas of Special Social Interest, which means it was no longer a prioritized

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47 Interview 26-04-2012 with a leader of the neighborhood association of Vila Autódromo, who showed the notification given to the COI in May 2011.
area for urbanization projects. However, this withdrawal was one of many issues that might bring the Vila Autódromo case to the court.

Later on new arguments emerged to justify the removal of the community. They included: the danger of natural disasters due to the proximity to the lagoon and the risk of flooding; the need of the area for the construction of equipment for the Pan American games in 2007; in 2010, the need to build a media center for the 2016 Olympic Games. Later it was argued that the settlement had to be demolished because of the construction of the Olympic Park, in spite of the plans pointing only to the area where the race track is installed today and not the Vila Autódromo. Then the argument was that one had to create a perimeter of security next to the Olympic Park, as if the community, which does not have any issues with drug trafficking, represents a danger in itself. Most recently the question of removal came up because of the construction of the Trans-Olympic highway, which does not necessarily need to pass through the settlement. Residents also asserted that the City wanted the community to be relocated not because of the neighbouring Olympic construction, but rather as a troca de favores (exchange of favours) between the Mayor and powerful real estate developers who wanted to build luxury condominiums on the site as part of the “post-Games legacy“. This large amount of justifications, that have all been proven illegitimate, just strengthened the hypothesis that powerful sectors of the real estate capital have interests in the area.

The intensification of the pressure for the removal of the residents over the last years can be explained by the coordination between the three federal entities to, among other things, organize the mega sporting events in the city. The support of one of the largest media groups in the country, Rede Globo, has reinforced the process. Various articles have been published throughout this period which affirms the total removal of the community, without ever discussing it with the residents.

The major difference between the previous and recent initiatives of removal is the municipal government’s articulation after 2008 with the state and federal governments, which has not happened in the past. The municipal housing department was led by a politician from Workers’ Party (PT) and acted in pursuit of a total removal of the community. The interests of major businessmen in the area, who see the land where the Vila Autódromo is situated as an important potential area for the real estate boom directed towards the upper (A and B) classes, were prioritized. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), also had interests in the area. According to the Municipal government, the IOC had plans that involve the removal of the community, although the IOC officially denied this in a response to a notification they received from the Public Defender in 2011.

6.4 Social mobilizations within and around Vila Autódromo

The main source of conflict for the case of Vila Autódromo was unquestionably the threat of removal by the municipal government. The residents also have a second historical agenda of mobilization and struggle which is the quest for the material improvement of the settlement. The main issue has been developing an efficient

48 Interview, ibid.
network of infrastructure, as the residents claim the government has never executed measures of upgrading and sanitation in the settlement. They have therefore organized themselves and acted on their own in order to ensure minimum living conditions.

In spite of being a small community compared to many others in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the representation and organization of Vila Autódromo and its Association of Residents and Fishermen Vila Autódromo (AMPAVA), is well constituted, without a prevalence of opposing groups. Within the Association there has been some tension between those who front the battle against removal and those who focus on improving the infrastructure; this did however not preclude anyone from participating in either of the two struggles. Moreover, the Association often held wider meetings which gather more locals, held in the small community soccer field. The Association has not acted in isolation, but based on the joint decisions of a sound number of residents.

Besides the work of the community leaders and the Association, it is important to mention the collaboration of other sectors of the society as well. One should note the work of the ombudsmen (Public Defender), in particular that of the Centre for Land and Housing of the State Public Defender of Rio de Janeiro. Because of its collaboration with Vila Autódromo, the Centre for Land and Housing had its nucleus dissolved and later on re-organized with new defenders, which diminished the prior commitments and assignments of the centre.

It was precisely the lack of participation and dialogue with the residents, guaranteed by law in Brazil, which sustained the argumentation used by the Ombudsman for non-removal. The resistance of the residents can also be explained by the organizational experience they gained before and during the Pan-American Games in 2007, where they proved victorious. Finally the residents refuse to accept the land offered by the city for their resettlement. They claim that the land presents environmental risks because it is located on a hill which was the subject of mineral exploration in the past.

In the middle of this deadlock, and to pass from a defensive strategy to a more offensive one, the leaders of the Association developed from September 2011 contact with some well-known academics they had met in the inter-city Comité Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas (People’s Committee on the World Cup and Olympics). Jointly they started the project of formulating a Plano Popular, a ‘People’s Plan’, for upgrading the community. The plan was developed by the residents in various working groups. They were supported by a group of scholars and students from the two federal universities of the Rio region (UFRJ and UFF.) They produced an integrated plan for housing upgrading, for sanitation/infrastructure and environment, for public services, and for the economic as well as cultural development of the community. The implementation of the plan would cost approximately one third of the cost of relocation.

“Everything we have in our community has been constructed with our own hands, including the bus stop. Therefore we work out our own

49 Such as Carlos Vainer, professor of IPPUR / UFRJ, UFF professor Regina Bienenstein, law professor Miguel Baldez and other researchers

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It is elaborated in alliance with some social movements and universities. We carried out various workshops, exchanged people’s knowledge with the academic’s knowledge to make a People’s Plan for the community.50

Moreover, a “Viva Vila Autódromo” campaign was launched in June 2012, during the ‘Rio+20 Summit’. An international demonstration in solidarity with Vila Autódromó, which is located adjacent to the official conference centre hosting ‘Rio +20’, was held by the alternative ‘People’s Summit’.

On August 16th 2012 this People's Plan for Vila Autódromo was delivered to the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes, one month before the municipal elections. The mayor, campaigning to be re-elected, promised that he and his Housing Department would need only 45 days to review the plan. On August 16th 2012 the People's Plan for Vila Autódromo was delivered to the current mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes. The only answer the residents received was that the Mayor and the Municipal Housing Department needed a period of 45 days to review the document.

6.5 The situation by the end of year 2013

While the city government (municipality) agreed to consider their case, the community did not receive a formal response. In an interview two weeks later, in August 2012, the Secretary of Housing said he had heard about the alternative plan, but not read it.51 Instead, the residents had been presented with the plans of the “Parque Carioca” which was announced as the «new address» of the Vila Autódromo residents. The construction of around 900 housing units had started on the location, about one kilometre from Vila Autódromo. In November 2012 the Mayor reaffirmed the decision to remove the community during an official visit to the future Olympic Park.

Mayor Eduardo Paes claimed that the removal of Vila Autódromo was the only one linked to the 2016 Olympic Games. During his visit in November 2012, he suggested that the process was made with a lot of dialogue, “like with all resettlements made in the city”. "The key word is to negotiate, negotiate, negotiate," he said.52


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meeting on July 1st 2013 he insisted that 70 percent had already signed a contract with the municipality. These numbers were however far from what the Neighbourhood Association and State NUTH (housing public defenders’ office) had registered. Civil society actors claim the municipality was laying psychological pressure on the residents of Vila Autódromo in order to get them to move.

By the end of June 2013, several homes spread out throughout the community were marked for removal. Scattered removal has been a well-known psychological weapon adopted to weaken resistance in Rio favelas. Vila Autódromo leaders contacted the Public Defender’s Office immediately, who then notified the city authorities about the residents’ concession of land use. A court order then prohibited the demolition of any homes. However, city employees were ceaselessly going door-to-door attempting to convince residents to sign up for the Parque Carioca resettlement housing. The tone of these visits is that if residents did not take advantage of this resettlement “opportunity”, they risked losing everything.

In wake of the June 2013 protests, Vila Autódromo residents and allies organized a march from the community through the surrounding area on July 20th, demonstrating continued community opposition to the threat of eviction among other issues. The march ended up in front of Parque Carioca, where the protesters chanted “we don’t want this” as they spread their signs across the front fence of the construction site. August 9th 2013 represented a turning point for the residents of Vila Autódromo. After twenty years of resisting the threat of removal, the Mayor Eduardo Paes committed to a solution that could guarantee the permanence of the community. The mayor acknowledged that there had been errors in the treatment community and said he was willing to initiate a round of negotiations based on the permanence and upgrading of Vila Autódromo. The same day the Residents’ Association released a public note stating that:

“After years of resistance and struggle, Vila Autódromo achieved a commitment from the Mayor: Vila Autódromo and its residents will not be removed.

A series of ‘technical’ meetings followed. From the municipality side were the municipal secretaries of the environment and housing, the sub-mayors of the Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá, a representative of the Municipal Olympic Corporation, and the Municipal Attorney General. From the Vila Autodromo side met representatives of the Association, their university partners, the State Public Defender’s Office, and the Catholic Church’s Pastoral das Favelas. The municipality presented their revised plan: removal of ‘only’ half of the community (278 families) in order to provide private elevated access for athletes and journalists onto the Olympic Park. In response, the team behind the People’s Plan issued an updated design that met the requirements for the access roads and pedestrian bridge. The People’s Plan would only remove 30 families and allocate space for their resettlement within the community.

However, by the end of 2013 no agreement had been met, and the Association accused the municipality of trying to split the community and push individual families to sign up for a free flat in a nearby housing complex. On the other hand, the Association and its counter knowledge/counter power alliance had prevented forced evictions and demolition of Vila Autódromo so far.

7 Concluding remarks

We have observed three cases of public interventions in sub-standard settlements. The public policy statements that accompany the interventions express an interest in reducing urban poverty and assisting the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the city. However, the interventions have not been based on participatory and empowered planning within the targeted communities themselves. This reduced the cost-benefit efficiency and goal attainment of the interventions. It strengthened suspicions within and around the communities that there were other goals, a hidden agenda, on the government side. The tight relationships between urban authorities and private real estate developers in the largest and most prestigious projects of the city suggest that capitalist-bureaucratic logics steer the machine of slum upgrading in Rio de Janeiro.

The interventions have unleashed different forms, levels and patterns of social mobilization. In Vila Autódromo the unity of action has been relatively strong, and every new attempt of removals have been met by adequate and high level of mobilization. In Manguinhos the unity of collective action was weak, and after 2009 a steady decline of social mobilization has been observed. Morro da Providência offers an intermediate case, of uneven mobilization: the unity of the community has been weak, but there have been repeated surges of high mobilization by the dwellers most directly affected by government interventions. In addition to social-structural factors (such as size, ethnic heterogeneity, exposure to outside world), which factors more related to human agency can explain these variations in terms of mobilization? Our analysis has examined the history embodying the settlement as well as its relationships to social movements and politics – power relations between the state and society at the local level - to understand the different courses of action in the three cases.

Manguinhos. Considering PAC as a large-scale public intervention, from the beginning it was planned without considering any possibility of participation in planning or implementation. The execution was highly authoritarian and the most basic needs of the area and its residents lost importance. Great amounts of resources went into prestigious infrastructure projects, mainly the elevation of the railway line. Its proper name, ‘Programme for the Acceleration of Economic Growth” seems to underscore the order of priorities. The PAC Manguinhos saw the investments of public funds as necessary engine to generate economic growth, based on a model of ‘new developmentalism’. Concrete demands on the side of the citizens seem to be of secondary importance or can even serve as a justification for investments in constructions, whose utility and long-term use can be put into question.

Confronted with this type of government and politics, the social mobilizations carried out by local actors and residents from the beginning saw little chance to find
ways of influencing the trajectory and modalities of implementation of the ongoing
of the mega project. The Manguinhos Social Forum was in its formation and
durability a success in terms of base mobilization, yet in terms of its goals and
purposes it suffered a great defeat.

The highly unequal power relations between government institutions at different
levels, on the one hand, and the local mobilizers, on the other, may explain this
outcome. The Manguinhos Social Forum was not capable of substituting the old
structures of neighbourhood associations, which were co-opted by the government
and controlled by drug trafficking forces. Despite alliances with some civic and
political forces in the Manguinhos area, such as the important health institution
Fiocruz, activists of the Social Forum became exposed to repression and saw
themselves forced to lower their critical voices.

**Vila Autódromo.** This community represents an exceptional example of
commitment and struggle within the context of Rio de Janeiro. Different
assumptions could be used to explain the particularities of this case and how it has
managed to resist removal so far. There is, compared to other communities, less
imbalance of power between the government and the residents due to the fact that i)
the settlement passed through a processes of land regularization in the 1990s which
granted land titles to the residents; ii) there has been no drug trafficking; iii) the
community is quite small; iv) the community leaders have had close ties to political
organizations, trade unions and other forms of associations even at the international
level; and finally v) the governments’ intention of a total removal of the community
prompted the residents to take a collective position against this threat rather than the
fragmented struggles one can observe in other communities. Their alternative
People’s Plan for Vila Autódromo stands out as an expression of a collective and
creative ‘counter-knowledge/power’, supported by resourceful groups and civil
society networks outside the community.

Unlike what usually happens to slum dwellers in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the
residents of Vila Autódromo have titles to the land and are recognized as right
holders. Hence, the relationship that developed with the government is different
from that of other favelas. The residents have been supported by the Ombudsman
(Public Defender) and the courts. The propositions the government has presented in
attempts to convince the residents to leave their homes have been a lot more
generous than what the government has offered other communities. Still, most
residents emphasize the value that the place, constructed by the residents themselves,
has in their lives, and they are convinced of their right to remain. **Morro da
Providência.** This settlement provides a case of uneven social mobilization.
Government and public interventions provoked large and relatively spontaneous
mobilization among the residents, in May and June 2011. That resulted in the
formation of a Commission of Mediation of Conflicts in July and of a Residents’
Committee in August 2011, followed by a ten-month period of a reflux of
mobilization. The more the public works proceeded, the more people tended to give
up and drop out from the struggle. By March 2012, the construction of the cable car
station and the funicular had reached a point of no return. The residents had lost the
struggle of influencing the profile and design of public works in the area. However,

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54 This could be observed during the Rio+20 conference held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012.
the battle of those residents who were threatened by relocation saw a revival in May and June 2012. A reorganized and strengthened Residents’ Committee managed to link up with external political events such as the Rio+20 conference 2012, the Peoples’ Summit in June 2012, the local (municipal) elections in September 2012, and last but not least the national street demonstrations in June 2013. In addition to the civil and political society, they brought in the ombudsman and other public entities dedicated to the defense of the citizen’s rights. In this way the activists have acted in the same way, and together with, the activists of Vila Autódromo.

Hence, although the residents as a collective lost the first round, a combination of politicization and judicialization of the struggle have strengthened the bargaining position of the particular residents threatened by relocation. In a longitudinal perspective, one can suggest at least two different interpretations of the recent encounter between public authorities and poor communities.

The first one is pessimistic and emphasizes the negative influences of the past. The legacy of one type of tyranny after the other (military rule 1964-1985, followed by armed drug traffickers’ rule, which was contested by military and police occupation of the favela after 2008) has created a certain governmentality, to use a concept of Foucault (1991). This legacy resulted in a modernized repressive regime after 2010; the tyranny of time, science and force. This configuration combines the capitalist-managerial expediency in handling urban renewal, paternalist middle-class concern for the environment and the residents’ health, and soft community policing. Thus, the sub-standard settlement is not capable of acting as a social collective. Still, there is room for individual adaptations to the prevailing regime, or individual negotiations, assisted by human rights activists and judicial devices of a partially democratized and liberal state. Symptomatic for this governmentality is the complete absence of the Neighbourhood Association, created in 1968, from the recent social mobilizations.

Another interpretation is more optimistic. In Foucauldian terms, resistance against the destruction and repression caused by modern urban governmentality finds a case in Morro da Providência. Identity politics, centred on Afro-Brazilian and cultural heritance, has been anchored in a delimited territory from which social mobilization could be launched. There is more at stake than the habitat of individual families. The conflict has been successfully socialized and politicized. An alliance with all-city and even national civic networks was established, and the struggle of Morro da Providência has become a symbol for the resistance of a radical(ized) civil society against neo-liberal urban plans in Rio de Janeiro and and globally. Counter-expertise has assisted the efforts to develop a counter-hegemonic discourse. Moreover, the mobilization has been able to scale up this way by using a progressive constitution and legal resources offered by the state. Although this may lead to judicialization and individualization of the social conflicts, it is transcending rather than reproducing the old practices of clientelism. Powerful individuals (e.g. controlling political parties) have small chances to instrumentalize and demobilize the struggle. Key politicians in the city government can even be credited for playing the game in a cleaner way than expected in the Rio de Janeiro context, which has a weaker participatory-democratic tradition than cities such as Porto Alegre and Recife. At least verbally, Rio de Janeiro’s politicians respect the rule-of-law and take the rights of the citizens in the sub-standard settlements seriously. In other words, what has been observed is the conflictual yet promising political-social transformation of metropolitan Brazil.
These two interpretations may serve as competing hypotheses, or ideal-types, for further empirical and analytical work. In comparative terms, the Manguinho case seems to support the pessimistic interpretation, while Vila Autódromo so far has nurtured the optimistic version. Morro da Providência is an intermediate case, calling for a mix of the two interpretations.
References


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Annexes (available on request)

1. Annotated bibliography (selected)
2. List of interviews
3. List and summaries of observed meetings
4. List and summaries of relevant public documents
5. List of relevant documentary video films (accessible on YouTube)
6. Maps (of the selected settlements) not included in the report